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This thesis attempts to answer the underlying question of the
extent to which social actors are constrained to act and think in
the ways they do. More specifically, this research examines how a
multinational oil corporation negotiated with local residents of
'rrinity B<lY, Newfoundland, in such a manner that the i;,terests of
fishing men and women in protecting their culture and way of life
werc~ effectively masked by the industry. These negotiations
resulted in the omitting of fishers' grievances from the agenda,
the inadequate articulation of fishers' intrinsic interests and the
exclusion of women's issues from the negotiation process. underly-
ing thiz empirical investigation is a theoretical analysis of
social power, in particular the three-dimensional perspective
ildvanced by steven Lukes. The analysis is based mainly on 78 inter-
views with fishers and plant labourers, company and government
officials, community leaders and other local residents.
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Chapter 1
FISH 1\ND OIL DON'T MIX?
"Eli's house is over around the point," the oldtimer said as
he gestured toward the turn in the gravel road lying ahead.
"You'll have no trouble finding it; it's the only house out
there." lis I drove past I politely thanked him, but felt
unsure of what exactly he meant by 'th~ point.' Having arrived
at this rather ambiguous location and feeling uncertain of my
role as a resoarcher, I was greeted with waving arms and
friendly faces - w'hich quickly dispelled any previous appre-
hension I may have had about the project I was soon to embark
upon. As I made my way toward this husky man in faded blue
coveralls who was standing at the end of the pathway, my well
rehearsed introduction was cut short. "You must be the one
from town," he stated, "who's come out to talk to the fisher-
men about the oil project. \~ell girl, you couldn't have picked
a finer day."
Eli, a local inshore fisher for more than thirty-five
years, began the interview process before I could barely
explain the purpose of my research. By the time we had arrived
in the kitchen I had already been informed of the poor h'lrvest
in the fishery from the previous year, local politics, and, of
course, the weather. According to some local traditions and
Newtoundland culture, introductory greetings at"e often cOllpled
with a discussion of the day's forecast <Incl specul.:\tion or
what may possibly 1::e in store. Inside the ft"eshly p<lintCl:I
kitchen Eli's wite smiled cheerfully but, fol':" the lQost part,
remained silent except for her initial comment on the C'l \Ill of
the sea. As she peered out through the large windolol OVQt"look-
log the bay of Bull Arm, the tranquillity "od still of this
confined body of water appeared inspiring. (At th;:lt momellt r
knew I had stumbled onto dn <lspect of social life that w,,:.:
incredibly meaningful, and far beyond what I h<ld prcviol.1Dly
conceived.) For all but a few seconds there was silence
between us when Eli turned toward me, lightly sh<lking hin head
and stated, "Isn't she beautiful ... "
"Well girl, come and sit down and make yourself at home."
On that cue Eli's wife hurried about placing coffee and
homemade tea biscuits on the table. Next to thu Carnation mil~
she placed a large white Mlug with black writing which read,
"Father." Beside it sat an eloquent china tea cup and saucer
with a small floral print. There was little question who this
was intended for as such utensils ar.e most frequently used for
people considered as 'company' or who are 'not one of your
own.' As I made my way toward the doy bed, I could sec
brightly crocheted, covered cushions evenly arranged at one
end. Behind me on the wall, hung a spoon collection carved in
wood in the shape of the island of Newfoundland. Eli sat in
the chair next to the wood stove and was soon accompanied by
the huusehold cat. Eli's wif!'?;, Florence, joining us and
sitting across the table, offen':! me her homemade biscuits and
jam, a symbol of her household labour. Beside her on the wall
I could see a small wooden placque. Although I could not make
out the fine print, the bold lettering read "FISHERMENS'
PRAYER." This soon became a familiar sight in many fishing
homes that I visited la':er that same year. As I nestled back
on the day bed and listening attentively to Eli, who required
little probing from me, I felt grateful to them both, for they
not only welcomed me into their home, but more importantly,
into their lives.
"All along," Eli began, "we were led to believe that the
GBS (Gravity-Based Structure) was to be built over in Come By
Chance ... up there by Adam's Head. Then one day last spring we
hears that its going to be built here ... out there in Great
MosqUito CoVt:!." Eli gesturodd toward the undeveloped country-
side that lay across Bull Arm. Great Mosquito Cove, for the
most part, is barren and uninhabited. It is most frequented by
residents of Sunnyside and thn 'odd' fisher wishing to make
use of the Cove's few scattered trout ponds. "\~hen Mobil first
came out here to tell us about the project," Eli continued,
"they told us not to worry ... I can hear them now telling us
that Mobil is going to take care of the fishermen." AS Eli
proceeded to recall past events, he would strike the arm of
the chair each time he mentioned Mobil's name. "\~11<lt thcy'n.~
doing is taking away our livelihood. This time next yCC"ll" tt.
will be allover ... we won't be able to fish out there no
more. "
Eli, now standing, gazes out through the kitchen \~indow
which overlooks Bull Arm. He physically milps (Jut in front .;)f
him the sea space that Mobil r.equires for dev(']opmcnt, stiltinq
in an extraordinarily solemn voice, " .. they're milkinq thi:;
their e>:clusion area." As Eli begun to vi,su.,lize the ruLI
impact of Mobil's intentions, he queried about hi~: aIm w.-.II
being and that at his fellow fishers. "I don't know Wllilt'~;
going to happen to me and some of the other fish~rmoJl l'urt:lCt'
up the A-..-m ...we've been fishing out there [or il lonr)
time, .. lony before Mobil ever came out here." It was diffil;llit
to imagine that the ~erenity and calm of Bull Arm would :~OOIl
be transformed and the land adjacent to it reconstructed,
adding little more than another chapter to Newfound lilnd' s
tainted history of attempte.d industrial development, AS r':l i
carried on with his oral history of where he and hi~ brother
fished, he provided detailed accounts of the fishing crew, the
gear they utilized and the species 1:hey caught from nearby
waters. He concluded his brief narrati""! ~lith a reflection
upon more immediate concerns, emphasising the unccrta inty th>:lt
he and other fishers were e:..::periencing; "No my dear," he
stated rather gruffly, "there's no amount of compensation thi.lt
can give us back what WE are going to lose." Although the b.:ly
of Bull Arm separiJtes Great Mosquito Cove from the town of
Sunnyside, any deve:lopment taking place in or around the Cove
wilJ inevitably hilve repercussions for fishers and the
communitit;!s they support. As Mobil Oil began to negotiate with
locaL inshore fishers over matti:!rs of access and control of
Ilu 11 Arm, the discuss ion focuses on the manner in which the
oil lnoustry will manage the sea space. Consequently, negoti-
<It ions are structured in such a way that issues Df the
pt"oject's environmental implicat':ons Dr fishers' interests are
not brought forth. In other words, these issues seldom reach
thl.' agenda, adding further to Mobil's cor,trol over the
bargaining process.
"I don't know what's going to become of it all.
uttered E.li as he returned to his seat by the wood stove. "We
don't have any say in what's going on .•. Mobil is going to do
whatever they want and there's nothing you or I 'can do about
it." After a brief pause, Eli carried on, stating, "Sure "'!e've
seen it all before ... it wasn't all that long ago when they
ruilt the refinery over there" - Eli ge3tured across the bay
toward the oil refinery in Come By Chance. "Those boats
(project vessels) never stayed in no traffic lane ... you ask
some of" the fishermen over in Arnold's Cove what happened to
their gear and their nets ... some of them still haven't been
compensated to this day."
Eli continued to recall similar past eV02nts such as the
'Red Herring Scare' in Long Harbour during the 1960s, which
caused the closure of the local fishery for th<lt se.:lson.
Fishers' experiences of domination by outside interest:.;
characterize much of their troubled history. In spite of their
seemingly fatalistic outlook, fishers underst<lnd some.thing o[
power and exploitation and how they ....·ork together to nmintclin
inequality. "\~hat is it going to be like when it's all
over ... five years from now? They can't tell us wh.:lt statc the
fishery will be in, nobody can tell us ... and then wh.:lt?
... where will Mobil be when it's allover and therc's nothing
left to cur fishery .. No my dear," Eli continued, ",15 the old
feller said. 'fish and oil, they don't mix'" (Dcptembcr.,
1990).
1.1 The Research Problem
The history of Newfoundland, particularly of thl2' outport
region, is a history of its fiSheries. The fishing grounds
were, at one time, the main reason for settlE!ment and provided
many with employment. While present (1993) day employment
prospects in the fishery are indeed dismal as indicated by the
recent cod fishery closure, the industry, prior to this
moratorium, continued to be the main source of employment a.1d
family income for many coastal communities. Even though it is
difficult to specuLate on the duration and impact of the cod
moratorium, the fishery will, at some point, come into
conflic": with the oil sector as it is the only local industry
to compete directly with petroleum development. As House
pointed out, the fishing industry is particularly crucial and,
as will becolllc evident, particularly vulnerable to offshore
activity (House, 1986: 1).
Hibernia, Canada's largest oilfield, was the sixtieth
well drillad in the Newfoundland offshore. Discovered in 1979
by Chevron Canada, H,e Hibernia well is located on the Grand
Banks ellst-southetlst of the capital city, St. John's. While
more than a decade of federal-provincial jurisdictional
dispute over ownership of the offshore resource has delayed
development of the Hibernia oilfield, this issue was formally
resolved through the signing of the Atlantic Accord in 1985.
(The Accord recognized joint lIlanagement through a Canada-
Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board [CNOBP).) The Hibernia
Agreement signed on September, 14, 1990, marked the beg inning
of a new oil era for the province of Newfoundland as it led
the way for the second phase of petroleum activity, onshore
construction. The Hibernia field will be exploited by pumping
crude oil from a gravity-based concrete platform built in
Great Mosquito Cove, a deep-water inlet in Bull Arm, Trinity
Bay. Onshore construction will last roughly five years,
although delays continue to slow down the process, the most
serious being the withdrawal of one of the oil companies, Gulf
oil. (A more detailed discussion will follow in chapter blo.
A chronology of dates and events leading up to this period is
outlined in Appendix A.)
The decision to pursue petroleum development oft' tho
coast of Newfoundland initiated much concern among toca 1
fishers about the likely effects of an offshor!! 01 1 industry
upon established industries and communitif;!S. Prior to the cod
fishery moratorium, the social and economic well-being oC
fishers in Trinity Bay was heavily dependent upon their
continued success in an insecure and ullstable occUputiOll.
Consequently, fishers and the communities they support were
vulnerable to any change in the natural environment th,lt.
affected the harvesting of sea reSOllrces. Even thouqh f Lshcrz
demonstrate great "adaptive resil; ence" to ch,lnging f isher~'
patterns, there are certain limitations beyond which their
adaptive strategies will fail (lieber, 1986:172). Onshore
development in Great Mosquito Cove placed new demands upon
fishers as it threatened to undermine fish harvesting in Bul\
Arm. Moreover, employment in local community fish plilnts was
heavily dependent upon the catch from local crews, and without
access to fish, employment opportunities for women greatly
were diminished. This may well prove to be beyond the adaptive
resilience of most inshore fishers and plant laborors.
As the communities of Trinity-Placentia Bay prepared to
enter into the construction phase of petroleum development,
the plight of local inshore fishers ar.d their control over
traditional fishing grounds cecame increasingly IlOre precari-
ous. To resolve this ra.ther contentious issue between the
fishery, on the one hand, and the oil sector. on the other,
Mobil oil sought to negotiate the managing of the sea space by
argUing for the feasibility of co-existence between both
sectors. While these discussions led to an agreement known as
the 'Fisheries Code of Practice,' llIuch of the negotiation
process focused on the oil industry's intention to regulate
Bull Arm. It is this negotiation and the effects of onshore
development that are the :ocus of this thesis. It is argued
that these negotiations have entailed the exclusion of
fishers t grievances from the agenda, the inadequate represen-
tation of fishers' intrinsic interests and the elimination of
women's issues from the negotiation process. This potential
conflict between the t ishery and the oil industry is fundamen-
tally one over territory, a conflict over access and control
of the bay of Bull Arm. AS House (1981) pointed out, when the
interests of the oil industry conflict, or are incompatible,
with those of the local economy, it is the interests of the
oil sector that override.
Local fishers are, for the most part, economically,
socially and politically weak, which restricts their negoti-
ations with a more powerful multinational oil corporation. The
inequalities that exist between the fishery and oil sector are
fundamentally differences between economic and politic;:!l
strei,gth; hence, a difference between strong (oil) and IJe ..,k
(Ush) commodity sectors (House, 1986:13),1)-1; 1985:~2J;
Marchak, 1986)_
How do we explain these patterns of sociill l-eliltlonships?
Under such conditions of incquillity OIlG would intll.ltivuJy
expect to find conflict or strife; yet, one finds ilccept,1nce,
or, as Gaventa (1980) states, 'quiescence.' The in()CJualitic>o~
that exist between local fishers and the oil industry ~.ccm not
to provoke eha 1lenge or observable stt'ugg1e. 11010' 1 s th i!O
social inequality maintained? \vhat is there ,1bout tlli:.~
relationship that prevents, or more importantlY, SIlPPl·C:;~;Cs.
either fishers' issues from being articul,1ted <lnd thci r
grievances from being expressed or their intercst~ from bcinrJ
identified? Why do people acquiesce in situations of injustice
or inequality? Under such conditions of disPilrit.y, the
reaction of the oppressed, according to Lukes (1974), m<lY be
seen as a function of power relations. Lack of overt confl ict
does not indicate consensus, or some form of social cohesion.
but rather a form of social control. Power serves, therefore,
to maintain c.·nd reinforce the prevailing inequality. r~orcovcr,
social patterns of power and powerlessness milY help explilin
how fishers come to see their own oppression as lcgitimiltc.
Power, argued C. w. Hills (1959), enables one to milnagc
and manipUlate the agreement of others, Yet, authority, he
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stated, is power "justified by the beliefs of the voluntarily
obedient" (Mills, 1959:40-41), More recently, Gaventa (1980),
whose research has been heavily influenced by the work of
Steven Lukes (1974), espoused similar views in suggesting that
power operate~·. to develop and maintain consensus among the
powerless. This proposed research is essentially a study in
the excrcise of power: how power relationships were maintained
over time and subsequently challenged when the field of power
was altered. How do we then explain Mobil's securing of
fishers' compliance for the control of Bull Arm, while
suppressing or averting any form of resistance? Why have women
employed in the processing sector not been represented in the
negotiation process? Under such conditions of glaring inequal-
ity I why have those most affected not sought restitution? This
analysis will help explain the social patterns that exist in
situations of inequality where the response or silence of the
oppres~ed is seen as a function of power relations, relations
which encourage inaction and quiescence among those more
vulnerable. ~ccording to Lukes, the object of inquiry becomes
not one of llpolitical activity," but, rather, one of "politi-
cal inactivity" (Lukes, 1974: 42).
The nonresistance or acquiescence of Trinity Bay fishers
is not unfamiliar to Newfoundland. Inshore fishers have, for
the most part, a long troubled history, much of which is
characterized by domination and exploitation by more powerful
11
groups. This research will subsequently provide an alternative
account to help explain these patterns of power relations.
Moreover, it will help foster a more thorough understanding of
the politics of inequality and the strategies used in muin-
taining the 'quiescence phenomenon' (Gaventa, 1980). finally,
this thesis will challenge the previous assumptions that oil
development in Newfoundland will have no serious negative
consequences for the fishing industry or that they can be
mitigated by a financial compensation program (canning, 1986;
House, 1985; NORDCO, 1981, 1984).
1.2 The Research Site
The 36 communities that comprise the region of 'rrinity-
Placentia Bay are scattered along a 35 km isthmus that joins
the Avalon PeninsUla to the main part of the island Newfound-
~and. While some field observation took place in the larger
impact area, the focal point for most of my work was in the
fishing settlements situated in Trinity Bay. The fishery
impact area has been defined as those communities which fish
from Bull Arm waters. They include Sunnyside, Chance Cava,
Bellevue and, to a lesser degree, Norman's Cove (NODECO,
1991). sunnyside and Chance Cove are located along Bull Arm,
whereas Bellevue and Norman's Cove are further outside the Arm
in an area known as Tickle Bay.
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1.3 Relevant Literature
This thesis is a study of power relations under conditions of
rapid economic growth, in particular, the impacts onshore
development will have on established residents. Therefore, I
shall begin with a review of two bodies of literature, that on
boom towns and fishery/oil interaction and conflict.
Writing over several decades, social scientists have
become increasingly interested in patterns of grt:','''.h in non-
metropolitan areas. More recently, attention has focused on
the consequences of large-scale energy resource development in
obscure and peripheral regions, which adds to a long tradition
of academic interest on the social effects of urbanization
(Greider and Krannich, 1985). Although this body of literature
has become increasingly more controversial as heightened
pUblic awareness has increased social and environmental
sensitivities, it has nonetheless provided social scientists
with an area of research that has considerable policy signifi-
cance (Krannich, 1981). The sociological literature that has
resulted from much of this work, or "boomtown" studies as it
is more commonly known, has shown considerable variation.
social scientists have, for the most part, used the community
impact model of the boomtown to explain the social and
economic consequencfls of energy related development. Similar
to other classic scholars in community sociology (Sinunel,
1950; Wirth, 19]8), much of the present body of literature
13
tends to embrace what Wilkinson and his associates call the
"social disruption thesis. II Social disorganiz~tion .. nd
personal malaise occur as small towns experience C\ transition
trom a previously homogenous stable society to one more
typical of urban dwelling (Greider and Krannich, 1985:5\).
Moreover, early findings in boomtown liter<:ature suggest th.:at
social change, brought about by industrialization, has
resulted in a weakening of social support mechanisms (Finster-
busch, 1982) coupled with a deterioration in community
services (Murdock and Leistritz, 1979) and adherence to
behavioral norms (Dixon, 1978).
As Greider and Krannich argue - in citing Bender (1971:1):
"Such changes have long been assumed to result in higher
levels of individualization, social isolation, alienation, unu
anomie, the consQquencQs of whiCh include a less integrated
society, greater levels of social pathology such as cr tille,
suicide, and mental illness, and, in general, social disorgan-
ization" (Greider and Krannich, 1985:5J). These findings tend
to characterize much of the earlier literature about bo"lmtown
communities, While adding further support to the social
disruption thesis. These descriptions, however, which documcrlt
social lite in rural communities, have been met with shurp
criticism. In the early 1980s Wilkinson and his colleagues
provided an exceedingly critical review of boomtown litera-
ture. They argued that "undocumented assertions" were fre-
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quently used to add credence to the social disruption thesis
(Wilkinson et al., 1982: 278). As a result, wilkinsOn et al.'s
critique initiated much controversy with counter criticism and
rebuttals of similar breadth (Albrecht, 1982; Finsterbusch,
1982; Freudenburg, 1982; Gale, 1982; Gold, 1982). Murdock and
Lustritz argue that they have "selectively" chosen quotations
from the impact literature and in so doing have used them out
of context (Murdock and Lustritz, 1982: 351). Gold argues that
their critique of the literature i~; a "misrepresentation of
the facts ... " (Gold, 1982: 352). Wilkinson et al. have based
their findings, according to Gold, on a rather narrow scope of
perceiveel social problems. Moreover, their reliance on
statistical measures and secondary sources has resulted in
their failure to account for how actors perceive their social
world. Meanwhile, Albrecht suggests that the literature fails
to present evidence to support the position that such impacts
do not occur (Albrecht,1982: 298), a conclusion that Finster-
busch (1982) also reached.
While conclusive arguments cannot be drawn from this
debate, research has demonstrated that energy related develop-
ment has produced a wide variety of social, economic and
environmental impacts upon those who live within the affected
region. Despite popular themes of unmanaged growth and social
disruption, residents from non-metropolitan
overwhelmingly support future development. According to Maurer
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and Napier (1981) these findings continue to hold true in
spite of evidence to suggest that costs and benefits incurred
are not equally distributed among rural dwellers. Moreover,
they argue that factors of age, education, gendet', occupation
and income level are directly r<~latQd to who will benefit froll
rural develOpment.
The basic ."echanism underlying the boomtown scenario is
that rapid growth occurs as residents move into the communi tv
to take advantage of employment and economic opportuniticz
provided by energy related industries. Social scientists,
concerned with sudden demogrilphic change in rural energy
communities, have focused primarily on issues relating to
criminality, comllunity services and infrastructure, and
interpersonal relationships. In particular, the 1 i tera ture
centring on issues of crime and victimiziltion hils b£!cm mor£!
thoroughly examined. Research findings which indicate
increases in crime rates are based heavily upon secondary
sources lInd case studies. While existing data tend to refute
the argument that crime rates increase as communities experi-
ence rapid growth (Xrannich et al., 1985; Wilkinson et al.,
1982), there does seem to be evidence to support the Clililll
that fear of crime increases among rural dwellers even when no
apparent increase in the crime rate has occurred (Freudcnburg,
1986; Greider and Krannich, 1985; Krannich et al., 1985). On
the other hand, illS communities experience the phase-out stage
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of development, characterized by a decline in the population,
too, does residents' fear of crime subside (Krannich et
al., 1989).
One of the earliest c·,anges in rapid growth communities
Is the deterioration of the community infrastructure. Sudden
demographic changes in isolated remote regions have the
potential to overwhelm both private and pUblic services by
disabling, in many cases, the ability of the community to cope
effecti ....ely with such demands (Dixon, 1978; Gramling and
Brabant, 1980; Gramling and fnudenburg, 1990; Molnar and
Smith, 1982; Murdock and Schriner,1978j 1979). The e>:isting
ev idence to support these claims, however, is mixed. If
measured in terms of service-to-population ratio the findings
tend to support the social disruption hypothesis. On the other
hand, if measured in terms of how residents perceive the
condition of public services the data illustrate far less
disruption, and in some cases, a substantial improvement to
the community (Greider and Krannich, 1985; Krannich, 1981).
Traditional theories of urbanization and its SUbsequent
impact on interpersonal relationships have been incorporated
into the boomtown literature. It has been argued that as
newcomers move into stable homogenous communities, primary
relationships are substituted by more formal types of interac-
tion. This eventually results in a deterioration of informal
support mechanisms and leads to experil,· ;::e5 of alienation and
17
anomie IFreudenburg, 1982). Such changes, it has been argued,
Ilay result in a weakening of friendship patterns and social
support mechlln:i.sllS that once operated to intel;Jra te tho
cOllUJ1unity as a whole (F"reudenburg, 198<\). Consistent with
previous arguments, however, the data tend to be alllbiguolls,
supporting as well as refuting the social disruption hypoth-
esis. Earlier studies illustrate a weakening in fr iendsh ip
patterns coupled with increases in psychological stress
(Finsterbusch, 1982), divorce rates (Murdock and L'.lstritz,
1979) and mental health difficulties (Dixon, 1970; l'lcisz,
1979). More recent research, however, provides contr<lry
evidence leading to the conclusion that rapid growth m~y
broaden residents' "range or opportunities" for seeking social
support (Greider and Krannich, 1985: 67). Moreover, the rolc
of family and friends is seen as crucial in mitigatincJ
disruption (England and Albrecht, 1984 j Kennedy and Mchra,
1985) • Overall, these findings indicate that adaptation occurs
as comlllunities undergo demographic change.
By comparison, the literature available on the North SeD
experience and social problems arising from oil related
development is sparse and poorly documented. During the 1980
International Conference on oil and Environment, stenstavold
commented on the inadequate monitoring of the socia-economic
environment (Cake, 1986). Writing over the past decado,
however, social !>cientists have attempted to addre5S these
18
gaps in the literature, while adding to our present under-
standing of encrgy resource development. According to House
(1985), research has demonstrated a causal relationship
between increased rates of crime and oil activity, particular-
ly in the t·c.-:ions oC Shetland, Pete::head and Lochcarron,
Scotland. Horeover, the literature has illustrated that as oil
activity decrcases, especiaily onshore development, so too
hil\.'C! rates of crime, as was evident in the Shetland experience
(Lnpsley, 1981; Liang, 1976; Moore, 19B1). Research completed
in Stavanqcr, NorwilY, however, indicates that crime rates not
only increaserJ in impact regions, but also in non-impact
regions of similar size (Stangeland, 1983). ThUS, stangeland's
Findings dispute oil development as a causal factor in
explaining increased crime rates.
While crime is the most frequently identified social
problem that prospective residents oC energy affected regions
art iculate, a lcohol consumption probably constitutes the
second most serious problem (Rouse, 1985). Research conducted
in Peterhead and the Cromarty Firth region of Scotland during
the 19705 indicates that excessive alcohol consumption was the
primary form of recreation among workcamp oil employees (Cake,
1986) .
Although social problems related to crime and alcohol
consumption are problematic for both communities and resi-
dents, together they create added disruption upon family life.
,.
According to House, these problems "plaque many oil families,
both among newcomers and locals" (House, 19G5:218). Despite
the extent to which research findings are often unsystemat i.e
and fragmented, the data do illustrate D. consistent pattern of
increased family problems a.mong employees in the petroleullI
industry.
11. significant portion of the research literature on
social impacts of energy-related activity suggests th<1t socia 1
disruption increases during periods of industrial dovelopment.
Yet, despite claims that much of this research la.cks system-
atic data, is often fragmented and methoc1ologic.:tlly wOuk,
evidence continues to support the initial argument (Albrecht,
1982; Cake, 1986; Wilkinson et a1., 1982). A large par.t 01
this literature, moreover, provides a descriptive account of
social impacts While evading theoretict:l! expl<lnations. In
addition to these limitations, one of the more signit'lci'lnt
deficiencies in the literature is the lack of comparative and
longitUdinal studies. Many of the cited sources focus on
short-term impacts of not more than two to three years in
relatively small geographic locations. Moreover, socit:l 1
scienti:;;ts tend to focus on a select few research areas for
investiqation. Subsequently, researchers def ine social
problems which exclude certain groups within the population,
particUlarly women, youth and low income earners.
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Although the oil industry has brought welcomed employment
and economic prosperity to regions in Norway, Scotland and
Atlantic Canada, it has also created conflicts with
preexisting industries. During the early years of. oil develop-
ment in the British sector of the North S~a, government's
ignorance of the functioning of petroleum industries, combined
with Britain I s desire for rapid development, led the way for
unrestricted growth. Lack of state interference and legisla-
tion to control oil activity continued in the United Kingdom
throughout much of the 19605 and early 19705 (House, 1986). It
was not until the mi1.-1970s that the British government
adopted stricter regulations to monitor petroleum development.
Norway, by comparison, with its tighter government regulations
of industry anc a more secure national economy, was better
able to control oil development from its beginning (House,
1986). surprisingly, however, both seC",tors of the North Sea
began oil exploration and production wit:hout consideration of
the impacts upon the fishery and the communities they support.
Today, the North Sea is one of the world's major oil
producing regions. In the United Kingdom oil has had a
~ignificant impact on the domestic economy (Mackey, 1986:22).
Economic factors have contributE'.d further to the oil indu-
stry r 5 political influence in government policy-making and
regUlation. The Scottish fishing industry, by comparison, is
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politically weak and consequently disadvantaged in its ability
to influence government legislation. This has been cle<trly
demonstrated by the British author.ities' laissez-faire
approach in dealing with the conflict between the fishery and
oil sectors.
Offshore petroleum activity has, for the most part, taken
place off Scotland with oil discoveries located primarily in
the northern area of the North Sea. Agricultural and fishing
communities most affected by oil development were located in
orkney and the Shetland Islands (McNicOll, 1986; Mackey,
1986). Not surprisingly, therefore, safeguarding the fishery
became an important concern among rural residents, although
its significance at the national level was largely dismissed
(Mackey, 1986).
The Norwegian government, by contrast, assumes gceater
responsibility for the protection of its fishery. Government
legislation has also been more progressive· by enacting
controls and restricting activities of the petroleum com-
panies. In addition, the fishery contributes substantially
more to the Norwegian national economy than it does in the
U.K., thus aiding fishers in influencinq government policy
(Andersen, 1986). Moreover, local fishers constitute a much
stronger lobbying group in the political sphere by comparison
to their British counterpart. Therefore, as problems developed
between the two sectors, government intervened with tighter
legislation (Andersen, 1986).
Even though fisheries groups, particUlarly the Norwegian
Fishermen's Association, have become more influential in the
mak.ing of petroleum policy, the early 1970s were charac-
teristic of much of their struggle to gain an effective voice.
When the interests of the fishery and petroleum industry
collide, the fisheries sector, argues Andersen, is "integrated
into the decision-making process in such a way that the
institutional conditions for articulating its interests are
good" (Andersen, 1986:83). The Shetland Fishermen's Associ-
ation, on the other hand, has had great.er difficulty in
successful negotiation. As argued by Goodlad, effective
political organization representing fishers' interests must
take place during the initial oil development stage (1986:71).
While earlier compensation agreements with fishers proved to
be advantageous for the oil sector, it was at the expense of
local fishers' interests.
Consistent with much of the literature on western energy
development, many of these studies focus G)(~ensively on data
collection and not necessarily on theoretical explanation.
This problem of divorcing theory from data is not unfamiliar
in the social sciences, as Merton (1957) among others recog-
nized more than twenty years ago. The analysis of the North
Sea primarily entails a descriptive account of the interaction
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between fish and oil industries. While much of the material is
rich with data, it lacks rigorous interpretation and theoreti-
cal explanation.
The final critique of the literature relevant to the
present discussion pertains to an often neglected area in
sociological discourse - issues of gender relations. Although
the literature defines the fishery in terms of both harvesting
and processing sectors, the impacts of oil development on the
processing industry are excluded, which oftcn haz implic.:ltions
for women. The literature fails to identify the strict gencler
division of labour in the fishery where men primarily harvest
the catch and women complete its processing. The a5sumption
implicit in these studies suggests further that not only arc
"fishermen's" experiences representat ive of bot.h men and
women, but more importantly, they illustrate the invisibility
of wom8n in the fishery. Omissions in the literature are also
apparent in discussions of compensation claims. 'Women who no
longer are employed in the processing sector due to plant
closures are absent from these stUdies; either women
excluded from compensation schemes or the literature has
failed to account for these women's experiences.
The fishery on the east coast of Canada, particularly in
Nova Scotia, has experienced similar problems to those of tho
North Se.:l.. According to Heber (1986), research
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findings suggest that five percent of fishers have experip.nced
conflicts with the oil industry. While this figure does not
indicate a significant degree of disruption, Heber argues that
loss of fishing grounds will probably have the most serious
repercussions for fishers in Atlantic Canada. Consistent with
the research findings of Mackey, Heber claims further that
fishers are "poorly organized to take any effective part in
the development planning for the offshore" and subsequently
halle little influencQ in government policy making (Heber,
1986: 175).
The extent to which petroleum developmt::lt has affected
the fishing industry and SUbsequently caused irreversible
damage cannot, at this time, be determined, if at all. Are
fishars catching loss fish due to loss of access to fishing
grounds or because of depleting fish stocks"? Research findings
dealing with these issues are at best alllbiguous (House,
1986: 132). While the N"orwegian government appears more
committp.d to protecting the fishery during the oil era,
British authorities remain uncertain of the adverse ef~ects of
oil activity on the fishery. Yet despite the significance of
these issues, they do not focus attention on the more funda-
mental issues of the structural inequality that exists between
the two industries (House, 1986). The main difference,
according to House, is between "weak ",nd strong commodity
sectors" (House, 1986:133).
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Off the east coast of Canada, the island of Newfoundland
and mainland Labracior, offshore petroleulll activity has been
taking place since the early 1960s. Exploration for oil and
gas off the coast of Labrador has threatened to disrupt local
residents, argues House, by upsetting their traditional
economic base and life-style (House, 1981:4)4). House attempts
to explain Labradorians' experiences with oil-related develop-
ment through the marxist concept of alienation. In so doing,
h2 applies both its objective and SUbjective meaning. Objec-
tively, suggests House, Labradorians have little to no control
over petroleum exploration. And as such, decisions rclatin') to
the pace at which development will proceed, the location oC
company operations, employment opportunities and impacts upon
the environment are removed from the decision-making proces5
of local residents (House, 1981:448). SUbjoctively, Labr.:ldori-
ans "feel their own powerlessness," contributing further to
what House called their "fatalistic resignation" (llouse,
1981:448) .
Their alitmation, both SUbjective and objctivc, is argued
from a larger theoretical framework of dependency theory.
Dependency theorists most often employ the term to describe
the social relations that exist between capitalist countries,
or regions within countries, within an international system of
production and exchange. The more powerful countries are those
which have access to key
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(capital, techno logica 1
innovation and skilled labour), resources on which hinterland
and peripheral regions greatly depend (House, 1981:435). The
pattern that soon results is one of exploitation and underde-
velopment. However. House contends that this pattern of
development can be reversed through government initiative.
Horeover. he suggests that Newfoundland and Labrador' s
offshore industry can become one at 'dependent development,'
where the local society reaps some of the economic benefits.
Previous studies of rural attitudes toward onElhore
construction in the region of Trinity-placentia Bay, indicate
that residents of the area favoured the development of the
Hibernia project (FUchs and Cakd, 1986). W'hile the costs and
benefits of onshore activity will not be equally distributed
alllonq the rural population, their attitudes toward the
industrial project continue to be sutJPortive. As Maurer and
Napier found, residents of rural cOlMlunities ....hich have
"little or no industrial base have been shown to be
over....helmingly favourable toward industrial development"
(Maurer and Napier, 1981: 101). Moreover, large-scale indUs-
trial projects are often vie....ed as a means for employment
opportunities despitt! their short-term nature. While Fuchs and
Cake's findings indicate support for onshore development,
closer examination of the studied popUlation reveals certain
sUb-groups who view the project with greater apprehension. To
varying degrees. the inshore fishers of Trinity-placentia Bay
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feel sceptical and uncertain about how the onshore development
will affect their livelihood.
While Fuchs and Cake do not elaboratQ on these f"indingG,
House (~985) attcmpts to providc an cxplanation to account for
the relationship between the fishing and the oil industrics.
He suggests that the unequal relationship that Exists between
the two industries is primarily a conflict between strong and
weak commodity sectors (House, 1985:223). oil, he argues,
constitutes a strong staple commodity where no suitilble
substitutes exist and where its producers exert strong control
over world market prices. Fish, on the other h.:ond, comprises
a weak staple commodity which is easily substituted and where
its producers have little control over world prices (House,
1985:223). The underlying problem that House identifies is the
difference between the two industry's economic and political
bargaining power.
Hause's analysis of unequal power relations between the
fishing and oil sectors does not extend beyond a discussion of
staple commodities. While his analysis focuses an the differ-
ences between the industries in terms of their political amI
economic strength, it does not consider how the industr1£!s
work together. What is the outcome of these social relat.ions?
Does this unequal power relationship help explain why fishers
come to see the strength of the oil industry as legitimat£!?
What are fishers' 'real' interests? Similar to many ather
2.
social scientists, House's analysis stops short of these
questions.
To a large degree, social reality in energy-related
regions has been explained through a macro-level approach.
Much of this research is heavily influenced by marxist
analysis common in the 1970s. Social phenomena, according to
this perspective, are explained from a larger structural
context of how society is organizedi and, in the case of the
fishing and oil industries, how social inequality is main-
tained. This perspective attempts to uncover the necessary
causal links that exist between social phenomena. According to
Keat and Urry, this goal is accomplished by "acquiring
knowledge of the underlying structures and mechanisms" whiCh
are not readily available through sense data (1982: 5). On the
other hand, social scientists interested in fishery and oil
interaction have seldom enlployed qualitative analysis or
carried out research at the micro-level. On the occasion that
field work has been adopted, explanation for social reality
has primarily been descriptive. Researchers tend to describe
social life, while eV~ding explanation of why social phenomena
exist, or why certain patterns of relationships take the
partiCUlar form that they do.
The boomtown literature, by comparison, is heavily
embedded in what C.W. Mills (~959) referred to as 'abstracted
empiricism.' Much of this literature relies extensively on
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survey research methodology. The logic which guides much of
this work is understood by an epistemological doctrine th<lt
assumes social phenomena to be 'tru€' by their observi.'lblc,
measurable and testable characteristics - ;) tr<ldition tlli.'lt i[J
similarly used in the study of natural science. lihat is not
available through direct observation is considered unsc len-
tific and, therefore, secondary to any soci010gicCll investiga-
tion. This approach, however, has been heavily criticized by
many marxists. They argue that social reality is known only
through a rather surface level of anCllysis. Moreover, sllt.:h a
perspective fails to uncover the hidden or underlying struc-
tures, which help account for social phenomcnCl that arc not
readily available through the senses. Giddens, too, h.:ls been
critical of this approach. Any social science, he ilt"CJUCS, th;;lt
adopts a similar "epistemology and ambition" to that of the
natural sciences restricts further our understanding of the
human condition (Giddens, 1976:14).
Although there is little feminist schol;:H'ship ClvClilable
to account for women's experiences with energy development
(but see Baird, 1985 and Porter, 1985), much has been written
criticizing survey methodology. A predominant theme in much of
the literature identifies the negative outcome of what
Jayaratne and Stewart call "professional obsessivene~s with
scientific objectivity," which has often implied quantitative
analysis (1991: 98). Their criticisms have, for the most part,
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focused around the exclusion of subjectively oriented knowl-
edge. Leaving the subject outside of social science, they
claim, also implies that it is left unexamined. Subsequently,
lIlany aspects of women's lives have not been captured in the
traditional practice of social science research.
SUbjectivists, llIore specifically, have difficulty with
the world being viewed as some kind of object of inquiry that
denies the presence of the social actor (Johnson et al.,
1984). From this perspective, the SUbjectivist social
researcher, unlike many marxists and empiricists, is actively
involved in interpreting events. The literature available on
energy-related development is seldom informed by a subjectiv-
ist orientation. It fails to consider how actors perceive
their soc;al world and to account for their experiences.
Moreover, it neglects to focus on explicitly fundamental
questions, or what Alexander (1987) calls presuppositions,
focusing around the nature of action. For example, Alexander
asks, "are actors rational or nonrational" (1987: 10l?
This research will SUbsequently provide an alternative
explanation to that which has been previously provided in much
of the literature. Social science research addressing these
issues, as well as limitations, will contribute significantly
to our present understanding of the social relations between
powerful groups and powerless people. Moreover, this work will
add to the literature on Newfoundland's offshore development
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by encompassing an analysis to account for the implications of
resource exploitation upon inshore fishers and pla.nt
labourers. This alone will contribute substantially to areas
of social research thought to be in need of further study. in
particular, the impacts of petroleum development on womcn in
the fishery and, 1IIore generally, the implications of develop-
ment upon indigenous industries. This study, therefore, wi 11
attempt to go beyond previous accounts of social life in
energy resource communities to explain the soel.ll patterns or
power and powerlessness, and how the powerful operatc to
maintain the status quo so that actors' 'real' interests ,H'C
not made visible. While this research is of rele'lilnce ror
Newfoundlanders e..ployed in the harvesting and process j nq
sectors, it will, nonetheless, have far reaching implic"tion:::
for marginalized groups living in per ipher<al regions elsewhere
in advanced industrialized societies.
1.' Theoretical Perspective
As a preliminary to further analysis, it in necessary to
specify how power will be understood in this thesis. This
section, therefore, will map out more thoroughly the theoreti-
cal perspective applied in this work.
The concept of power continuE':s to be one of the marc
controversial and debated concepts in the social ::lciencen.
contrasting views of the nature of power are found 1n the
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'consensus' and 'conflict' models of explanation. Intellec-
tUillly, much of its history stems from the work of May. Weber.
Weber claiJ:ls that power is 'the probability that on:'! actor
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry
out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1978: 53).
Detrand Rw;sell defines power as "the production of intended
effects" (Russell, 1986: 19). Similarly, Robert Dahl views
power as the ability to control another's behaviour. He
suggests that "A has power over B to the extent that he can
get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl,
1957: 215).
Both Weber and Dahl focus on the idea of "power over"
(l.ukes, 1986: 3), a conceptualization that Hannah Arendt
r-ejects as llIisconceived. Power, she argues, should not be
viewed as 'who rules wholll,' but rather it should focus upon
political institutions i!!IS "manifestations and materializations
of power." Power is "not the property ot an individual," it
"corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act
in concert" (Arendt, 1970: 44). Talcott Parsons, in agreement
with Arendt, also rejects the Weberian approach to power.
Moreover, he suggests that power has the capacity to achieve
communal ends:
Power then is generalized capacity to secure the perform-
ance of binding obligations by units in a system of
collective organization when the obligations are
legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective
goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a
J3
presumption of enforcement by negative situ<ltionill
sanctions - whatever the actual agency of thilt enforce-
ment. (Parsons, 1967: J08).
While these attempts to define power are by no mCilns
conclusive, they do illustrilte the diversity and breadth or
sociological theorising. Social scientists have, for the most
part, their own theories of knowledge or epistemologies which
guide much of their explanation of social phenomenCl. y€'t some
would argue that this diversity creates fragmentation in the
discipline as it filil~ to reconcile agency and structllre
(Johnson et al., 1984). Social scientists, like all other
philosophers of knowledge, have long debated questions of
truth, claims to knowledge and the nature of the social world.
social scientists, in other words, share little agreement on
whether power is intentional, or structural, or if in fact it
is both. Existing perspectives, moreover, fall short in
treating systematically the contradictory views of power. As
a reSUlt, much controversy continues to surround prCBent
debates as it remains a highly contested and often problematic
concept.
This research will attempt to go beyond conventional
explanations to provide a more thorough al., critical approach.
Through this proposed stUdy, then, I intend to explain power
relations by taking into account the sUbjectivist strilteqy
and, by so doing, incorporate into the analysis a notion of
agency. This research, moreover, will attempt systematically
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to link together agency and structure, IoIhich is essential, I
contend, for any explanation of the social loIorld. We know that
actors produce structures, while at the same time they are
both constricted and enabled by the range of actions available
to them. The ac'.:or is never tied to any particular response,
but rather acts according to his or her culture, history and
past struggles: "Social and cultural life," wrote Sinclair
(1990), "is constructed by people who face immediate con-
straints and are influenced by the past" (Sinclair, 1990: 31).
Every situation and similarly every structure "is potentially
liberating and destructive, emancipating and limiting"
(Knuttila, 1992: 23).
When we attempt to explain the social world by looking at
both agency and structure, we engage in sOlie of the great
themes of classical social theory: they encompass questions of
free-will and determinism, interpretation and explanation. A
crucial aspect ot this thesis is to provide a 'sociological
account which considers both the notion of human agency and
structural analysis. Although action and structure often
appear in sociological discourse as antinomies, Giddens would
argue that such a connection is indeed possible (Gidden£ I
1979). Essentially, for Giddens, what is required is an
account of the human agent which considers the "conditions and
consequences of action. It structure is then introduced as some
how entangling both those consequences and conditions (Gidd-
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ens, 1979: 49). The approach taken in this research can be
summed up best by Marx and Engels when he wrote: "People mi3ke
their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted from the past" (Marx and Engles, 1962:
247) .
Among the more prominent social theol'ists of power.
relations, the work of Steven Lukes (1974) stands out .:IS it
challenges many previous accounts and interpret.:ltiolls. lIis
work allows for an analysis which takes into account ques-
tions relating to agency and structure or interpretation and
explanation. While his theory is useful in explaining the
acquiescence of fishermen and plant women, when applied it
falls short in certain areas, in p3rticular its discussion of
the social relations of gender. The existing applications of
Lukes' theory, consistent with many other theorists, treats
issues of gender as unprobl€lmatic where women continue to be
invisible or hidden in the analysis. This thesis, however,
will attempt to correct this omission by providing an account
of womenls experiences in the fishery.
The concept of power, according to Lukes, can be under-
stood best by sketching out what he referred to as three
conceptual maps, or a three dimensional approach. Robert Dahl,
Nelson Polsby and Richard Merelam, to name but a few, employ
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the 'pluralist' view of power which, according to Lukes,
cOllprises the one-dimensional approach. Authors in the
pluralist tradition focus on behaviour in the making of key
decisions over which there is observable conflict of (subjec-
tive) interests (LUkes, 197(: 12). Moreover, pluralists argue
that interests are essentially policy preferences - any
conflict of interest is, therefore, a conflict of preference
(Lukes, 1974: 14). Thus, Polsby (1963: 3) states that:
One can conceive of "power" ... as the capacity of one
actor. to do something affecting another actor, which
changes the probable pattern of specified future events.
This can be envisaged most easily in a decision-making
situation.
Polsby later pointed out that power may be studied by examin-
ing those who participate, gain, lose, and prevail in deci-
sion-making. Any direct conflict between actors, he argued,
can be seen as a situation Dost closely resembling an "'ex-
perimental test' of their abilities to affect actual outcomes"
(Polsby, 1963: 4).
The pluralist approach thus limits itself to a tradi-
tional causal mode of explanation, Where participation in
decision making constitutes observable data. As Dahl stated,
their "actions were then tabulated as individual 'successes'
or 'defeats.'" The participants with the greatest proportion
of success out of the total number of successes were then
considered to be the most influential" (Dahl, 1961: 336).
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The pluralist approach, however, callie under attack for
concentrating solely upon observable participation in decision
making. Its critics, Peter Bachrach and Horton Baratz (1970),
reject this view as being rather narrow and restrictive.
Power, they argue, has "two faces." The first is that eX.:lmined
by Dahl and his fellow associates in t:hat power is reflected
in concrete decision making. However, they argue that power \!:i
also exercised when:
A devotes his energies to creating or reinfor-cint] social
and political values and instituti.ona 1 prilctices that
limit the scope of the political process to pUblic;
consideration of only those issue.:; which are comparative-
ly innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing
this, B is preventGld, for all practical purposes, from
bringing to the fore any issues thiJt might in their
resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of
preferences (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:4).
The crucial point of their argument is that po....er exists when
actors, either consciously or unconsciously, construct
barriers to the voicing of policy conflicts. Although the
writings of E. E. Schattschneider in his book, The sellli-
Sovereign People (1960), are now rather dated, much of his
work, nonetheless, contains the theoretiCill underpinning5 or
two-dimensional power as evidenced in much of the work of
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Crenson (1971).1 As Schattsch-
ne ider argued:
A detailed study of how U. S. towns, G;;:ary and East
Chicago, have failed to make a political issue of theit"
air pollution problems. See erenson (1971) for details.
3.
All (orms of political organization have a bias in favour
of exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the
suppression of others, because organization is the
mobilization of bias. Same issues are organized into
politics while others are organized out (1960: 71) .
The two-dimensional view of power, therefore, entails
examining both decision making and non-decision making.
Bachrach and Baratz (1970:39) define a decision as "a choice
among alternative modes of action." A non-decision, on the
other hand, is "a decision that results in suppression or
thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or
interests of the decision maker" jBachrach and Baratz, 1970:
44). They write:
Nondecision-making is a means by which demands for change
in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in
the community can be ::mffocated before they are even
voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access
to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all
these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-
implementing stage of th.e policy process (Bachrach and
Baratz, 1970: 44).
Although Bachrach and Baratz extend their argument beyond the
pluralists to examine non-decision making, they do share SOllle
similarities, namely thf' emphasis on actual observed behav-
iour. Pluralists contend that power in decision making is
evidenced only when there is conflict. Bachrach and Baratz,
however, suggest that, while this is true, power is also
evident in cases of non-decision making. They conclude that in
the absence of any conflict, overt or covert, one is left to
that consensus exists and non-decision making would,
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therefore, be impossible (Lukes, 1974: 19). The conElict that
they identify as necessary is between t.he int£!rests of those
involved in decision making and those excluded from a h£!aring
within the public realm.
Lukes has, in turn, criticized this view for being too
behaviouristlc and tor its insistence that for power to occur,
there must exist observable conflict and grievanc£!s (overt
conflict). Alternatively, LUkes suggests a more comprehensive
approach, a three-dimensional view, which encomp,1sses the
first two dimensions, while allowing for consider;;l.tion of less
visible ways that potential issues are kept out of the
political process. Power, Lukes argued, may be exercised in
the absence of observable conflict and grievnnces. Barrett
referred to this hidden aspect of power as the "c<lpacity to
impose stability," to maintain the statu:;! quo (t904 :16J).
LUkes asks, "Is it not the supreme exercise of power to avert
conflict and grievance by influencing, shaping and determining
the perceptions and preferences of others" (Lukes, 1986:669)?
The three dimensional approach illustrates how power is
subsequently used to "preempt manifest conflict" by shaping
perceptions of non-conflict (Gaventa, 1980: IJ). Luke I s
definition of power states:
That A exercises power over B when A af fects B in a
manner contrary to B's interests (LUkes, 1974:34).
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The exercise .,)f power is not only evident under conditions
when A prevails in the resolution of key issues, or when B is
prevented from expressing grievances, but also th.rough B's
conception of the issues. While three-dimensional power may
not be accompanied necessarily by observed conflict (al.though
it may have be!)n averted) there must exist' latent conflict' -
in other words, "a contradiction between the interests of
those exercising power and the real interests of those they
exclude (Lukes, 1974: 24-25). "Can we always assume," asks
Lukes, "that the victims of injustice and inequality would,
but for the exercise of power, strive for justice and equal-
ity" (1974: 46). Lukes continues to state that we need to
"justifY that B would have acted differently" if not for 1\,
and to specify the mellns or processes by which A prevented B
from doing so (~974: 41-42).
As LUkes and other social scientists point out, this
perspective is not without some difficUlty. According to the
logic guiding three-dimensional power, actors are often
unaware of their real interests. To claim that these actors'
IIpolitical consciousness ll becomes Il s tunted" denies them any
notion of agency as well as contradicts the presupposition of
sUbjectivism Which, Lukes would argue, underlies this theory
of power. If we state that human beings have interests of
which they are not conscious we are suggesting that their
interpretation of the social world as some form of dialogue
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over the meaning of events and objects, similar to what
Giddens (1976) referred to as a "set of reproduced practices,"
is not necessarily the same as the meaning others, such as
Lukes, would provide. The consequence of the sUbjectivist
strategy makes clear these unresolved tensions to preserve
actors as agents. A purely interpretive or sUbjectivist
sociology, I would argue, has become increasingly mo!':"e
problematic. While the concept of real interests raises
difficul ty for theories of social action and the preservation
of actors as agents, it is also troublesome for the soc:L1}
scientist.
Three-dimensional power presupposes that ~he rescilrchcr
knows best the real interests of actors and, therefore,
assumes a rather privileged as well as difficult position.
Much has been written on the concept of r~a1 interests,
although little consensus has been reached on whether or not
it is possible to know the real and objective interests of
others (Benton, 1981,1982i connolly, 1972; Ilindcss, 1982;
Knight and Willmott, 1982). Essentially, the concept is
founded upon a value standpoint which contributes to much of
the dispute and controversy. As Lukes himself would <lgreGl,
"different conceptions of what interests are <Ire associated
with different moral and political positions" (Lukes, 1974:
34). Yet, some social ;;;cientists have attempted to provide <In
alternative to 'real interests' by suggesting that we focus
"
upon the actors' 'objectives' (Benton. 19811. while others
have attempted to side step the issue by qualifying their
statements about actors' interests. For example. in Crenson' s
study of air pollution in Gary and East Chicago. he argues the
'real interests' of citizens by suggesting that •all things
being equal.' the residents of Gary would preter not to be
poisoned by dirty air (Crenson. 1911). connolly, on the other
hand, goes one step further by focusing on the results of
specific policies. He states:
Policy x is more in A's interest than policy y if A, were
he to experience the results of both x and y. would
choose x as the result he would rather have for himself
(1972: 472).
While connolly provides what he suggests "as a first
approximation" in resolving the difficulties of 'real inter-
ests,' his definition is highly speculative and relies on the
results of policy not on the attitude tovard the policy itself
(Connolly, 471). The perspective that I take to lily Olin work,
however, is that we cannot know indisputably actors' real
interests. Having said this, I will qualify the concept real
interests with quotations and will often SUbstitute 'stated
interests' for 'real interests' where others may not. Although
this prc.lblem remains unresolved. this thesis does not ulti-
mately stand on a notion of real interests, but rathr:r on its
su·ccess as a study in the exercise of power.
4J
Lukes' radical view of power masks a number o[ additional
dit"t"icult issues. Perhaps the llIost serious of these is the
question ot gender. Similar to many other theories of power,
gender relations continue to be unexplored in this work,
concealing wo:nens' experiences which often contribute to their
marginalized positions. This issue becamo particularly cle~r
in an empirical case study of the Appalachian Valley. John
Gaventa, a student of Steven Lukes, attempted to explain the
power relations between Appalachian miners and a multination<tJ
energy corporation by focusing exclusively on the experiencQ[;l
of men, While this strategy may well llilve been unintentiotl.:l.L,
the outcome exposes a number of critical problems l'el<:1ting to
Lukes' theory, To begin, Gaventa, and Lukes for that matter,
define the arenas in which people participate as 'political
arenas.' What are the implications of these political arenas
tor women? 00 women face additional barriers or obstacles to
participating in the 'pUblic' sphere? These questions arc not
raised by LUkes and contribute to salle of the problems founel
in Gaventa' 5 case study.
Gaventa's research points to other difficulties relating
to Lukes' theory, especially the ethnographic bilse of his
stUdy. Gaventa, early on in his work discusses briefly the
region ....here his research took place. Vet, he fails to
provide, in any systematic way, an account of the social
environment. Moreover, he neqlects to consider the power
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structures in place prior to the arrival of the multinational
corporation. For social scientists to comprehend the experi-
ences of the non-elite they must take into account the pre-
existing power structures which help shape peoples' percep-
tians.
And, finally, ethical considerations present some
difficulty in Lukes' theory. Although Lukes himself did not do
an empirical study, the social scientist interested in
adopting this perspective must consider the implications of
doing social science research. Quite clearly, Lukes' theory of
power implies a value judgement on what constitutes social
inequality. What obligations, if any, does the social scien-
tist have in acting upon injustices to help bring about more
equitable conditions? If for instance the social scientist
assumes the role of 'activist as ethnographer,' is he or she,
in fact, engaging in social research or is it something quite
different?
In adopting the three-dimensional perspective, I will
examine the power relations in whiCh fishers and plant workers
were embedded such that their interests in preserving their
life srile and employment were poorly protected, and in some




From the theory put forward by Lukes there are severa 1 means
by ....hich power laechanislIls can be identified. More specifi-
cally, Lukes suggests that an analysis of power relations lIIust
demonstrate the "relevant counterfactual" illustrating tholt.
without A's power, B would both think and act differently
(Lukes, 1974: 41). Although identifying hidden or invisible
power struct<Jres is not without its difficulties. the social
scientist can rely upon various modes of inquiry and methodol-
ogies to inform her. as in this case, of tho: various power.
mechanisms taking place. It is critical to this study that the
mechanisms which operate to neutralize potential confl let be
made visible. In so doing. one can identify the socl.11
relations of power IoIhich prevai 1. dur lng these encounters.
A qUalitative approach is most suitable for this analy-
sis. The social scientist, in other words, is fortunilte .:IS she
can observe particular patterns of relationships and SOCi'll
processes in their natural habitat. 1'his allows the sociaL
scientist to explain better the forces causing thp. phenomen;)
in question and to identify the causal networks shilping such
phenomena. What events, attitudes, perceptions and pol icies
help shape these relationships? How do these forces interact
to bring about the social relationship under investigation?
Observation and in-depth intervieWing are two crucial
techniques employed in qualitative research. They comprisQ
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essentia lly the core of my field research carried out in
Trinity-Placentia Bay. The early stages of field work, dating
back to September, 1990, entailed primarily participant
obccrvation in the communities of Sunnyside, Arnold's Cove and
Come By Chance, which constitute the main socia-economic
impact area in the region. During this initial period of field
work much of my role as a social scientist is described best,
accordinq to Babbie, as the participant-as-observer (Babbie,
1989: 265). Interaction with nonactors and non leaders was
cruciul as it allowed me to probe and understand more fully
peoples' at ti tudes, perceptions and conditions and to under-
st )nct whether or not their experiences had been shaped by
power relations. In addition, I attended, assuming the role of
observer-as-participant, local community meetings where issues
critic,]l to local residents more generally, and fishers and
plilnt labourers in particular, were considered. Here, observa-
tions were made to confirm how patterns of power and
powerlessness exclude key issues from arising and prevent
actors from acting. Moreover, the r..echanisms which operate to
neutralize contradiction or potential conflict became evident
as actors began to negotiate. In total, 27 meetings were
attended: three monitoring meetings organized by ISER Offshore
(discussed in later chapters) from Memorial university of
NeWfoundland; fourteen local community meetings comprising the
Bull Arm Area Coordinating committee, representatives from
"
both the provincial government and Mobil oil; and ten loc"l
community meetings with the Bull Arm Area Coordinating
Committee. In addition, two years and five months of minutes
were consul ted.
The core of this study, however, rests on semi-structllred
interviews with fishers engaged in fish harvesting in the Bull
Arm region of Trinity Bay, Newfoundland. A snowball sample WilG
taken of 25 fishers from the communities of Sunnyside,
Arnold's Cove, Bellevue and Norman's Cove. (?'ron. this silmplc
nine fishers were interviewed twice, once durin!? the negot.i-
ation process of the compensation agreement and the second
time following the signing of the contract.) '1'l1is siJ.mp.le,
moreover, includes all the skippers from the four communitLec
who were involved with the negotiations with the oil company.
In addition, eight fish plant workers were interviewed, [our
of them twice, (once during the negotiation periOd followed by
a second interview after the agreement was signed). The
interview process itself is critical as it <lllows one to
consider the subjective effects of power relations. Do fisher:;;
and plant labourers feel powerless? Are their perceptions
shaped by power relations? What are the social forces thi.lt
help shape participation patterns of the relativaly powerlt>5G?
Are these social forces the same for men and women? If not,
how are tlley different and what impact, if any, does this
difference have for fishers and plant labourers?
"
Interviews (J2 in all) were also held with community
leaders who occupy local positions of mayor, community
supervisor, government administrator and local commi ttoe
representatives. These k.ey informants are by virtue of their
r'jsitions closely link.ed to institutional and decision making
bodies in the community. More importantly, they are informed
of the issues concerning' devel J, _.... nt strategies and are
instrumental in their implementation. Concurrently, meetings
were held with representatives of the provincial Department of
Environment and Lands, the Hibernia Management Development
Company (H~lDC) , Newfoundland Offshore Development Construction
(NODECO), the Fishermen Food and Allied Work.ers Union (FFAWU),
canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board and PCL-Ak.er
Stord-Steen-Becker. These interviews have enabled information
to be gathered on how the interests of fishers and plant
labourers were managed and considered by the oil company, its
main contractor and the proVincial government.
Finally, secondary sources were examined, in partiCUlar
the 'Fisheries Code of Practice, I which outlines the fishers'
compensation program. More generally, impact assessment
reports and environmental protection plans will be incorpor-
ated into the analysis as they illustrate clearly what groups
were represented during the negotiations and whose I real'
interests were being served.
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In the remaining chapters, two through six, I provide an
account of the impact of rapid economic growth on 10C<11
residents.
Chapters two and three provide a context for the thesis.
Chapter two is essentially an overview of the history of the
Offshore petroleum sector in the province of Newt'oundland
since its beginning, whereas chapter three presents a descri.p-
tion of the research area in Trinity Bay and the structure of
the local fishery. Chapter four examines fishers' ilnd plilnt
labourers' early experience:; with the oil company and how
power relations were first established in the region. Chapter
five then addresses how patterns of prevalence once e8tab-
lished are, in fact, enduring despite the many ineqlli'llitie~
occurring in Bull Arm. The second p~rt of this chapter, the
collapse of consent, examines what happened after Gulf oil
pulled out of the Hibernia project in F'ebruary of 1992. lind
finally, chapter six, the conclusion and summary. will provide
an overview of the analysis and arguments raised in this work.
These arguments, moreover, tell us much about what future
research should be conducted in both theoretical and empirical
areas. To conclude, I will draw on the relevance of th LS
thesis for a discussion of agency and structure and how I have
attempted to reconcile them into a coherent argument.
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Chapter 2
•Hibernia means dignity; dignity for all Newfoundlanders'
'l'he History of the Offshore oil Industry in Newfoundland
You could hear the clinking of tumblers as fellow Tories
raised their glasses to commemorate one another and their
leader, Brian Peckford, for having 'taken on the feds' in the
jurisdictional dispute over the management of offshore
resources. Tory mania, or Peckfordism, as some would call it,
was at its peak (Johnstone, 1986). Peckford's vibrant manner
had successfully replaced the old style politics from the
Small\wod era, enjoyed by so many Newfoundlanders. His
enthusiasm and often candid articulation were welcomed by
many, contributing further to a sense of pride among local
people that had been shattered during the previous Liberal
government'iS term in office. The government spared no expense
for this lavish affair as more than 500 staunch Conservatives
gathered from all regions of the province to witness the
signing of what was later to be recoqniz:ed as Peckford's
greatest accomplishment, the Atlantic Accord. The Tory party,
enjoying the majority of seats in 1;:he House of Assembly at
this time, hosted one of the more exorbitant events surround-
ing the saga of the oil industry in Newfoundland. As Peckford
assumed his position in front of the stage, Conservatives
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steadfast in their faith applauded 'With such vigour that one
could almost feel their exhilaration. "Today marks a watershed
ill the development of Newfoundland," Peckford proclaimed. "It
signals a dramatic turning point in the history of this place.
The document being signed here today on offshore mineral
resources is tangible evidence of that fact" (Peckford, 1985).
This chapter will provide a context in which one Ciln
understand more fully the power relations between fishers and
the oil industry by setting out the history of the offshore
petroleum sector in the province of Newfoundland. In other
words, I will discuss the salient events and processes which
led up to the present day situation primarily through descrip-
tive detail of Newfoundland's experiences with the petroleum
sector. While the focus of this chapter lies predominantly
with various stages of oil development in the industry and the
sUbsequent passing of state legislation, I will, nonetheless,
attempt to make clear the structural apparatus in place. In
order to comprehend fully the experiences of actors, including
how they perceive resource development, one must recognize the
larger macro structures that help shape people's experiences.
2.1 understanding Development
As Canada's youngest province, Newfoundland and Labrador.
entered into Confederation in 1949, little was known of the
vast petroleum resource that lay buried beneath the sea.
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Ilewfour.dland's economy, at the time ot union, was based on the
staples of fish, forest products, and, to a far lesser extent,
llIinerals. Central among these: was, of course, the fishery.
Yet, exploitation of these staple commodities did not bring
about economic growth as promised by pOlitical leaders during
their quest for election to pUblic office. Poor management and
state policies including ineffective, if not controversial,
development strategies left the province in a highly precari-
ous state, where it still remains on the periphery of an
advanced industrialized society. According to dependency
theorists, Newtoundland fell quickly into the classic pattern
of underdevelopment (Archibald, 1971; House, 1985; Matthews,
1983), a theory popularized in the late 19605 by A. G. Frank
(1967) and his colleagues to explain the predominant experi-
ence of Latin Americi!lo. Mi!IoritiJlle scholars in general, and
regional social scientists in particular, have borrowed, and
since modified, these explanations to account for development
patterns in Newfoundland by arguing that it is not only
underdeveloped, but dependent both economically and pulitical-
ly (House, 1985; 1981). Underdevelopment, argues House (1981),
occurs within a dependent region in that dominant centre
economies exploit the resources of dependent peripheries
(House, 1981: 435-436). These resources are, for the most
part, exploited in a dynamic way by an external dominant
economy that receives most of the financial rewards. This
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history has strongly shaped the direction of offshore petro-
leum development in Newfoundland since the first exploration
permits were issued in 1963. And, it is within this soci"l
historical context of the development issues that perplex
Newfoundland society that one must understand future resource
development.
The position taken by both provincial and federCll
governments to rely upon multinational corporations to develop
the oil fields off the coast of Newfoundland may furth0t'
constrain economic development in the province. As House
(1985) points out, most, if not all, of these multinational
corporations have their main office located outside of Canada.
The ramifications this will have, according to House (1985),
are that Newfoundland, at best, could hope to attain some (arm
of dependent development (House, 1985: 102). The risk, of
course, is that development of offshore oil will follow a path
similar to that in other resource sectors such as the mining
industry or hydro-electricity.l The difference between these
two development paths, dependent development and underdevelop-
ment, is, however, critical. Underdevelopment, on the one
hand, will mean that most financial benefits ....ill go to
outside companies, while local people enjoy short-term
employment opportunities and some business gains. The implica-
See House (1985) for a more thorough discussion of these
events.
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tions at this development path is that oil, in the long-term,
will not be "used as a vehicle for development" (House, 1985:
103). Dependent development, on the other hand, would presup-
pose that some revenues frolll offshore oil would, in turn, be
reinvested in the province. Moreover, local residents would
participate Illore fully in offshore activity by acquiring the
needed skills through some kind of partnership with the oil
companies, thus enabling them to compete in the market.
Although exploitation2 does seem to characterize many oil
companies' interactions with other places, both inside Canada
and elsewhere, until more recently, House (1985; 1981)
suggests that petroleum industries have employed strategies of
"incorporation" since establishing operations in Newfoundland
(House, 1985: 119; 1981: 436). Incorporation implies tho
"inclusion of peripheral people in the master institutions ot
a larger society" (House, 1981: 436). (Incorporation, however,
applies only to the island of Newfoundland and excludes
Labrador, which shares features of exploitation not unlike oil
development in the Third World [House, 1981: 119)) According
to House (1985; 1981). oil companies have attempted to
establish a new image ot good corporate citizenship. Moreover,
he suggests that these multinational oil corporations in
general, and Mobil oil in particular, have dramatically
Exploitation in the sense of the extraction of the value
of resources.
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altered their relationship with host nations and h'we demon-
strated further an interest in establishing some form of
positive pUblic relations with local communities.
While this may be true, one must bear in mind that oil
companies act not in the interests of society, E!)(cept insofar
as those interests are compatible with their own, but rather
in the interests that are more consistent with the philosophy
of corporate growth and profit (House, 1985; Marchak, 1979).
Multinational corporations, moreover, utilize human labour and
technologies as resources. As Marchak: (1979) points out, these
resources are most often managed by corporations so thilt
technology, labour, and knowledge become harnesses to COl"pOr-
ate growth and not social welfare (Marchak:, 1979: 12).
According to Giddens (1979), resources are the "media through
which power is exercised, and structures of domination
reproduced" (Gidden~, 1979: 91). Viewed in this way, power is
not conceptualized as a resource, but rather it- comes to be
understood as the "ci\pacity to determine conditions of
existence" for large portions of the social world (Marchak,
1979: 15). The exercise of power by mUltinational corpor-
ations, therefore, is not an example of an 'act,' but more a
routine and regularized phenomena (Giddens, 1979: 91).
56
2.2 Exploration: 1963 - 1.990
Exploration off the east coast of Newfoundland and Labrador
began in 1966 with the first well drilled on the Grand Banks.
By the end of the decade one additional well had been drilled
followed by a rapid increase by the 19705, which saw the total
number of wells dril1~d expand to 62 - 40 on the Grand Banks,
17 off the coast of Labrador and 5 off the northeast coast of
Newfoundland (House, 1985: 104; Shrimpton and storey, 1991:
2). This increased pace of exploration quickly brought New-
foundland onto centre stage as a major location for the
international petroleum industry. By the mid-1970s 11 oil
companies, inclUding five of the Canadian subsidiaries of the
seven sisters had established themselves as operators in the
province. (The seven sisters include Mobil, Chevron, Texaco,
Imperial and BP (House, 1985: 104).) It was at the peak of
this exploratory activity that Newfoundland began to promote
its claim of jurisdictional control over offshore resources
which resulted in the need for all oil companies to obtain
both provincial and federal permits. Newfoundlanders, unfortu-
nately, benefitted little from seismic and drilling activity
during much of this period as most economic benefits were
secured by foreign vessels and their crews. This pattern,
however, did not persist long after 1976 when Brian Peckford
was appointed provincial Minister of Mines and Energy under
the new Conservative administration.
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Although the Liberal government was defeated in 1971, no
substantial change was evident in petroleum policies or over
jurisdictional claims until Peckford assumed his position .:IS
Energy Minister. The true change in power, therefore, "'ilS
between Smallwood and Peckford , with Moores (t'"\e first
Conservative premier to follow smallwOOd) acting as a transi-
tional figure. The new "Peckford movement," House argued,
sought to restructure economic development policies around
provincial control over resource industries (House, 1985: 43-
44). This new era of resource management was best illustrated
in the 1977 'Act Respecting Petroleum and Natural Gas.' Whi Ie
these guidelines, today, have no legal standing under the
Atlantic Accord, they remained significant until 19UJ as oil
companies operating in the province agreed to abide by them to
that date. More importantly, hO"Jcver, this legislation
assisted Newfoundlanders in both obtaining employment and
generating local business activity. Newfoundland firms
expanded into business ventures in the areas of sllpply boats
and light fabrication as well as witnezsing an increase in
hiring of local residents. until the mid 1980s the offshore
work force ~las comprised entirely of men with the overwhelming
majority of the crew coming from the urban centre of St.
John's (Fuchs etal.,198l). By 1985, however, women had gained
greater access, albeit marginally, to offshore employment
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where they represented 1.7 percent of the Newfoundland
offshore labour t'orce (Anger et a1., 1985: as).
Not long after the 1977 provincial legislation, the
federal government under P. E. Trudeau sought to introduce its
own national energy policy similar to the more "intervention-
ist" strategy previously adopted by the Newfoundland govern-
ment (Johnstone, 1986). While the energy policy promoted
energy self sUfficiency, Canadian ownership coupled with
increasing business and employment opportunities, the preser-
vation of the social and biophysical environment, and Petro-
Canada as an active partner in all development, it, nonethe-
less, crippled relations between ottawa and the province. The
new 'national policy', passed by the House of Commons in 1981,
was seen by local officials as another attempt by the federal
government to assert control over offshore resources.
Although there was a temporary slowdown in exploration and
seismic activity, instigated by the oil industry, in retali-
ati:m against the 1977 provincial legislation, activity was
soon underway as energy prices increased combined with federal
government incentives to encourage frontier drilling. Probably
the most significant ~actor influencing further exploratory
work, however, was the discovery of the Hibernia P-15 well on
the Grand Banks in 1979. Hibernia, Canada's largest oil field
(House, 1985), quickly brought Newfoundland into the offshore
arena as a central player. Located 315 km east-southeast of
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the capital city, St. John's, the oilfield was initi"lly
thought to contain more than a billion barrels of oil. Further
investigation, however, estimates the recoverable reserves to
be between 525 and 650 million barrels (Shrimpton and Storey,
1991: 7). The discovery well brought with it, moreover, il
"flurry of speculative activity" in the st. John's reCJion
which caused housing prices to escalate coupled with <til
increased demand for rental units (Shrimpton and storey, 1991:
6; Shrimpton, 1986). The added demand for office space <llso
became apparent in the st. John's area and encour<l.CJcd the
subsequent construction of new buildings in the do\·mtown
region. This scurry of development, however, was not without
its costs as the availability of lower income residentiill
units diminished, causing many to seek subsidized housing
(Shrimpton, 1986: 94). By 1980 and 1981 development started to
lag as the national recession and delayed offshore activity
started to show their effects.
Nineteen seventy-nine also saw a change of leadership in
the Conservative government. After eight years in pUblic
office, Frank Moores resigned as premier of the province and
was successfUlly replaced by the former Minister of Mines and
Energy, A. Brian Peckford. During much of the early years of
the Peckford era, offshore oil and gas development became a
prominent issue for political debate. Not long after the
initial Hibernia discovery, settling the offshore jurisdiction
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claim began to ~ake prominence as developing the oil field
·Jould be furthcr delayed .... :thout some form of settlement. Much
of th<.: early 19805, therefore, was marked by federal and
provincial dispu~es t)ver the rightful ownership of the
t1c .... foundland and Labrador offshore. A resolution of this
rather contentious issue was reached in March, 1984, when the
Supreme Court of Canad<.o ruled unanimously in ottawa's favour
by granting jurisdictional control to the federal government
([louse, 1985: 60).
Peckford, however, was not con~ent with the Supreme court
rUling as he, l!Ind his associates, Get out on a national
campaign across Canada arguing for "a hir deal." Negotiations
.... ith the federal government culminated with a response from,
then Leader of the Opposition, Brian Mulroney, recognizing
joint management of offshore resources with Ne....foundland being
the principal beneficiary of the vealth from oil and gas off
its shores (!louse, 1985: 60). Finally, one year after the
Supreme Court decision a federal-provincial agreement estab-
lishing the rules for offshore development was concluded with
both levels of government signing the document, known as The
Atlantic Accord, on the eleventh day of February, 1985. After
si>: long years of ardent debate, the signing of the Accord
brought an end to the conflict between ottawa and the prov-
ince.
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since the Hibernia discovery in 1979, numE!rous reports
and studies have been submitted to both federal and provincial
governments. Shortly after the signing of the Accord, in
February, 1985, Mobil Oil presented an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) to a joint federal-provincial pUllel <1.$
required under the Newfoundland and Labrador Environm@nt,])
Assessment Act (1980) (EIS, 1985). Following this report
public hearings were held in the Fall of 1985, when Newfounctl-
anders were able to voice their concerns pertaining to further
development of the Hibernia field. After 11 dayS of !louring!;
that inclUded 66 oral presentations and 90 written documents,
the panel submitted in December, 1985, their eVilluntion of the
project along with SO recommendations for consider.ation before
proceeding to the next phase of development (!!E:I\P, 19(5).
Concurrently, Mobil submitted for appr.oaval by the CilnarJil-
NeWfoundland Offshore PetrOleum Board (CNOBP, Ll report on the
Benefits Plans, which was accepted in June, 1986 (CNOJ3P,
1990).
After the Board's consideration of the recommendations
from the panel and the Benefits and Development Plans, which
are not open to public review, the Board gave its approval (or
the continued development of the Hibernia Project. By July,
1988, the approval. was formalized and the statement of
Principles siglled by the government of Canada, the government
..",
of Newfoundland and Labrador and the oroponcnt (CtlOBP,
~990: B). Two years later in september, 1990, the Hibernia
Development Project agreement was signed by both orders of
government and the project consortium. aver the following few
weeks, federal Members of Parliament and Senators alike
debated the Hibernia Project Act, Bill C-44. On October, 29,
1990 the Bill received its third and fbal reading. The
signing of the 1990 agreement also brought with it the final
epilogue to the exploration phase of the Hibernia oil field,
when the consortium of oil companies (comprising Chevron,
Petro-Canada, Mobil and, before its withdrawal, Gulf) formed
the Hibernia Management Development Company (HMDC) , which
assumed responsibility for the construction and operation of
the Hibernia facilities (CNaBP, 1990).
2.3 Development Phase: 1990 to the Present
Although the signing of the agreement to develop the Hibernia
oil field in the Fall of 1990 demonstrates a commitment by the
primary operator, Mobil Oil, to pursue development uff the
east coast, the agreement was not without its costs. In terms
of financial support the federal government has agreed to pay
25 percent of the project's ';onstruction costs (up to maximum
of $1.04 billion) and will, in addition, provide loan guaran-
tees for 40 percent of these costs (Shrimpton and storey,
1991: 10). As articulated by a senior official at the signing
ceremony, the primary interest of the federal government in
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agreeing to these conditions was to assist the province in
overcoming regional disparity.
The second phase of activity, the onshore construction,
is the stage in which maximum social and economic imp<\cts
occur, particularly for those communities that lie within the
impact region (House, 1985). While the construction philsc fOI"
any oil field does not usually exceed five years, it is
followed by an extended production stage during which hydro-
carbons are extracted from beneath the sea. The most recent
estimates of the life of the Hibernia field suggest that it
will produce for a period of 18 years (CNODP, 1990), with peak
production occurring in the fourth year of development (lIou5c,
1985).
During the early stages of planning for the construct Lon
phase, a floating production system was the preferred techno-
logical design as it would be more easily manoeuvred aWny (rom
potentially damaging icebergs (House, 1985: 12). Since the
initial development stages, however, Mobil has planned fol:" a
fixed concrete platform, the Gravity-Based Structure (<,;1),5).
Local politicians arg'led in support of the GBS design a~ it
would create substantial employment opportunities for New-
foundlandel:"s. This stage, then, will comprise the constl:"ucting
of the GBS as well as the topside faci Ii ties for the produc-
tion platform (Snr impton and stOl:"ey, 1991: 71. Immediate ly
following the 1990 agreement to develop the Hibernia field, it
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was announced that NODECO (Newfoundland Offshore Development
corporation) was the successful contractor with full responsi-
bility for development of the construction site. The devEolop-
ment site itself encompasses 100 square km and will require
$200 million, at the minimum, to develop.
Early discussions of the construction phase focused
around the possibility of onshore development taking place in
Adam's Head, Placentia Bay. Since that time the proponent has
chosen an alternate location on the opposite side of the
Isthmus of Avalon in Great Mosquito Cove, Bull Arm, Trinity
Bay (CNOBP, 1990:24). The ne·... sita is close to Adam's Head
with a distance of 12 km separating the two locations. Mc.L'e
importantly, however, Great Mosquito Cove in Bull Arm remains
within the same socia-economic impact area of TrinitY-Placen-
tia Bay. The decision to relocate the construction project to
alternate grounds was due primarily to the incnased water
depth for the drydock location. Deeper water in Trinity Bay
extends nearer to shore operations and thus time spent
transporting materials would be reduced (CNOBP, 1990: 24).
Secondly, and for purposes of this research, more importantly,
Trinity Bay was chosen for onshore construction as it Would
cause less disruption to the inshore fiShery - the fishery in
Placentia Bay supports approximately 400 fishing men and
65
Although the change in location from ;.·..3m' s Head to Great
Mosquito Cove will not show much variation in the socio-
economic milieu. the biophysical environment (including the
fishery) is entirely different. The Environmental Impact
Statement Mobil submitted to the provincial government in 1985
made clear the potential impacts on the natural environment in
Placentia Bay. The report, however, did not include a dis-
cussion of Trinity Bay and the likely implications development
would have on the biophysical environment in that are".
Moreover, the construction of the GBS in Bull Arm was exempt
from the application of the Newfoundland Environmental
Assessment Act due to the added costs and time required for
assessment (Department of Environment and Lands, 1990). In its
place, the provincial government accepted the recommendations
made in 1985 by the Federal-Provincial Review Panel. One of
these recommendations states that any environmental disturb-
ance resulting from the onshore development phase "may be
reduced to an acceptable level or eliminated by the applic<J-
tion of mitigation measures" (Department of Environment and
Lands, 1990). The government, however, did require the project
proponent to submit an Interim Environmental Protection Plan
for the first 180 days of onshore development in Great
Mosquito Cove. While the gover.nment claims that "public
interest would best be served" by adopting this strategy, the
inshore fishers of Trinity Bay do not share the government's
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same optimism. As expressed by one fisher from Bellevue: "Its
no good to do all these studies now when they're started to
build over there. The damage to the fishery will already be
done ... and then what, what will Mobil do then for the fisher-
men?"
The 12 years that separated the Hibernia discovery and
its development allowed for a thorough assessment of the
potential impacts related to this stage of activity and
designing of appropriate management strategies to counter any
unforeseeable problems that may arise. While one could argue
that both time and money were well spent on assessment and
developing management approaches, the present government and
main contractor (NODECO) have been slow to implement the
management tools available to them. Almost two years after
the project commenced, there was still no formal process
through which all three parties, the government, the community
and the industry, could collectively resolve issues. Regret-
tably, Newfoundland's opportunity to both optimize and control
the effects of onshore development may be lost through lack of
commitment to impact management.
In February, 1992, the Hibernia project experienced
another ill-fated turn of events when Gulf oil announced it
was withdrawing. Uncertainty was abound as rumours circulated
throughout the province of the possible new investors in the
troubled project. By early Spring there was much talk of
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foreign interest as government officials tried to remain
optimistic. Yet, the construction site in Great Mosquito Cove
was experiencing massive lay-offs followed by a reduction in
staff at both HMDC and NODECO office£:. Until a new partner
could be found, the provincial government agreed to support
the project for a six month period. As Japanese investors soon
lost interest in the Hibernia project, rumours of Texaco as a
possible new partner quickly surfaced. Local people, however,
had little faith in either the provincial government's ability
to find a new partner or in Texaco' 50 supposed interest in
joining the project. Texaco confirmed many of these unct'lr-
tainties when it announced in early January of 199J that it
would not invest in the Hibernia project. "'s one of the local
mayors claimed, Texaco's decision has:
had no affect on the people at alL They couldn't care
less if the Hibernia went ahead or not. I can't see one
person in the community being bothered. It's like
watching a house fire in Detroit, it has little affect on
us here. Maybe this community has hardened ·to this sort
of thing because of the refinery. It's opened now and
will stay open God willing, but it was closed for some 13
years. We survived it alright, people around here arc
used to these sorts of things happening.
By mid January of 1993, however, new partners were found
for the Hibernia project; Murphy oil from El Dorado, Arkansas
and the federal government had agreed to invest 6.5 percent
and 8.5 percent respectively. To make up the additional 10
percent of Gulf's share - which was originally 25 percent -
both Chevron and Mobil oil invested a further five percent
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each. The new consortium as of January 15, 1993 consisted of
the following: Chevron Canada Resources - 21.87 percent;
Chevron-Hibernia - 5 percent; Mobil Oil - 28.12 percent;
Mobil-Canada Hibernia - 5 percent; Murphy oil - 6.5 percent;
Petro Canada - 25 percent; and the federal government (The
Canada Hibernia corporation) - 8.5 percent.
construction at the Bull Arm site quickly returned to its
earlier level of activity prior to Gulf oil '5 withdrawal as
employment rates started to increase steadily. By late !'lay of
\993, the first concrete for the gravity-based structure was
poured. To mark this rather symbolic occasion a heavily
pUblicised ceremony took place in Great Mosquito Cove where
both provincial and federal politicians once mare reaffirmed
their belief in the project. While Hibernia is considered by
many provincial politicians as a catalyst for economic
development, elsewhere in Canada it is seen as a giant make
work project. The 'dignity' that Hibernia was· to bring to
Newfoundlanders has slowly disappeared and, in its place one
finds much pessimism and doubt. At the time of writing this
thesis peoples' attitudes remain unchanged and controversy
about hiring practices is today the main concern for local
residents. By late May of 1993, people's frustrations about
lack of local employment opportunities had resulted in
demonstrations and protest outside the construction site. In
defense of the protestors,
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of the local mayors argued
that: "People don't care what job they do or how much they're
going to get paid, all they want is work ....Hhere is the
justice to this?"
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of tho
petroleum industry in the province of Newfoundland and
Labrador since the first exploratory permits were issued in
the early 19605. To understand fully how the province will
experience offshore development, it is necessary, I contend,
to map out Ne\o'foundland's fonner development path as it
provides a context in which one can understand present events.
Newfoundland's tainte:d history of past resource development
has helped shaped much of the present day situation. Social
scientists, and politicians alike, therefore, would do well to
be sensitive to past histories, cultures and regional
struggles. While the remaining portion of the chapter is
concerned primarily with a descriptive account of how the
offshore industry proceeded in the province, it does, nonethe-
less, illustrate the larger structure in which the oil




'out here in these parts'
The Research setting
In the distance you could see a trail of grey smog indicating
that the turn-off for sunnyside was near. The Come By Chance
oil refinery had become my land mark over the past two and a
half years sine I first set out on this project back in the
Fall of 1990. It is now early March of 1993, and my field work
is drawing to a close. This will be one of the last field
trips I make across the Trans Canada Highway to Trinity-
Placentia Bay - the impact region where onshore development is
taking place. Just beyond the small wooded area past the sign
for Southern Harbour lies a small body of water where men and
women ice fish during much of the winter. This is the time of
year, however, when the ice is still frozen on the rocks; ice
formations hang from these cliffs and on the rare occasion
when the sun shines through the clouds these icicles seem to
glisten. While few trees grow in this barren part of the
island, there are certain favourite places where you can see
men and young boys labouring together as they haul timber from
the woods. Wildlife is also plentifuL in these parts where
moose crossings are an all too familiar occurrence.
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Turning off the main highway and into the town of
sunnyside r make my way to the town council office for one
last interview. As I enter the community I can see Elwood's
boat tied up at the government wharf where it has been sitting
for several months. 'l'he wharf seems to be a favourite spot for
local youth to skate and play their much loved sport of ice
hockey.
The community seems quiet, but not unusually so, with
only the odd person strolling "in around da' road." The narrow
bay of Bull Arm is frozen and for a brief moment seemG al most
serene. I recall the first year I came out to sunnyside, when
you could look across the narrow Arm and see it filled with
many small fishing vessels. The sun rises over this bay each
morning casting an almost orange tinge bet.....een the sky flnd
tree tops. The early morning tranquillity is lost,
however, by the sounds of development coming from Great
Mosqui to Cove.
The old dirt road that leads to the municipal office is
a much slower drive as the pot holes and mounds in the road
demand that one proceed with caution. The drive up the slope
is rather slow and intentional as I take in some of the last
familiar sights. Just beyond the old tattered fishing stage,
there are several old wooden boats that lie abandoned on the
bank. Further along on the opposite side of the road, you can
see the Whalen's many lobster pots stacked one on top of the
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other and leaning against the old skipper's shed. Looking out
over the village from the top of the hill I could smell fumes
frolll the oil refinery which quickly reminded me of the
industrial pollution that already exists in these rural parts.
As I began to approach the newly renovated building, I started
to wonder what Bull Arm would look like tive years later. How
will it have changed; how will fishers and their families
survive? Maybp Eli was right after all, perhaps 'fish and oil
don't mix.'
This chapter provides a description of the social and
economic en'Jironment where onshore development is taking
place. Moreover, attention focuses on the fishery and holo' it
is organized in these rural communities. The research
includes, however, only those fishers who harvest the catch
within the immediate impact area of Bull Arm, Trinity Bay.
Those that fish beyond Bull Arm or in other bodies of water
are not included in this work.
3,1 Trinity-placentia Bay
S1tuated on the southeast coast of the island of Newfoundland
and approximately 165 km west frolll the capital city of st.
John's, are the many small villages, bays, harbours and Inlets
where much of my field work took place (see map 3,1). More
than 30 settlements are situated on this narrow rocky isthmus
which joins the Avalon Peninsula to the main part ot the
7J
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island. To the northeast lies Trinity Bay and to the sC"..lth-
west, Placentia Bay. The small towns dispersed among the many
shores and coves are distinct from one another with their own
histories, folklore and geographic boundaries. Many of these
settlements, however, are small with popUlations often fewar
than 700. Six thousand households mak.e up the impact area tor
onshore development and include those communities which are
dispersE:d in between Long Harbour and Clarenville. They are,
in other words, the settlements which fall within a 50 km
radius of the Great Mosquito Cove construction site.
The land along this rocky isthmus is poor and unsuitable
for cultivation. l"uch of the area is barren where the soil has
little ability to sustain some form of permanent pasture. As
a result, few trees grow, particularly in and around Bull Arm,
as the rock is buried thinly under a layer of soil (NODECO,
1991). The climate in the area is harsh; the winds are high
and the fog and drizzle, at times, seem unrelenting, Unlike
Placentia Bay, Trinity Bay freezes over every year from mid
January to March, where offshore pack-ice covers much of the
Bay. Yet, despite the stark physical features, people have
settled along these shores for hundreds of years. 1 Histori-
Archaeological digs in the communities of Arnold's Cove
and Sunnyside have uncovered some evidence of Dorset and
perhaps Beothic pre-European habitation. More specifi-
:::a11y, historical data suggest that Great Mosquito Cove
was used from as early as 1500 years ago.
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cally, those living in the numerous villages survived by
combining an inshore cod fishery with subsistence activity.
3.2 Tbe Socia-eoonallic Environtlent
Rural communities similar to those found in Trinity-Pli'lccntiOl
Bay are the areas most often affected by resource cxploit<l-
tion. These settlements are usually politically weak <'Ind
poorly organized to take an effective part in the planning for
industrial development. As the history of this area shows,
Trinity-placentia Bay is no exception whore attempts to
industrialize and stimulate economic growth have been initi-
ated without much success.
The people who live in these rather barren parts of the
island have had to bear the illlpact of various failed develop-
ment projects and government policies implemented over the
past several decades. An oil refinery in COllle Dy Chance has
reopened after a thirteen year closure and is once again
experiencing difficulty.2 While the refinery brings much
needed employment to the area, the residents must endure the
fumes and stench which linger over neighbouring communities in
exchange for local jobs. Further alonq the isthmus in the town
The Provincial Refining Company (PRC) oil refinct'y in
Come By Chance was constructed in 1971 and becFln oper-
ations in 1973. In 1976, however, the plant clot,;od and
did not begin operations again until 1991. See Felt and
Carter (1980) for details.
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of Long Harbour, other environmental effects resulting from
improper regulation and development controls have persisted.
Ponds are still heavily lade:l with contaminants from the
town's phosphorous plant after its most recent closure. Yet,
in spite of the many environmental impacts the residents of
Long Harbour have experienced, the most significant being the
'Red Herring Scare' in the 1960s,3 residents have been faced
more recently with the possibility of hosting another poten-
tially hazardous project - an incinerator to burl' American
garbage. But as one of the members of the town council stated,
"Now that the plant has closed people will accept just about
anything at all if it me<..ns they'll get their stamps."
\~hile many of the past development policies of the former
liberal and conservative governmer,ts have failed to bring
about any long-term economic growth, I!lany unanticipated social
ramifications of development still remain today. The town of
Arnold's Cove, a fishing settlement with fewer than 35
families in the early 19605, was identified as a 'growth
centre' under the Smallwood government's controversial
'resettlement' program. By 1967, however, it t.ad become the
In 1969 contaminants from the Er.co Phosphorous plant in
Long Harbour spilled into the ocean where it contaminated
various fish habitat, particularly herring. The reSUlt,
however, was that the fishery had to be closed for three
months until the level of pollution in the sea had
returned to acceptable standards. See Legge (1962) for a
discussion of the social, econvlnic and environmental
impacts of the ERCO Phosphorous plant.
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place of residence for more than 200 families. 4 Local towns-
people today continue to spea'" of their family homes being
floated on barges across the bay from Tack's fleach <lnc!
Kingwell and from Woody Island to Spencer's Cove, to n.:lme but
a few. Although more than fifteen years have passed since the
resettlement program was first introduced, many still ["cf.ar to
their home community as the place in which they were born. "We
go back to Woody Island every year," commented the school's
vice principal, "and when I retire in the next few YOilrs we'll
be going back for good. there's no place like it."
'let, in different ways, the many small inlets, coves and
harbours are rich with "social vitality," custom <lnd t["adition
(Matthews, 1976). Most of these communities, for example, have
a communal place where locals gather to particip<ltp. in idle
chatter and community gossip. In some settlements the common
meeting space is the general store, while in other nearby
towns it is the post office or government Wharf. The youth, on
the other hand, congregate in a different space where they
tend to cluster together in greater numbers. Similar to many
other rural outports in Newfoundland, men and women in these
communities engage in gender specific activities. for the most
part, men hunt moose, caribou and other small game, haul wood
For a more detailed discussion of the reset.tlement program sec.
Ralph Matthews (1983), The Creation of Regional Depend.ency.
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and build their own home in conjunction with neighbours and
other male kin. Women, on the other hand, make their Qwn bread
and preserves, care for children, make crafts, pick berries,
fish recreationally and maintain a tidy home, which for many
is a source of great pride.
In many of these small villages, it is common to find
family members living alongside one another. While this seems
to be a custom practised primarily by male kin, women, on the
other hand, often marry into their husband's communities where
they then live in close proximity to their new partners'
families. As Davis (1983) points out, social change in the
traditional Newfoundland outport has not caused disintegration
or some form of social malaise as many scholars at one time
thought. Instead, Davis argues that "cultural homogeneity and
the integrity of the family has been maintained" (Davis, 1983:
J). Yet, some local residents in Trinity Bay spoke of how
certain customs and traditions of the past were seldom
practised today. According to Pearl, an elderly women from
Sunnyside: "You don't see no mummers like you used to at one
time. At Christmas you always had mummers coming to your
door. ,,5 Just beyond Bull Arm, in Bellevue, a fisher described
how social relations have changed within the community as he
Mummering means to participate in group activities (Which
normally include song and dance), while dressed in
disguise. The custom most often takes place around
Christmas time.
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recalled how fishers years ago would labour together with
others in providing assistance to local fishing crews. lle
stated:
People are more independent now.. Yoars ago if you had
to get your boat out of the water you had the Whole
community to help. But not now, you Ciln get it done
yourself because we got the technology to do it ...
Lifestyles and attitudes are changing. The old ways o(
doing things was best, but we are gradually fi'lding ilW<lY
from it ... This is all changing in my life time. It's one
of the disadvantages of progress.
3.3 The Main Impact Area
The socia-economic impact area for onshore dC\lelopml'nt i~
those communities which fall within a 5 km radius of the GI:O:lt
Mosquito Cove construction site - they include Arnold's Cove,
sunnyside and Come By Chance. Arnold's Cove is the lan-Jest of
the three settlements with a popUlation of 1,106, a rcltlti.vcly
small decrease since 1986 when the census repot'tcd I,ll"
inhabitants. Sunnyside and Come l3y chance are much sm.,.llct'
communities with popUlations of 622 and 296 respectively (zoe
Table 3.1 for details). Whereas sunnyside's popula.tion hi:ld
decreased (-1.9 percent change from 1986), Come l3y Chance hud
experienced considerable growth of 11.3 percent since 1986.
Much of this increase, however, can be attributed to tho
reopening of the Come By Chance oil refinery.
80
TABLE 1: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
CONSTRUCTION IHPACT AREA
Arnold's Come-by- Sunnyside Nfld.
Cove Chance
population
1986 1117 266 634 568,350
1991 1106 296 622 568,474
, change 1981-86 -0.6 -21.1 -9.8 0.1
• change 1986-91 -LO 11.3 -1. 9
Incomes
Median income: men $14,316 $12,777 I $13,408 $13,721
Median income: women $7,553 $8,610 I $6,220 $7,471
composition of Income
% Employment
%: Gov' t. transfer
%: Other income
Education and Labour Force
.::G9 education as










































Source: Statistics Canada, Profiles. Newfoundland: Part 2
Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1988; statistics Canada, Profile of
Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Newfoundland - Part A.
ottawa: statistics Canada, 1992.
81
If one considers the larger surrounding impact area, with
the exception of Clarenville which experienced il population
growth of 3.5 percent, the demographic trend in the reg ion
indicates an overlill decline. While population changes do vary
between communities, the town of Long Harbour experienced the
most significant decrease as census data report a ch;:tnge or -
16.7 percent (Statistics Canada, 1992). One would credit the
change to the recent closure of the town's phosphorous plClnt.
In addition to varying demographic patterns, incomes for.
men and women in the impact area are low, unemployment is hiqh
and 36.1 percent of residents 15 and older' have attained an
education level less than grade nine - which is poor even i.n
comparison to the Newfound.and average of 26.6 percent.
Occupational choices f..>r men and women in the area are few ilnd
much of the work. is temporary or seasonaL Table J.J provides
an occupational distribution by gender that illustrates manual
work as the mast common occupation for bath men and women.
particularly in the case of women, manual work. is predominant-
ly fish plant labour. However, one would expect the percentage
employed in manual work to decrease with the advent of the cod
moratorium - cod is an important species for f ish plant
operations.
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'f1\BLE 2: OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE BY GENDER
FOR THE IMPACT AREA, 198G
Men Women
occupations Number Per cent Number Per cent
Man. , Prof. 110 18.5 60 16.9
Clerical JO 5.0 65 18.3
Sales 20 3.4 15 4.2
Service 15 2.5 <5 12.7
Manual 215 36.1 130 36.6
Primary 100 16.8 30 8.5
Other 105 17.6 10 2.8
Total 595 100 355 100
Source: Statistics Canada, Profiles. Newfoundland: Part
2. ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1988.
Those with primary occupations are fishers. Fishing, for
the most part, is a male oc.:cupation which includes 16.8
percent of the male labour force in the impact area. While 8.5
percent of women are employed in the primary sector, they fish
only in those communities situated along Placentia Bay
(Arnold's Cove and Come By Chance). Construction of the GBS,
however, is expected to alter significantly the occupational
structure in the area during the five year life of the
project. Yet, changes in local residents' socia-economic
status are not anticipated; local men and women are excluded
from most employment and training opportunities as the
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construction phase is governed by a labour agreement encom-
passing 14 unions.
While more peripheral communities to the north and south
of the main impact area show similar patterns and Ch.:1rolctcris-
tics, exceptions do occur. For example, the unemployment r"te
tor the town of Clarenville was 16.6 percent in 1986, whero~.. ~
Chapel Arm had an unemployment rate of 46.7 percent (Statis-
tics Canada, 1988). Clarenville, moreover, the l .. rgest urb,'n
centre in the impact area, has a popUlation grc.:lter tll"n 3,000
(statistics Canada, 1992). Due to its s.i.z~ and the r .. ngc or
services it can provide, Clarenville is expected to receive
many of the project benefits, particularly in comparison to
other smaller communities. Yet, perhaps the llIost significant
difference today among these many slllClll settlements is the
fishery. Fishers all along Trinity Bay fished for northern
cod; the moratorium announced last July of 1992 affectc those
whe. harvest and process the catch in these waters. Although
fishers in Placentia Bay argue that their fishery too is poor,
they do not fish for northern cod and, therefore, have not
experienced the sallie disruption. In many of these outports the
fishery is the economic mainstay of the community. 'rhe 10ng-
term social and economic impacts of the present crisis in the
fishery, however, have yet to be realized. The experiences oE
a fish plant worker from Chance Cove, however, provide some
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indicatio;'\ about what the costs of the moratorium will be. She
commented:
The day Crosbie announced the moratorium, Illy dear it was
just like someone had died in the cOJlllllunity. I felt
lonely for the first time ... I~ didn't feel like ....e were
living in Chance Cove any morei like we were strangers in
out own cOllUllunity. People couldr.'t believe it happened.
I mean we knew the fishery was bad, but we didn't expect
it to close especially after all the rishermen had geared
up for the season.
3." Impact on the Fishery
The fishing communities that will ex~<..rience direct impacts
from onshore development, however, are those settlements
situated along the shores of Trinity Bay, particularly
Sunnyside, Chance Cove and Bellevue, and to a much lesser
degree NorJllan's Cove. As these cOllllllunities comprise the main
fishery impact region they were the focal point for the field
research. With the exception of those who operate one offshore
fishing vessel, these fishers form part ot the Newfoundland
inshore fleet (see nlap 3.2).
In 1989, the Departltent of Fisheries and Oceans reported
a total of 137 fishers. of whom 81 were considered full-time,
from the villages of. sunnyside, Chance Cove and Bellevuc. 6
Although Norman's Cove is II much larger fishing community than
those reported above, only 16 fishers are affected by onshore
All fisheries data were supplied by the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans as reported in the Environmental
Protection Plan (NODECO,1991: vol. 4).
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Source: Environmental Protection Plan by NODECO, St. John's
(1991: Vo1.4)
86
activity. The inshore fishery in Bull Arm is an all male
fishery. 'let, elsewhere in the province women have been more
visible in fish hllrvesting (Nadel-Klein and Davis, 1988),
particularly in Placentia Bay where .ore than 50 Io'olnen fish.
Fishing crews are, for the most part, organized along male
kinship and friendship lines and consist or roughly two to
three men in vassels that are mainly under 3S feet. Fishers,
moreover, spoke about the transfer of knowledge about the
resource and industry from one generation to the next. "We
learned about the grounds from our father who learned from his
father." Invariably, some changes have occurred as evidenced
in the more recent development of the draw of fishing berths.
Mid-February you draw the berths. That works very good.
We started that because people from other places would
come on our berths ... It seems now that there is a break
down in that tradition ... The respect for people's space
is gone.
with the exception or Chance Cove, all those who fish in Bull
Arm today draw their berths each year.
The inshore crelo's fish frOID small open boats and almost
exclusively in the bay of Bull Arm. Vessels leave the shore
early each morning and return by late afternoon. The fishery
in Trinity Ray is seasonal and operates from May to October
each year. During normal fishing periodS, activity would peak
in June and July due to large landings of caplin. Cod, caplin
and squid (Io'hen they are running) have been the most important
species; mackerel, herring, salmon, lumpfish, turbot and
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lobster have also been commercially illlportant since 1979. fish
landings in th@se three villages from 1971J to 1989 aVer;H}ect
3,250 tons valued at $863,000. Although fishers IIIi1Ke use of iI
wide range of technologies, traps, for the 1II0st part, pt·oducc
roughly half the landed value. 1
The inshore fishery is a low investment fishery whet"o tile
profit is often minimal. FiShing incomes vary in 'rrinity lj.,y
with personal earnings ranging between $6,000 to $·17.,000
annually.s Tht':! sunnyside fiShery, situated in the bottom o(
the bay, is a zmall scale fizhery. In comparison to other
fishing villages in Trinity Bay, Sunnyside cn~....s h<lve invc$trd
little in the industry; they continuE' to f ish from l';nl.:lll
wooden boats with a minilllal amount: of gear and tcchnololJY.
Many neighbouring fishers, moreover, do not consider Sunnysitle
fishers as legitimate fishers or whnt they articulatc as "rcill
fishermen. "
They're not what we considers real fisherlD£!n ... 'rhe
fishing in sunnyside is different frail us. They h<lve 1 or
2 cod traps, but here there are men with 8 and () coo
traps ... Sunnyside fishermen have about $20-$30,000 of
gear and in Norman' s Cove we has up to $ tOO, 000 and in
some case $200,000 worth of gear.
Fishers in Bull Arm utilize a variety of fizhinq goar and
teChnology including the following: cod tri"ps, 9 i 1incts,
trawls, capelin traps, lobster pots, j iggors, purse
seine, herring nets and bar s~ine.
Personal communication with the fishery consultilnt from
HMDC during the winter of 1990.
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Similar statements were also made by plant workers as evi-
denced in the following comment from Sari'!: "sunnyside Fishcc-
men are not fishermen ... there's just a hi'lndful of them trying
to catch a few fish that's alL" While Sunnyside fishers h.1VC
neither much invested in the fishery nor received much of .'1
return for their efforts, they are no legs committed to the
fishery than others in nearby communities. "I got me .:t I iccn~c
to fish," said one of the Sunnyside fishers, "and I'm goi.ng to
use it until someone takes it from me,"
The only fish processor in the fishery imp.1ct ill:CiI
operates a seasonal freezer plant in C:h.:lnca Cove and cmployu
about 55 people, with a double shift during the caplin sc.'lson.
Smith's Seafoocls is the local community fish plant where only
Chance Cove fishers are permitted to land their C.1tch. 'rhe
plant first opened in the early 1970s and initially employed
the wives (;f local fi!lhers. Much has changed since then; yet,
its day to day operations continue to be performed prim.:!ri ly
by women 1n a non-unionized setting. "The plant takes in
everybody ..• Now when it started off fir!>t it was m;JinlV
fishermen's wives, but not so much now." For the most part,
Smith's Seafoods will be the only plant in thc arc.:! to
experience direct impacts from onshore development in Crcat
Mosquito Cove. While this view is not sh3red by llMDC, both
plant labourers and fishers alike recognize the uncertainty
ahead for those dependent on processing incomes. similar to
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many other rural fish plant operations in the province,
procl'!ssing work in Chance Cove very clearly means jobs for
10c0l1 people more generally, and in particular jobs for rural
women. "Where else arc we going to get jobs," Nellie responded
when asked how important the plant was for the local commun-
ity? "You take the plant out of Chance Cove and you got
nothing," commented another. Yet, it would be wrong to assume
that only members of fishing households recognized the
importance of the local plant. As articulated by one of the
shopkeepers in the town: "without the plant, Chance Cove would
be a gllOf>t town."
The construction of the GaS in Great Mosquito Cove hus
had and will continue to have seriou& implications for those
who depend on the fishery due to the conflicting demands on
Bull Arm waters. To manage and regulate Bull Arm better, HMDC
produced a set of guidelines which include the details of an
exclusion zone in the immediate area of Great Mosquito Cove,
a formal traffic lane and a compensation package: for fish~rs
to cover any losses incurred. The exclusion zone affects
primarily the fishers from Sunnyside, while the traffic lane
affects those from the more distant settlements of Chance
Cov!:'!, Bellevue and Norman's Cove. The compensation agreement
was worked out primarily by fishers themselves - the fisher's
union, the FFAWU, did little more than sign a preliminary
agreemGnt between HMOC and the inshore fishers in the winter
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of 1990. The document is signi f icant, hO\~ever, as i t sct:~
precedent in offshore fishery relations; it marks the fin~t
time such an agreement had been put in place prior to any !OZf;
or damage.
The philosophy of compensiltion has an implicit .:IssumptiOll
that oil industries have the riCJht to disrupt il5 101K) ,15 they
have the desire and ability to compensate for <lny loss. \-Illi Ie
compensa'::ion does counteract any loss to individu,lls, it doe:~
not consider the disruption to the social ,wd n<lttH'ill envi.ron-
ments over the long-term. The dotcd Is of tho compensil t ion
agreement state that fishers' earnings would not be <lUolo/cd to
fall below t.he average of the previous five j<·ears. 'rhcrc 101,1:;
no compensation, however, for plant workers, mainly women, who
process the catch. The implication to be drilwn from th i:> i:~
that the casts of the fishery interferencl;! filll tlisproportion-
ately on women employed in the fishery.
As the analysis Which fallows will show, the compensation
arrangement between fishers and the oil industry failed to
protect fishers' long-term interests and neg leeted the
concerns of plant workers altogether.
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Chapter 4
'well, by' she's gone'
The Shaping of Power Relations
You go for a walk now down by the harbour and you'll see
fishermen with faces on down to here (as she gestured
down toward her waist line.) .•• oh, they're right sad
looking they are complaining that they've lost 'their way
of life.' No mistake they've lost their way of life.
They're sitting home now on their fat fannies collecting
their moratorium ... if you or I lost our jobs we wouldn't
be getting no hand out from the government ..• we'd be out
there looking for another job just like everybody else ...
Yes girl, much craves more (December, 1992).
Newfoundlanders have long depended on the harvest from the sea
as the basis of their way of life in a region where alterna-
tives have been few. Even though fish stocks have declined
the fishery nonetheless provides a livelihood for many coastal
people. All t<.>o often, however, inaccurate assumptions arc
made about the career aspirations of fishers: for example,
that they are somehow unmotivated to find employment away from
a deteriorating fishery. While I do not wish to romanticize
the fishery in general, and fishers in partiCUlar, I find it
difficult to accept the argument that fishers only fish as a
last resort. Moreover, the findings of this research indicate
contradictory assumptions about fishing practices in Trinity
Bay and the way of life it has come to define.
If you don't fish it's hard to understand what it means
to say it's in your blood, but it is ..• 'lou got to
understand that way of life •.• it's completely different
from any other kind of job I know. By trade I'm a school
teacher. But I left it to go fishing with my brother Joe
and we have been fishing ever since. It's who I am I
suppose, a fisherman •.•
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If indeed fishers' intrinsic interests do lie in the
preservation of fishing as a way of life, how is it that they
willingly entered into an agreement with the oil industry
(HMDC) where their interests were left unprotected? Why did
fishers sign an agreement with HMDC that permitted further
destruction to their fishery and livelihoud, to their way of
life? tvhy was there no opposition, no protest to what people
thought was a blatant injustice? Why has the discollrse ",bout
Hibernia never accounted for plant labourers' griev<lllces? How
is it that fishers and plant labourers came to tolerate ",nct
~ubsequently accept this form of inequality, where 'inctction
upon injustice' is somehow seen as legitimate? This chapter.
will begin to explore the quiescence phenC'menon by attempting
to provide explanations for these questions.
r will begin this chapter by examining in some detail
fishers' early perceptions of onshore development as they shed
light on what they perceived to be their 'real' interests
before the advent of the oil industry. To understand how
fishers' perceptions were shaped or their "political con-
sciousness stunted" (Crenson, 1971) so that they came to
accept the legitimacy of the oil industry, we must first
comprehend what these early experiences were and the meanings
they held for inshore fishers themselves. For Lukes, this
meant identifying the "relevant counterfactuals" - what
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fishers would have done, in other words, were it not for the
alleged exercise of po·....er (Lukes, 1974: 46).
This analysis will be followed by an account of two-
dimensional power. More specifically, it will consider the
arena where fishery interests were to be managed. This will
entail .:In examination of a three party group comprising the
oil. industry, the provincial government1 and a local group
organized to represent the impact area (the Bull Arm Area
Coordinating Committee better known as B.A.A.C.C.). This
section will illustrate well Bachrach and Baratz's (1970)
notion of pow(;;r's 'second face' (or two-dimensional power) and
how power can be wielded over deprived groups such as those
employed in the harvesting and processing sectors. According
to this perspective it is not only necessarily a question of
who loses or wins in the struggle, but who "determines the
agenda of struggle" (Parenti, 1970: 501-30). A further
relevant aspect of two dimensional power will be used to
consider the less visible facets of the fishery. In particu-
lar, this section will address the experiences of women
employed in the proc8.:=:sing sector and how their grievances
were managed by the oil industry.
In a more detailed and comprehensive stUdy the role of
the provincial government would be considered. However,
government officials in the present context were non-
actors and remained largely invisible during the negoti-
ations between HMDC and the inshore fishers.
"
The final section of the chapter will show how fishers'
perceptions were, in fact, shaped during the course of
negotiations with the oil industry so that thei. 'n~al'
interests we.e masked by sho.t-term economic gilin. 'l'his
analysis will help reveal the mechanisms of socL,l powor ilnc!
how they were used to both shape and contain conflict. \~hilc
much of these data will be explained acco.ding to the perspcc-
tive put forth by Lukes and his notion of three-dimensional
power, the interconnections of these mechanisms are indeed
evident in this analysis and add further to our understand i I1(J
of this social phenomenon. In other wot"ds, the three dimen-
sions of power must be understood and viewed as "interrelated
in the totality of their impact" (Gaventa, 1980: 20).
As this research is a study over time, this chilpter will
commence with the onset of onshore development in September,
1990, and carry through until the agreement between fishers
and HMDC was reached in March, 1991. 2 (The dat(!, March, 1991
is rather arbitrary; the majority of fishers had, by this
time, signed their contract with HMDC. While fishers in
Norman I s Cove did nut enter into the agreement unti 1 much
later, they were guided by the same principles prev ious ly
arranged with other inshore fishers.) The subsequent chapter
The data used in this chapter were collected between
september of 1990 to March of 1991, unless otherwise
stated.
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will address the events which occurred ~fter March, ~99l and
again after Gulf oil pulled out in February, 1992.
4.1 The 1nitia1 Encounter
4.1.1 Understanding the •counterfactual ,
The long awaited announcement made in the Fall of 1990 to
pursue dev(>lopment of the Hibernia oil field brought with it
a feeling of excitement and exhilaration, sentiments that
Newfoundlanders, today, seldom experience. Trinity-Placentia
Bay, the region to host the onshore phase, was in a flurry as
residents were bustling about with anticipations of prosperity
and wealth. They had, in their estimation, much to celebrate
as development clearly meant opportunities for local people
where alternatives have, oVer the years, ~10rn thin. Residents
from the surrounding impact region all the way from Long
Harbour to Deep Bight were optimistic about their future.
Hibernia, and Mobil oil in particular, promised to bring
benefits and growth to the local communities. "It's like being
on cloud nine," uttered the mayor from Arnold's Cove, "every
council meeting there is something new, a new plan for the
town." Yet amid all the optimism, some reservations and
uncertainty lay festering. While it would be misleading to use
the term homogeneity to define the inshore fishers from
Trinity Bay, they did, nonetheless, share similar concerns
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about onshore development .:::.nd what it could potcntiillly mC<lll
for their social and economic survival.
The oil industry'.s presence has, over tl1e years, been
well known in Trinity-Placentia Bay as the industry sought
early on to establish working relations with the loc;)l
communities. This is not an uncommon practice ilmOll<J oi 1
conglomerates as Wills illustrates in the Brent discovery off
Shetland. Wills maps out how Shell, the oil con~orti.um
responsible for development, interacted with the loea 1
community by sending "smooth-talking public relations men
round the village halls" with slides and vilrious other
paraphernalia, assuring local people of full consultation and
cooperative working relations (WillS, 1991: 8). Even thoulJh
Mobil was clearly visible in the region, it was not percei.ved
to be by the fishers of Trinity Bay. According to one of the
town clerks:
F1shermen are like that. They are their own people, they
stick together.... when they thought Mobil Wilzn't going
to interfere with them, they wanted nothing to cia with
meetings or committees.
Previous interactions between the oil and f i5h1ng ~ector~
involved only those who fished in Placentia Bay waters - the
site first chosen for the onshore phase of development. Not
surprisingly, therefore, Trinity Bay fishers did not partici-
pate, nor did they wish to, in these discussions as they
assumed that onshore development would not directly implicate
97
them or their way of life. Moreover, fishers were poorly
informed iJbout the process of assessment that had taken place
over the prev ious 10 years. For example, they ~/ere unaware of
the reports and findings c~ntained in the EIS (Environmental
Impact StiJtement), the HEAP (Hibernia Envir.onmental Assessment
Panel) and Decision 86 documents that were crucial in protect-
ing both the environmental and fishery interests.
(When) we heard Bull Arm was going to be the site we had
no information ... We didn't want any really bec3.use we
weren't going to be affected.
The decision, then, to relocate the onshore project from
Placentia waters to Trinity Bay - the other sidp- of the
isthmus - left the fishers in nearby communities in a rather
precarious state. Fishers experienced considerable torment
about the possible threat to their way of life as they h:"lve
come to know it. onshore development " ... is going to take away
our livelihoods" was a comment many articulated. All along,
fishers were led to believe that onshore construction would
not affect their harvesting of sea resources, thus making
negotiations with them unwa:-ranted. Yet, the inshore fishers
found themselves immersed in a complex set of social relations
- with a multinational oil company - where they were plagued
by their ignorance. The powerfuL and in this case a multi-
national oil conglomerate, often construe this ignorance as
"ineffective opposition" (Barnes, 1988: 98).
"
lihile town councils and development associations in the
region were busy planning future development ventures hoplng
to enhance some kind of economic growth, the inshore fisher:;
situated along Bull Arm were left pondering tht-ir. own future
prospects. They were, in every respect, ignor<lnt Ot the
development project and how they would best rnanilgc th" i I'
interests. Some of their apprehensions nrc indeed "pp<lt'ent In
the fcllllwing c.omments from Isaac, an older, illitcl·"te fbhcr
from sunnyside. Isaac fishes with his neighbour, <I filthcr ,Inti
son in a small open boat, mainly in the bottom of the b<ly Ol
Bull Arm:
I started fishing with my father when I was nine ye;'r:;
old and I have fished all my life ... ! don't know how to
do anything else.
As the interview continued, Isaac, rather solemnly, wou it!
interject with his own feelings of despair <lS he reflected
upon what was soon to take place. Looking out tow'Jrc.b flu I I
Arm, Isaac, shaking his head, would utter: "Well by' she's
gone .•. " Isaac continued during the interview to rcpC<lt the
same observations of how "she's gone," thereby disclosing much
ahout the cultural significance of fishing in Trinity Bay.
Isaac's experience, however, not only makes visiblc the
importance of fishing as a way of life, but, as well, the
possible risk of environment annihilation. "We don't want yOll
poisoning our waters," stated one of the fishers belonging to
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Isaac's crelol as he recalled past conversations w-ith Mobil oil
during one ot their cOlllr:lunity visits.
Fishing is, indeed, il:lportar.t for Clany alO!lg the shores
of Trinity BilY as it defines, in some case~, w-ho these men
are. To understand fishers 'real' interests attention must be
focused on how they, themselves, define the ceaning at fishing
and the significance it holds for them. It is not, as some
....ould argue, only !l mellns of i.ncome or 'earning one's keep,'
but it, in f<lct, means considerably more to those who engage
in the harvesting ot' fish. Alonzo, a young skipper from
Norman's Cove, started fishing ....ith his father and uncles:
Long before I finished school, I I d go out with Dad every
chance I could get. The teachers tried to convince me to
go on to univelCsity after I finished school because I
finished with honours and all, but I didn't want to go.
1 want to fish ... 1 enjoy being out on the water ...This is
what we knew growing up ... and we learned it all from our
father ... Dad always did good in th"J fishery and when he
died a couple of ye8rs ago we just carried on ... Earl
(Alonzo's brother) and me.
Alonzo and Earl did well in the fishery as their father had
done before them. By comparison, the earnings of Sunnyside
fishers are considerably less than other fishing communities
further 810ng the Arm. Yet, in spite of low incomes, they
still share many similar sentiments toward the meaning of
fishing and what it means for them to be a 'fisherman':
(fishing) is all I've ever known. 11.11 our life we fished
together. We here in Sunnyside never got a whole hell lot
of fish, but we made a living. We kept the wolf from the
door ... Me and me brother had a full-time job at the
refinery some years back now... ~nd we saw our boat5 up in
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the st.ed ... and then seeing the b"ys out in the Arm.
Harry, me brother said, 'I don't think I C<lll st"y <Ill
summ€lr on land. t I liked it alright at the refinery, but
it's what yOll gets used to. So not long aftel" th"t, ll':IlTy
and me quits the refinery and goes b<1ck ;\t th,~
fish ... Fishirlg is i~~portant to Sunnyside. Yes my denr, ir
is important to the community ... Sunnysicle was al\.ayn ;\
fishing community. No one ever starved to de.:lttl.
\~e cannot view fish harvesting as a 'thirCj-likc' ph~~no1l1-
enon occurring in Great Mosquito Cove, independent oC val"yinq
interpretations; it is, as 5ubjectivists would :IrfJuc, tll('~(>
interI":::et,~t.i<')ns. Fishers do socially construct their vwt"ldn.
Their aC"cions, moreo~'er, largely depend on how they i.ntcl:prct
the conditior.s in which they find th0nlSelv€!z. Unden::t;lIH..linq
fishers' experiences, thereCore, compels the sUbj0.ctivi~:t
social scientist to replicate actors' interpret<1tion:; of the i r
soeial ....orld in il way that is consistent with the intention:;
and reasons of fishers themselves. This is si.milur to whiJt
Giddens refers to as the "double hermeneutic":
The conceptual schemes of the social sciences therefore
express a double hermeneutic, relating both to the
entering and grasping of the frames 01' meaning involved
in the production of social life by lay actors, ami
reconstituting these ne.... frames of meaning inv:>lvcd jn
technical conceptual schemes (Giddens, 1976: 79).
Fishers did not, to be sure, welcome the cOl,ling of Mob i.l
oil - in the Fall of 1990 Mobil oil in conjunction with the
other partner~ formed the Hibernia ~i ... nagcment tlevelcjJrnent o'lnc.l
Company (HMDC). Their early perceptions about the onshore
project, ho....ever, tel~ us much about their attitude!;: toward
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development prior to any oil conglomeratG imposing itself on
them. 'fo th is end, iln argument can be made that fishers' ear 11'
perception:; do, in fact, reveal their 'real' interests,' even
if they do not articulate them as such or remain incognizant
of them. Fishers' early experiences shed light on the appre-
hens ions they felt development would have on their livelihood,
....here their .... ily of life would become threatened and the havoc
created in the natural environment all but inevitable.
l'lildrad, i) tisherman's wife who married into the commun-
i ty of Chance Cove was visibly troubled by the development
soon to take place in Great Mosquito Cove:
111' 1 i fe solely depends on the fishery. In five or six
years time there won't be no fishery with this Hibernia
project here.
~lildred continued to discuss how development would hurt
var ious habitats and the implications this would have for
their economic survival: "Caplin pays your bills," she
clilimed, "and without it Albert may as well hang up his hat."
Other accounts incl.ude that of Chester, a fisher from Bellevue
....ho has lived in the community all his life and fished for
Illore than t ....enty years with one other neighbour - except for
the caplin season when their crew takes on a third member.
Chester's experiences are indeed informative as he played an
essential role in all negotiations between HMDC and Bellevue
fishers:
'0'
\';e had a lot of questions about pollution ... Just .:l
little bit of leakage over there could pollute OUl- firm.
Fishermen aren't going to allow them (mmC) to "'::'.h,C in
and take over •.. 1 told them you got to treat the fisher-
men right because one day the fishermen will
respond ...They're taking a lot of freedom away [rom the
fishermen. They say they're not doing it ... There's no
way we can be out there working together, that. is prime
gill net ground. The opportunity to go over there is !l01"
gone ... it was a beautiful pltlce down there.
Other fishers from Bellevue articulated simililr concerns,
evidenced in the account of Thomtls, one of four brother~ who
are considered, by many in the community, to be the' rishel'men
of Bellevue.' "There were rumours they were neCJotiating ave I'
there" - referring to when Mobil oIl was com:idQring ctl.1nging
location from Adam's Head to Bull Arm. The decir;ion to
relocate:
was pretty short notice. \';e had a lot of conc~l:"ns ilbollt
them coming. We never before had bOilts cominr} out here i.n
our Arm. So to bring the project here is il lot for th~
fishermen .••. Fishermen are being displaced. We don't
know how much traffic will be in those ltlnes. If fisher-
men take their gear and mov~ somewhere else it wi 1J
infringe on the other fellow. (As the conversation
continuod Thomas discussed the environmental concerns
which were crucial for the loca 1 fishers.) We're a (tel'
addressing that (environmental issues) a few times nO~/.
It seems like the environmental effects ... they are not
taking it serious•.. This was something we mention ;.111
the time ... but it seems like t.hey never gave us no
straight answers ... They're all the time mClking excuses .
.. . We're worried about the under water blasting ... they
said blasting didn't affect the fish in Norway.
Situations which prevent others, in this case the inshore
fishers, from lIengaging in the process of inquiry" (frC!ire,
1970: 73) where limits are placed upon their access to
information are a "valuable resource," Barnes would argue, in
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shaping their subordina'.:ion (Barnes,1988: 102). To alienate
fishers, then, "from their own decision-making is to change
them into objects" (Freire,1970: 73).
As the negotiations between the fishery and oil industry
continued throughout the winter of 1991, much confusion about
the project lingered on as fishers began to grapple with their
scarce information.
When Mobil first came out here, they told us we could get
jobs on the site cause we wouldn't be able to fish. Now
they're telling us we can't get jobs because of the
unions ... but if I takes another job while they're
building I'm going to lose my license to fish. And then
when it's allover in five years I got nothing.
fishers wanting employment alternatives with the Hibernia
project felt "hard done by" as HMDC did not, in their estima-
tion, live up to what they had promised.
As onshore development proceeded, HMDc, along with local
fishermen's Committees, began to develop and later implement
the procedures that fishers were to adhere to during the
development phase. These negotiations, later formalized in the
document 'Fisheries Code of Practice, ' permitted some concerns
to be brought to the fore, although fishers had, for the most
part, little control over how the negotiation process ""as
structured. J Some of the principles that HMDC was trying to
The ffAWU (Fishermen Foo~ and Allied workers Union) was,
for the most part, uninvolved in negotiating the Fish-
eries Code of Practice. This was larqe'!.y due to fishers'
own request to negotiate the COmp&ilsation program on
their own. The role of the FFAWU, therefore, was minimal.
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put forward was that fishers were to continue t'J fish where
they could during the period of onshore construction. IHthout
insisting that fishers continue to harvest the cat.ch where
possible, HMDC felt that most, if not all, would no longel"
engage actively in the fishery. As one HMDC represent.<ltive
stated, "Fishermen don't have much incent.ive to
work ..• fishermen only fish for stamps." For somc fishct:"s,
HMDC's strategy meant that they would have to reloc.. te to
other fishing grounds in other regions of the bay, wh ich
troubled many:
It's all bad enough that they're over there doing thls,
but now they're telling us where to fish •.. It's out there
in this part (Derwin pointed to the bottom of the Arm)
that I fish and I don't want f.lobil or anyone else telling
me that I got to go outside the Arm. If Mobil are qoinq
to make this the 'exclusion area' then they compensate u!;
for this here.
still other fishers were clearly not interest.ed in compcns<t-
tion schemes:
I don't want no handout from Mobil 0 i 1. ... a handout to
do what, to sit home and do nothing.
More significant, was a comment stated by one of the more
elderly fishers who drew attention to the dynamic occurring
between fishers from different communities:
I don't want to be fishing out there with the crews from
Chance Cove or Chapel's Arm and I can assure you they
don't want us. What Mobil Oil is doing is going to cause
fights between the fishermen, cause if there's any fish
out there to be caught they don't want us taking them.
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Rapid social change in Great Mosquito Cove has undoub-
tedly altered the deqreo:! of control and autonomy fishers had,
at one time, exercised over their own livelihood. Onshore
developllent in and around the cove has restricted not only
where fishers Ray pursue the harvesting of fish, hut it has
also curtailed their control over the environment itself. They
are, moreover, alienated by the process where they no longer
are the creators of their own history (Johnson et al., 1984:
123-24). In this context, alienation can be understood as
being embedded in the social and economic arrangements of
industrial capitalism, and not in individual deficiencies.
Although my data suggest that fishers both knew and
understood their intrinsic interests in the preservation of
the fishery as a way of life, as did the Illountaineers in
Cavcnta's study, they nonetheless agreed to enter into It
contractual arrangement with HMDC which contradicted those
interests. Can we, then, assert that what seems' to be a case
of consensus among fishers was, in fact, imposed? According to
Antonio Grarnsci:
... the social group in question may indeed have its own
conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a
conception which manifests itself in action, but occa-
sionally and in flashes - when, that is, the group is
acting as an organic totality. But this same group has,
for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination,
adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed
from another group; and it affirms this conception
verbally and believes itself to be following it, because.
this is the conception which it follows in Inormal times'
- that is when its conduct is not dependent and auton-
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oroous, but submissive and subordinate (Gramsci, 1971:
327) •
In similar fashion, I argue that fishers accepted the vision
of their interests that was put to them by a dominant soci.:d
group.
4.1. 2 Fishers' Acquiescence
While the data illustrate fishers' apprehension toward the
proposed development, these perceptions, nonetheless, changed
so that fishers were neither tormented by nor articulated such
appreheno;ions. l~hat we, then, find in a relatively sllot't
period of time is evidence indicating support for tha onshore
project. Fishers came to trust IlMDC, as evidenced by their
lack of legal consultation when it came time to sign their
individual contra.::ts with the oil industry. The term "good
faith" was used by many to describe their experience, During
a dialogue between a couple of fishers from Chance Cove, one
of the skippers stated: "We thought HMDC was acting in good
faith when we signed that agreement." Jack, agreeing with his
friend and neighbouring fisher, continued stating:
The way Mobil oil went was to go back five yei'lrs and takc
yoUr average of those earnings ... Hhen \riC signed that
contract, we thought what we were signing was pretty
good ..• Yes, John Banks (Project Manager tor HMDC) used
to come out on the first of it. The way he put it, and he
knew we always fished out there, they weren't going to
bully us. They were responsible people and we couIcJ work
together ...
'0'
Trust, ",s Freire (1970: 80) defines it, is essentially
"contingent on the evidence which one party provides the
others of his true, concrete intensions"; it breaks down when
onc;l particular party fails to act accordingly _ In other words,
to articulate one thing and act differently will not encourage
a trusting relationship. While the fisr.ers did. in fact, trust
the oil company, they did not question, nor did they seek
evidence to support their perception of HMDC's true inten-
tions. Instead, fishers fully accepted as legitimate the
actions and practices of key HMDC players.
During the winter of 1991, fishers entered into the
contractual arrangement under the belief that HMDC
operating fairly and that their long-term interests were
protected. "We took their word for it," commented Alonzo, a
fisher from Norman's Cove. The "people were happy" with the
final negotiations. Even the atti tudes fishers held concerning
environmental risks that were, according to fishers, "very big
on everybody's lnind," had changed to approval, "they assured
us that nothing would be done," that is, to the environment.
Other fishers explained how Paula White (the Environmental
Supervisor for HMDC) "seemed to really care about what the
fishermen had to say_ ..They treated us good .. _ II Some fishers,
further along the bottom of the Bay, felt that "we've never
had it so good," and that the Hibernia project was "the best
thing that has happened out here in a long while. If Fishers'
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wants and preferences became a product of a system that
distorted their t real t or stated interests. Chester, wl"ose
early experiences with HMDC centred around the; 'loss oE
freedom' fishers would encounter as deve lopment proceeded,
later spoke of the oil industry's 'generosity' in est... bllshing
the compensation program:
I cQuldn't see how much more generous they could be th... n
they were ... the compensation is set up so that the
fisherman is not worse off than he was I': aviolLsly.
Simi larly, Rayment's initial oppos i tion in ilccept ln9 'hillld-
outs I from the industry was a year and a half later r.cpJo1ced
with rather contradictory statements: " •.. compensation w... s
good, the fishermen were pleased ....MobU hud negotiated
fairly." The oil company's extensive generosity had few
restrictions as they continued to graciously accommodate
fishery committee members throughout the negotiation period.
11. young fisher from Norman's Cove recalled the process ....ell:
Some meetings we had were in town .. they (llMDC) bought all
our meals, paid for our gas. Even out here they would pay
for everything ... Yes by' Sam (fishery consultant hired by
HMDC) and them were good.
Fishers
'
VUlnerability combined with the effective exercise of
leadership over the negotiation process allowed the dominant
elite to shape the elite's own legitimacy, to bring about
their own consensus (Gavcnta, 1980). DUll consideration of this
issue is crucial as it allows one to examine more closely
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oth~r em~rging social processes which reshaped what were once
fishers' grievances.
Fishers had, according to Freire's rather emotive term,
become willing participants in a 'culture of silence,' where
fishers no longer articulated their interests in preserving
their culture and way of life (Freire, 1970). Negotiations
between fisht'lrs and the oil conglomerate had been channelled
rather ab.uptly in a certain direction, a directlQ"n that
considered only f).nancial compensation.
4.2 PO\<ler's Second Face
4.2.1 The Political Arena
Under what conditions and against what obstacles did fishers
acquiesce, when their 'real' interests have been shown to lie
in the preservation of the fishery and its associated way of
life? Do we, .i.n fact, consider fishers' willingness to sign
the agreement with the oil industry to be a form of consensus?
According to the pluralists, fishers would indeed have acted
upon any recognized grievance as the political system is
structured in such a way as to allow issues to be brought
forth, either through representative leaders or through their
own participation. Non-participation, then, or fishers'
inaction would not be considered a political issue. The
difficulty with this approach, however, is not only that it is
restrictive, but that it depicts an image of the political
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system that is based upon some notion of equ,llity. fig D.1111
puts it:
, .. a political issue can hardly be solid to exist \Inles:::;
and until it commands the attention of a signiricC"lnt
segment of the political stratulll (Dahl, 1961: 92).
This approach, however, fails to consider two cruci.:ll
arguments as suggested by Bachrach and B.:lratz. First, the'
pluralist view is weak as it fails to account [or the filet
that power is often "exercised by confining the scope of
decision-making to relatively 'safe' issues" (Di\chruch .:\nd
Baratz, 1970: 6). Secondly, pluralists such as Dahl and l'ol~;by
provide no criteria for how we are to discriminate between
important and unimportant issues that arise in the pol it le011
forum (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Bachrach <lnd Botwinicl:,
1992). Bachrach and Baratz, in fact, question the very concept
of power and if it can be understood as only that whlch i::::
"reflected in concrete decisions" or circumstances "beariorJ
directly upon their making" (Bachrach and Barat?, 1970: 7). H
issues are indeed prevented from arising, so too ilrc pooplc
prevented from acting. (The stUdy of power, therefore, must
focus on who gets what, how and when they get it, and who gets
left out.) When this alternative view of power is upplicu to
groups such as the inshore fishers of Trinity Bay, cxplana-
tions for quiescence and social inequalities arc IJndcrstood
differently. These explanations, I might add, arc significant-
ly different from those found in the one-dimensionill view or
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the pluralist perspective and add considerably to our under-
l::tanding of power relations.
Power is exercised, according to the two-dimensional
approach, not only upon individuals within a decision-making
process, but also towards the exclusion of certain issues and
participants altogether. The question that cornel'> to the fore,
then, is how were fishery issues and grievances managed within
the political arena? Were fishery issues, in fact, considered
or were they relegated to what Bachrach and Baratz called non-
i~::;ues? Do community political institutions reflect the issues
of the people or do they help shape the nature of these
issues? This section will examine the political arena and how
local residents' interests were managed.
'l'he community political arena established to manage as
well as articulate the interests of local people in the
Trini ty-Placentia Bay area is a three partied group4 first
organized in the Fall of 1991. The new organization comprised
two branches of the provincial government (the Department of
Environment and Lands and the Department of Mines and Energy),
the petroleum industry and the B.A.A.C.C. group (the Bull Arm
Area coordinating committee), a local committee representing
t.he impact region. The mandate of the new organization was
The three partied group which contains industry, govern-
ment and the local community never had a formal name.
Throughout this thesis I will refer to the group the same
way other party members have.
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essentially to act as a single umbrella group miltlag ing the
interests of the local impact area with respect to three
specific issue areas: a} to enhance loc<ll employment opportun-
ities, b) to encourage and promote local businezs v(~ntures .,nd
c) to articulate and monitor fishery related issuec. As il
three partied system they came together monthly, ;'I For.milli.:cd
agenda circulated a week in advance, followed by an indepen-
dent meeting of solely B.A.A.C.C. members to continuo dis-
cussions or address other pertinent issues in u more pl-iv<1tc
forum. Other local committees have either beell !:"eplacE'd,
dismantled or, as in the case of the 'Concrete Platform
Advisory Committee,' continue to operate in some rathet' Vil<Jue
capacity. Por local residents, the new structurE:! meant "n
immediate link to government as well as to the oil consortium
- although this objective was seldom realized as it WilG
originally conceived.
In theory, control over the agenda W<lS not. an authoritilt'-
ian process, but rather one in which maximum participation by
all governing bodies was encouraged. Ideally, all parties
would submit to the Chair of the B.A.A,C.C. group issues to be
brought forth during the next formal meeting, where thcl issues
would then appear on the agenda. Yet, this process seldom
materialized. B.A.A.C.C. 's employee, and long time committee
member, for the most part, constructed the agenda in agreement
with HMDC and independent from other committee members. In
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spite of what appeared to be a democratic process, the end
result reveals the suppression of certain key issues and the
promotion of others. AS Crenson points out, the various
demands that rise to some significance within a community
political system, in other words its key political issues, are
often decided by the polity itself (Crenson, 1971). By the
same token, issues that fail to enter the arena may have been
"consigned to political oblivion" by the actions of those
within political institutions (Crenson, 1971: 17). For
example, the system may not, in fact, be 'penetrable,' as the
plurillists believe it to be, where some issues are concerned,
and issues like the Trinity Bay fishery can end up becoming
non-issues. According to one of the former mayors from the
region, the formation of the B.A.A.C.C. group was shaped by
the powerholders and subsequently served to reinforce their
(the oil company's) position.
I was Mayor at the time and I didn't even know the
committee (meaning B.A.A.C.C.) was being formed, it was
done in private ... The few people that for.med it are
brown nosers... Mobil knew who they wanted on that
committee ... they are the ones that say 'yes Mr. Albee,'
'no Mr. Albee.' As the conversation continued, the former
mayor went on to discuss further how the B.A.A.C.C. group
h<ls too easily supported HMDC without questioning their
actions. "The information Centre located in NODECQ's
off ice. That should be off the site. That Information
Centre is not there to represent Mobil .. , It's like
sending the fox to take care of the chicken... The
original idea to have the group was a good one. _ .but the
way it was formed was wrong from the beginning.
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Attendance at these meetings - with the three p.:'Irtied
commi ttee - study of the minutes and interviews with local
B.A.A.. C.C. representatives show the key issues of the rc<)lan
to be such things as employment opportunities far loc.,1 people
and the promoting of small business adventures. fUthouqh <l
fishery representative to articulate grievunces ....a~ ,\ 111cmhl'l"
on the committee, his attendance WClS, <It best, spar,1d i.e. In
fact, on the rare occasion that the fishery rcprcsontat.ivo dill
attend, issues pertaining to the loc.\l inshore riGhcr.-y WCl"L'
never articulated, nor.- were they on the agenda. (S5110S r,1 i~;£'d
by the local committee in general, and the fishory rcrro~.C'l1t,,-
tive in particular, ware framed in such iI wuy as to enCOUr,l(jO
a positive reception by the oil industry. Of ton, the i~:luc~;
raised were consistent with the inclinations of the corpQt'iltc
elite, which would serve to eliminate some issues ulto(jcthcr",
such as those surrounding the inshore fishery. undcrst<lndinq
this form of nonparticipation, however, is cruc i<1 t to our
understanding of power relations.
More often than not, responsibility for in<:Jction or
nonparticipation has been explained by arguml2nts lookinrj ilt
individual deficiencies such as poor edUcational levels or low
incomes or other socio-economic criteria. All too often,
inaction becomes equated with apathy. In trying to account ror.-
nonparticipation of deprived groups, Schatt5chnciclcr argued:
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There is a better explaniltion. Absenteeism reflects the
suppres~:don of the options and alternatives that reflect
the needs of the nonparticipants. It is not necessarily
true that people with the greatest needs participate in
politics most actively - whoever decides what the game is
about also decide!" who gets in the game (Schattschneider,
1960: 105).
According to HMDC's fishery consultant, employed to negotiate
with the fishers, fishery-related issues did not need to be
addressed by the committee: "there's no reason for these
things (issues) to be brought up .. everything is working out
well the way we're doing it. The fishermen are happy, HMDC is
happy, it's just not necessary." Fishery interests were as
Schattschneicler (1960: 71) stated, "organized out" of the
political agenda. In fact, the oil industry's approach in
their negotiations allowed them considerable control over
fishers unci the issues that would appear on the agenda and
subsequently be addressed by the committee.
It would be misleading, therefore, to assume fishers'
silence surrounding their interests to be a form of consensus.
In fact, few fishers at this time were aware of the three
partied committee 1n place and that their interests were
supposed to be represented during these meetings. A young,
well educated fisher from Bellevue, who later left the fishery
to take employment elsewhere with the Hibernia project,
stated:
Up until I came here, I didn't even know it existed
(referring to B.A.A.C.C.) .... like existing for us
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(fishers). We didn't know the fundamental purpose oC the
committee (January, 1993).
Fishers from the neighbouring community of Chance Cove Ihlcl
similar experiences, for example: "never even knew it \~<lS
there, it's no good for us." Even when fishers became ilW;;J.rc of
the group's mandate, they continued to express similar senti-
ments: "Never knew nothing about it, nobody ever told us thClt"
fishers could voice their concerns. "They'd be of no use to U5
anyway," he continued, "people gets on those commlttecs for
themselves, that's all." Although fishers did nat inltiCllly
comprehend the role of the committee, the Sllme C1lnnot be sidd
about the oil industry as it played a critical part In mak inq
sure fishers had as little information as possible. '1'0
maintain the limited knowledge of the powerless, i1r</llc:,
Barnes, "the flow of information to subordinates should 1.)('
relentlessly interdicted, filtered and distorted" (Dilr.-ne:.,
1988: 101).5
In spite of the apparent lack of understanding ot the
political process in place, fishery-related matters ware
articulated on one occasion. Oddly enough, however:, the
state!'!lent was expressed by the- Environmantal supervisor (01:"
HMOC, Paula White, after a mgeting was adjourned. As a result,
the issue was never entered into the Official minutes or
In SUbsequent chapters I will discuss in more detail how
information was controlled by the oil industry.
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subsequent documents arriving from those minutes. White's
comment itself did not, however, address the concerns of local
fishers, but was rather a reference alluding to the prelimi-
nary agreement reached between the oil consortium and the
inshore fishers of Trinity Bay. In fact, White's comment was
the only time fishery-related issues were mentioned throughout
the period in question - September, 1990-March, 1991. Accord-
ing to Bachrach and Baratz, any analysis of power must
comprise an examination of what actually constitutes both
decision making and nondecision making. In other words, they
are reexamining what actually comprises a political issue.
viewed in this way, fishery-related issues fall into the
category of 'nondecision-making.'
As Crenson pointed out in his study of the dirty air
issue in Gary and East Chicago, political institutions have
something similar to an "inarticulate ideology." An ideology
that encourages a rather "selective perception and articula-
tion" of social issues -and a certain 'political climate' thus
develops (Crenson, 1971: 23) - in short, what Bachrach and
Baratz called a 'mobilization of bias.' In this context, it is
easy to see how certain kinds of social phenomena get left off
the agenda. The visible issues that do, in fact, make the
agenda, are also those that are I relatively safe,' although
they may not necessarily be the most important. The end
reSUlt, therefore, is that the political apparatus serves to
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protect the interests of the company, in this case H~lDC. As
Crenson noted the object of inquiry is not "political activity
but political inactivity" (Crenson, 1971: 2J).
The findings suggest that whereas business, employment
and industrial development are topics of much local concern,
the issues affecting the fishery tend to be neglected. \~hat
seemed to be occurring was that the prominence of on~ issue
was associated with the suppression of others. In other wOl'ds,
loca! employment and business interests not only domin,lted t.he
agenda, but silenced debate on the issues of water pollut.ion
and environmental damage, to name but two. Similar findimp;
were noted by Crenson in his research on the dirty air issue,
where a "negative association between the air pollution ilod
economic development issues" was found as t.estimony to the
competition that exists between political issues (Crcnson,
1971: 165). As Crenson pointed out, a political organization
that consigns itself to one specific kind of issue helS the
potential to commit itself to an entire spectrum o[ similar
issues, While, at the same time, minimizing its ability to
address other more antagonistic concerns.
Crenson's research, however, called attention to the
issues themselves where he organized them into one of two
categories: issues that are either 'collective' or 'specific.'
Collective issues, Crenson believed, could be best thought of
as matters such as air and water pollution, issues that affect
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the collective good. Specific issues, on the other hand, were
seen as those that af!ect individual good such as business or
employment opportunities. This means, then, that issues that
are either collective or specific tend to cluster together so
that the cOlilJllunity's political agenda is less likely to
contain both kinds of political concerns. Instead, one finds
a general bias towards issues that are either relatively
collective or those that are relatively specific.
similar arguments to those made by Crenson can be made
for the case of Trinity Bay. Specific issues encouraged the
proliferation of other similar kinds or issues, while collec-
tive concerns were kept latent. For example, local business
opportunities soon led into issues around the selling of
crafts or other cottage industry goods. Conversely, collective
issues remained oft the agenda and somehow took on a 'hidden'
status. While it would be lironq to 5UggC!st that the labour
market is not a collective concern, the liay in lihich the
community organization defined employment relegated it to the
category of specific issues. Employment Iii thin the political
arena was considered as only those positions that were created
by onshore development; the areas of work previously estab-
lished, on the other h2md, such as the fishery were not
"0
included in their definition. Ei The items on the political
agenda, therefore, neither encourage the scope of politic,)l
discussions to include all aspects of the labour market nor to
contain collective as well as specific issues. Instead, the
politit;al agenda encourages the scope of debate to develop
along a cer.tain path (Crenson, 1971: 71).
Throughout much of this time period some of Nobi l' s
central players, along with NODECO off~r.ials, were high Ly
visible on the local committee, never sending reprcsentativc~~
as a SUbstitute. Their presence, so it seemed, went hand in
hand with their "generosity" as they donated a large amollnt to
the startup of the B.A.A.C.C. group. At every meeting, there
appeared on the agenda an added contt'ibution from ei.ther HMDC
or NODECO. Yet, as Eipper shows, HMDC behaved in 'rrinity-
Placentia Bay as Gulf did in Bantry Bay. The flnillll..:la l
contributions, Elpper argued, were often a plo}' the industry
used to silence potentially sensitive issues (Eipper, 1989).
In other words, the power holding group develops a series of
practices which reinforce the acquiescence of local people.
What may first appear as genuine support for the B. A. It. C. C.
group is nothing more than the deploying of various myths to
maintain the status quo: for elo::alllple, the myth of th£l chari.ty
In the North Sea, particularly Scotland, the impact of
offshore development on established industries has been
more serious. See Blackadder (1986) for a full Dis-
cussion.
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and generosity of the corporate elite. As Freire points out,
the powerholder is "fostering selective good deeds" which, in
turn, reinforce people's belief that the elite somehow
"promote the advancement of the people" (Freire, 1970: 135-
36). The response, then, of local residents is compliance -
their gesture of appreciation or gratitude for the donations
received. To be sure, the donations secured from the oil
company did, in fact, help camouflage key issues, while at the
same time they served to contain any potential criticism. As
one of the local mayors argued:
That committee is not going to be able to do nothing
they I ve already demonstrated that... Their too busy
try ing to keep Mobil and the rest of them happy. If you
asks me, it's like being ir. bed with the industry
(December, 1992).
4.2.2 The 'Non-issue' of Women
While fishers may, in fact, sit on the periphery of any debate
or discussion taking place about onshore dGVa'lopment, the
women employed in the processing sector have virtually been
excluded from the discussion altogether. To correct this
omission an empirical analysis will make visible the most
significant non-issue surrounding the managing of fishery
interests, the iSSlie of fish plant labourers.
Although women might not say so pUblicly, interviews with
f ish plant workers revealed their apprehension about the
likely impacts onshore development would have on the plant,
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especially the possibility that it would lead to their loss of
employment. "It we lost the plant it would be like a cl<1p of
thunder that hit and split it all open ... We'd be in some
state, Illy dear, don't know what would happen to us." Thet"e W<iS
a long pause between sentences .hen Vera looked up and sa id:
"the fishermen depends upon that too." The agreement reached
between the inshore fishers and the oil industry acknowledCJe5
the contributions of 'visibly' rewarded male fi5het"s engaged
in the harvesting sector. Women, on the other hand, who
contribute to the 'invisible' work in the processing soctor
were largely ignored throughout the negotiation procoss.
Naomi, the wife of a local fisher, was one of the first women
to be hired at Smith's Seafoods. Since, then, she has been
employed in a number of different capacities until today l'ihe
has the position of floor lady. She was visibly torllented by
the little attention paid by HMOe toward the issues of ploJnt
labourers. She stated:
If the fishermen can't put their nets out, they're not
going to get any fish, and if that's the case, it is
going to affect us too. ... but as far as they're
concerned the plant isn't going to be affected.
Naomi's neighbour, Sophie, the wife of a local skipper
expressed similer thoughts:
Yes, the plent workers wanted compensation. We thought we
would be affected ... but the plant was excluded from the
negotiations. Now we let it go for awhile ... \ole didn't do
too much on the first of it ... After Joe (Sophie's
husband) would come from a meeting with HMDC I'd ask him
if anybody said anything about the plant ... I ko:!pt saying
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to Joe, well, you're being compensated so what happens to
us? ... I think Joe was the first one to mention it to
Paula white ... She didn't want to meet with us, but she
had some pressure put on her so they sent out Dave Day
(H!1DC representative), Stewart Ryan (NODECO representa-
tive) and Paula White. She was. really hostile ... She said
she didn't see how we would be affected so she didn't
offer us any compensation. They said if anything did
happen then later we would get something ... it was a 'wait
and see' thing.
Despite fishers' reluctance to articulate or include in
their negotiations with Hfmc, the issue of compensation for
the plant workers, they did, in effect, express in private the
view that compensation should have been extended to the
processing plant and that negotiations between the two sectors
should not have been segregated. "They wanted to negotiate
with the plant separate," commented one of the fishers
negotiating with HMDC. "They wanted to keep it two separate
issues ... but they should have been involved with our agree-
ment." HMDC was insistent, fishers stated, on keeping the
issues of the plant out of the negotiations. ".They told us
that they would deal wi~h the plant after the fishermen had
reached their agreement."
By the time the plant workers had arranged a meeting with
HMDC the f h.hers from the Cove had already settled their
compensation package with the oil industry. According to one
of the plant women, "they only agreed to come out 'cause we
threatened them that we w(.Juld go to the media." Although
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reluctant, Paula White along with other ke~' Mobil players did
agree to meet with plant workers in the local. church basement:
They came out showing us big pictures of Hibernia and
what it was going to look like and so on ... Finally, we
told her we didn't want to see pictures <lnd that turned
her right off ... It was a waste of time to talk to her.
They had their minds made up before they ever· came out
here.
One of the central plant organizers for the meeting later
expressed how she wished: "the hell they didn't come out. I~e
didn't get anything settled. It don't make sense to me. They
told us that the plant \>10uldn't be affected. Everything W<ln
in an uproar when they said we weren't going to get nothing."
According to anot.her plant worker:
Paula White came out for two meetings ... her re~ponse W.:IS
that we were not affected directly, so there would be no
compensation ... Her attitude was you guys do what I want.
She listened, but it was going in one ear and out the
other •.• We depend on the local catch and if the men have
nothing then we have nothing. If the boats were coming in
on the traffic lanes fishermen would be reimbursed for
that day cause they couldn't fish, but we lost iI day's
pay for that.
For some, the plant provides the only form of hnuschold
income either because both parties are dependent upon wages
generated from processing labour or plant incomes compr ise the
sale means of household support. George and his partner Myrtle
have lived in Chance Cove all their lives and have worked <It
the plant for close to fifteen years. Their economic survival
is solely dependent upon their earnings from the processing
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plant. "It's like she (Paula White) wasn't interested in
plant workers at all," said George:
They only came out as a formality thing. They had no
intentions of getting us anything ... It was like talking
to the wall it was ... They did nothing but say, 'you kiss
my ass'... (George is now standing and appears visibly
troubled by the issues. As he leaves the room he asserts
rather boisterously): We should have been negotiated
with.
In his absence, Myrtle tried desperately to excuse her
husband's behaviour arguing that HMDC's lack of interest in
negotiating with fish plant workers left him quite distraught.
This is not difficult to comprehend when one looks at the
world from where George standn. The economic survival of the
0' Brian household is contingent upon the two incomes from the
processing plant. HMDC's unwillingness to protect fish plant
workers' incomes creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and, in
George's case, anxiety. Not long after his abrupt departure,
he returns to the discussion calmer and more composed. As he
enters the living room Myrtle remains silent. Without acknowl-
edging his own absence, George continues the conversation as
if time had not interrupted the dialogue.
There is so much bureaucracy in all this, it's hopeless.
I~e have to want ~o long to get: anything done ... it makes
no sense. It's pointless to talk about it any more,
nothing is going to get done. What use is it any more in
just going over it and over it. Mobil can do whatever the
fuck they want and not Wells not nobody is going to say
fuck all to them. They don't no more carE' about what
happens to the plant workers; as far as we're concerned
we are nothing more than dirt under their feet. It's all
a game to them.
126
Although plant workers, as they said, felt "put out" by
Mobil's response, they did initially attempt to pursue 50me
kind of negotiation with the industry_ After their first
rather unsuccessful meeting, some of the women formed a small
committee where they continued correspondence with HHI..lC's
Environmental Supervisor. "She (Paula White) did l.,rritc ..
letter back," said one of the women, saying "that the traffic
lanes weren't going to be used and if they were they would
come out again ... We weren't going to get anythi.ng fl:"om them
anyway, so we left it." These non-decisions <Ire rCully
decisions of a kind which serve to prevent a certain course of
action. Much of HMDC's behaviour resembles that which H<lrold
Lasswell (:1.950) called 'politics of prevention' where the oil
industry was successful in keeping the issues of the plant off
the community agenda with fishers' negotiations ilnd <H".,y from
the attention of the B.A.A.C.C. group.
The Newfoundland fishery is, for the most part, defined
by both the harvesting and processing sectors. "'ct. financial
compensation from the oil industry extends only to those who
harvest the catch. The implications we can draw from this
indicate the costs of onshore development will fall dispropor-
tionately on ....omen emflloyed in the processing sector. Accord-
ing to one of the plant women:
If we were unionized we would have been on the compensa-
tion. She (Paula White) wouldn't have gotten away with
it ... Who did we have to fight for us as plant workers?
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We were really upset about it ... There was a lot of
hostility. Negotiations with the fishermen were stretched
out for a couple of months. Joe (her spouse) and them
really had a fight on their hands. But why are we any
different. the men got their compensation?
Fish plant women, in fact, were poorly organized to take any
effective part in planning for onshore development which
contributed to their minimal influence in negotiating success-
fully for compensation. In addition, the plant's non-unionized
status restr icted further women's ability to seek compensation
through collective action. IIIf we had a union we figure we
would have hi:ld more," was a frequently uttered comment by many
of the women. The economic survival of the plant, where many
of these women work, is contingent upon the catch from local
crews. without access to sea resources in and around Bull Arm,
the fishers from the Cove will experience a considerable
reduction in their overall catch. A reduced harvest could
seriously jeopardise the security of the plant and future
employment prospects for these women. As stated by one of the
local fishers:
If Mobil puts that traffic lane through the Arm the
fishermen from the area are going to lose 50 percent of
their catch and if that happens there's a good chance the
plant won't open next year.
While this particular fisher was hesitant to state the
necessi ty of the second income, his spouse, a plant labourer,
continued the conversation. "If the plant don't open, then I
don't lenow what we're going to do when my stamps runs out."
Never during the period, albeit brief, in which plant
workers attempted to negotiate with the oil industry did mlDC
acknowledge the impact onshore development would hilve on the
processing sector. ThElY attempted, when questioned, to
counteract the statement by suggesting thilt they were provid-
ing a "community" bonus to all fLshing communities, thOl-cby
compensating, so they argued, for women's lost wages. Commit-
tee members, on the other hand, from the provincial government
and the B.A.A.C.C. group - who each comprise i1 segment of tho
three partied system in place to manage the interests of the
fishery - were entirely unaware of the fish plant's existence.
The only segment of the organization that was informed fully
about the issues of the plilnt '....as, in fact, the oil indllstry.
Dahl's view, then, that all groups can "make themselves hCilnl
at some crucial stage in the process of decision-milkinq" docs
not actually hold true (Dahl, 1956: 137).
Both sides of the Atlantic are similar where issue~;
surrounding the neglect of fish plant workers arc concerned.
As Blackadder pointed out, Shetland axpar .lenced il cons j derab l,e
number of fish plant closures during the 1970s when Scotl.lnd
began to exploit, more rigorously, offshore resources (FHilcl'.-
adder, 1986: 51). Yet, the literature would suggest that the
problems experienced by fish plant workers are, in fact, non-
issues. In other words, the literature has failed to account
for plant workers' experiences of offshore development as weI!
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as having ignored th~ question of whether compensation was
~y.tended to the processing sector. Other parallels, events
illustrating community power, can be seen in Parenti's work on
lower-strata blacl: Americans who attempt to influence dec i-
sions from' the bottom up' (Parenti, 1970). "There exists,"
Parent i argued, "the world of the rulers and the world of the
r'ulcti" ilnti "blacks find themselves inhabiting the second"
(Parenti, 1970: 519).
1'0 assert that the '....omen from the cove or (as in the case
of Parenti's study) that black Americans have a potential
power thilt would succeed were they to choose to use it is the
same as saying that their non-participation is simply a matter
of choice. Such an argum~nt dismisses the fact that the
abj lity to act to or to "convert potentiality into actuality"
is in itself a form of power (Parenti, 1970: 527). In other
words, the successful exercise of any potential power requires
certain preceding resources in order to act. Contrary to the
pluralist arguments as suggested by Dahl and Polsby, the
practices of the political system do not ensure that all
groups will have access to decision making arenas.
The two-dimensional view of power adds much to our
understanding as it incorporates into the analysis questions
of control over the agenda and the ways in which certain
issues are kept out of the political process. Yet, as Lukes
would suggest, in trying to account for all the potentially
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invisible issues we create a rather false picture of thl!
practices of groups, individuals, organizations and institu-
tions and how they succeed in preventing key issue!> (rom
arising in the political process_ It is crucLnl, therefol-e, to
discriminate between decisions, choices made cnnscimwty by
individuals where alternatives exist, and the 1J1<ls of tho
system, which can be 'mobilized' or restructured in certa in
ways that are not individually chosen or consciously intended
(Lukes, 1974: 21). for Bachrach and Barat;.: their "main conC(H"1l
is not whether the defenders of the status quo usc thei r pO\~el"
consciously, but rather if and how they exercise it <lnll wh<lt
effects it has on the political process und other ':H..:torG
within the system" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 50).
For Lukes, the bias of the system is not mere 1y nhl i n-
tained by "a series of individually chosen acts," lmt more
significantly "by the socially structured and cuI tura I IY
patterned behaviour" of institutions, groups or org<lnizilt lons
"which may indeed be manifested by individuals' inaction"
(Lukes, 1974: 21-22). To this end, the power to control the
agenda and prevent certain grievances from being articulated
cannot be understood adequately unless it is seen a!? <l
function of "collective forces" and/or "social arrangements"
(Lukes, 1974: 22). To argue differently, as do Bachrach ami
Baratz, one runs the risk of analysis that suffers [rom
methodologica lind i v idualism.
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The theoretical accounts provided in both the one-
dimensional and two-dimensional views of power do not, in
fact, go far enough to explain why fishers wilfully entered
into a contractual arrangement with HMOC. While the argument
put forth by Bachrach and Baratz lIlakes visible previously
hidden aspects of power relations, it accepts as genuine what
appears to be widespread acquiescence. Despite the crucial
difference between the one and two-dimensional view, there
exists a significant characteristic in both analyses, the
emphasis on observable conflict, either overt or covert.
Fishers and plant labourers' acceptance of HMOe's development
plan duriny the onshore phase, then, does not suggest conflict
or strife. Fishers' stated preferences, moreover, indicate
their actual interests where silence on any issue. is under-
stood as some form of consent.
4.3 Shaping perceptions
What may, in effect, appear to be quiescence need not imply
consensus, but rather it may indicate a situation of domina-
tion and control. In the 1I.-B scheme used in the present power
analysis, A might not only exercise power over B in resolving
key issues or by preventing B from articulating those issues,
but also through shaping B' s understanding of those issues
altogether. As Lukes succinctly put it, power not only exists
when A is successful in getting B to do what A wants, but also
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in how A shapes, influences and determines the very natur:c of
B's wants (Lukes, 1974: 22). Power is most effectively
exercised, thought Lukes, when it is wielded against others in
such a way as to pr:event them from having any recognized
grievance in circumstances ....here people's wants <llld pr.e fel--
ences have been shaped or disguised so that they accept tIle
order of things as natural. The three-dimensional view at'
power is useful as it sheds light on how fishers' came to
understand their interests and iot'hy they supported the actions
of HMOC. This approach examines the perceptions fishers h'lve
about the conflict and subsGquently links thOSG perceptions to
power processes.
4.3.1. Negotiating with HMDC
During the Fall of 1990 the key issues surrounding oM.hora
development, as fishers themselves professed, could be seen as
falling into one ot three areas: the demise of fishers'
culture and lNay of life; environmental destruction; and <l
threat to fishers' individual livelihood (Ottenheir.u~r, 1990).
Yet, the situation in which fishers later fount: themselves
(entering into a contractual arrangement with HMO':) had little
bearing on either protecting their lNay of life 0'" the naturi.ll
resource. Interaction between the two sectors we ~ constructed
so that negotiations focused predominately around loss of
income and not around issues relating to environmental
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concerns or cultural practices. This was by no means uninten-
tional, but rather a deliberate and thoughtful).y calculated
means to achieve certain ends, the suppression and containment
of conflict. When fishers later reflected back upon the
negotiation process, they recognized not only the insufficient
amount of time given to issues concerning the natural environ-
ment and their way of life, but lilore importantly, how HMDC
would approach the very subject matter. "In the meetings this
would come up from time to time," commented A.lonzo', n ... but
there should have been more meetings on that." Albert's
account of the negotiations, however, reveals more clearly the
oil industry's intention to both silence and redirect fishers'
concerns. "They would brush it off," commented Albert, "they
would say that we have an environmental protection plan to
take care of that." Other fishers, however, spoke of the oil
industry's promises as evidenced in Jack's remark: "she
guaranteed us that nothing would happen." Comments such as
these, served to silence any further discussion, while
allowing attention to focUs around the issue of financial
compensation. As uttered by one of the fishers from Bellevue:
They were coming right at us asking what can we do for
you. They kept on their toes constantly giving to the
fishermen... It shocked us at first the way they were
giving us the money (February, 1993).
Data from Alonzo and Albert are from the winter of 1993.
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What we see taking place is the process through which fishers'
'real' interests were being twisted and disguised in such i\
way as to shape the nature of their preferences around issues
of short-term economic gain. In other words, HMDC's agenda
during negotiations successfully suppressed fishers' 're,ll'
interests where fishers themselves began to articulate issues
around matters of cOllpensation, neutralizing any overt
conflict. Evidence, then, ,~uggests that the prior consensus to
sign the agreement with the oil industry had been a miwipu-
lated one.
As stated previously, fishers knew little af the develop-
ment planning that taok place over the previous ten yeurs,
which contributed further to their own powerlessness. fisher'S'
subordinate position from the beginning allowed the all
industry to dominate the structure of the negotiiltion process
where KMDe initiated most meetings and the nature of the
discussion to follow. According to one of the fishers from
Bellevue:
Paula and Sam and them had agenda~ which they took to illl
the fishermen from Sunnyside, Bellevue, Chance Cove ilnu
further on.
Moreover, fishers were dependent on HMDC, while they may not
have been cognizant of it, to become informed about the
onshore project, which further limited the knowledge they
obtained. For example, fishers were uninformed of the recom-
mendations outlined by the Canilda-Newfoundland Offshore
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Petroleum Board (1986) which stated that a comprehensive
policy to compensate for any loss or damage to fishery
interests should be in place before the project commences
(CNOPB, 1986: 96). Fishers experienced this as the oil
industry 'hurrying' and not necessarily as a government
requirement before the onset of development. "They were in
somo..l big hurry to get the deal signed" uttered one of the
skippers involved in the negotiations.
for tile most part, fishers were unaware of the extent to
Which they lacked critical information about the onshore
project. One of the skippers reflecting back on the negoti-
ation process commented on how HMOC provided information to
fishers rather selectively. He stated, "everything is on a
need to know basis"S which illustrates how HMOC sought to
control the information process. Similarly, Shell's handling
of the Brent discovery off Shetland reveals much resemblance
with Mobil as the company released information only as it
suited it: in particular, Shell kept the discovery of the oil
well secret for roughly one year, which set the pattern for
further oil development in Shetland. Effective domination, to
be sure, entails that the powerless "should possess so much
knowledge and no more" (Barnes, 1988: 101). The result of this
strategy is that the dominant shape the consciousness of the
Data are from December of 1992.
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subordinate, which, in turn, determines how the powerless, in
this case fishers, understand reality.
4 ..L2 'Divide and RUlfl,9
The oil industry was successful not only in theit:' control over
the agenda during the negotiation period, but also in how tllCy
effectively managed to splinter the popUlation of fishers from
Trinity Bay. These men did not negotiate with HMDC as il group
of fishers from the region as such, but wet:'e divided by the
oil industry along community boundaries. In other wonlG,
fishers were not united during their negotiations, insteud
settlements stood as distinct communities, or <IS i.n the C.1se
of Norman's Cove, fragments of a communi ty. "The wuy we
negotiated was wrong," commented one of the fi.shers from
Bellevue:
we would have been better oU if we worked together ... not
negotiating community by community. It was the best th ing
for HMDC and th£!y knew what they were doing... Yes, j t
was like divide and ~-:onc;:uer.
Fishers entered into discussions witb HMDC as small and
poorly organized individual fishing communities. They were,
moreover, ignorant of how other fishers in neighbouring
communities, fishers who would experience similtlr imp"...:i:s from
onshore development, had acted or attempted to act with the
Data in this section come from the winter of 1992 until
March, 1993.
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oil company. As Barnes points out, "the powerless will find
that they do not know what others, similarly powerless, are
about to do or likely to do" (Barnes, 19B8: 98). Fishers'
actions were, then, hindered by their own lack of understand-
Ing of ....hat had t.aken place with other fishers. "If we stuck
together," argued one of the skippers, "and we all knew what
the other community was doing then maybe things would be
different." Fishers' lack o( information coupled with their
inexperience in dealing with multinational corporations
immobilized them, where they were, in effect, unable to make
the most of their rotential to act. As Earl, a fisher from
Norman's Cove ....ho attempted to find out about other fishers'
experiences with HMOC, states:
This is what Sam and them wanted was to divide us up ... So
after when they started going community by community I
went down to a meeting in sunnyside the fishermen were
having with Mobil and they (referring to ~lobill asked me
to leave ... But this is what Paula White and them wants
is to divide the fishermen.
AS the powerholder begins to impose itself upon the
subordinate popUlation, it is essential, wrote Freire, to
divide the powerless and keep them divided in order to remain
in power. Unification is an ingredient the dominant cannot
afford as it would "undoubtedly signify a serious threat to
their own hegemony" (Freire, 1970: 141). Any mellns of setting
limits on fishers actions, preventing them from either acting
collectively or gaining knowledge about their own situation,
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is considered crucial to securing corporate power. As one of
the more senior sid ppers commented:
They drove that wedge in between us bit by bit until the
fishermen started to ask for their own meetings. It WilS
sunnyside fishermen that first went. off on their own, and
wtlen that happened all the fishermen's committees wilntcd
their own meeting ... At the time we didn't think much of
it.
similar comments were made by other fishers further alollCJ the
mouth of the Arm, as evidenced by liindzell:
Mobil wanted to do community by community ... It was better
for them to have the fishermen divided up, then, to h;lVe
to negotiate with all of us as one big group .. , IViln
Johnson (fisher from Placentia Day responsible fOl" p~st
negotiations with Mobil) told us that we were better 0[[
sticking together because as a group we could be a lot
stronger.
Although HMDC is now, according to most fishers, hold
responsible for dividing the inshore crews, ilt the time o[
negotiations, fishers blamed one another. with divisions <:I1omJ
community boundaries and Where animosity between fizhcrs
flourished, the process itself had became establishod, or
perhaps more appropriately, self propelling. The following
comment illustrates fishers' apprehensions and how they wcre
directed mainly toward the fishers from the town of Sunnyside.
sunnyside fishermen thinks that if they negotiates on
their own, they're going to get more then if they stay
with the rest of us ..• Lord Jesus you can't tell them
nothing. That crowd's different •.. They don't make
nothing at the fishery anyhow; they're not Whilt we calls
true fishermen.
The strategy of 'divide and rule. ' as mapped out by Barnct>
(1988) and Freire (1970) in addit-.ion to many other social
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scientists, has proven to be an effective form of domination,
.....here it has constrained concerted action on the part of the
fishers as well as their access to crucial information, thus,
illustrating power in the second and third dimensions. stated
differently, fishers unarticulated grievances reveal the two-
dimensional view; three-dimensional power, on the other hand,
1s seen operating in the mechanisms employed by HMDC to
neutralize recognition of any grievance.
4..3. J Appearance and Promise
Appearance and promise, crucial components for petroleum
developers on both sides of the Atlantic, went hand-in-hand
throughout much of the early period of onshore development. To
be sure, key Mobil players in the industry wer.e highly visible
in the local area where they participated in and attended many
community events. often, on request they would visit certain
settlements to meet with v~rious groups and townspeople to
address any concerns residents might have. They were certain
to attend themselves, never sending representatives in their
plelce. By 1993, however, the situation was quite different:
many central Mobil players had in fact left Newfoundland to
return to the U.S. As Wills suggested, they made reassuring
promises that all ....ould be well, while playing "down the
impact of the impending development" (Wills, 1991: 8). Similar
accounts could be heard in Trinity Bay where one of the local
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mayors claimed: "We were told that benefits would go back to
the local community. My dear, it was promises, promises,
promises. "
Other community leaders, speaking more critically of the
oil project, suggested that Mobil Oil officials had planned
their strategies in order to effectively influence <'Ind
manipulate the local people. The following comment illustrates
well how three-dimensional power was operating during this
period of development.
We in this area have been shafted, shafted,
shafted ... Gerry Ablee, John Banks and Catherine Small
(key Mobil players) came out here a number of years ago
and led us by the nose .•.They wet'e highly trained and
they knew exactly what they were doing. The s<l.d thing is
we didn't know what they were doing ... You'd ask them a
question and they were programmed to answer .•. they knew
what to say ... The people in this area wet'e led down the
garden path and never knew no better. When they fLrst
came out they promised us everything. They carne out to
all our meetings and were really friendly to all the
people .... We even gave them a big dinner one yea r lip in
the town hall. .. that was a mistake .... We shoul.d have
demanded our rights up front and if they didn't like it
well take the project somewhere else .•. Later on we were
criticized for being negative because we wet'e asking
questions and we were ostracized tor it ... You got to
give them credit for being smart (NOvember, 1992).
Fishers too spoke critically of how things have changed since
the early days of onshore activity. "At first when they were
coming out they would bend over backwards, but now it is
completely different ••• hindsight is a great thing." Another
fisher along the Arm expressed similar sentiments:
on the first of it they were coming out all the time and
asking what we wanted done; telling us we could call them
if we had any questions. A.nd now, my dear, they don't
come handy.. As soon as that deal was signed that was
it, they didn't come out no more (January, 1993).
During the early negotiations with fishers, HMDC worked
hard ilnd successfully to earn fishers' trust and eventual
support. The oil company was applauded for its efforts and
willingness to participate in rural cultural practices. "She
(Paula White) even went out fishing with some of the boys ... ,"
was a frequently uttered remark by local fishers. Moreover,
the oil industry's generosity, by way of gift giving to
certain individuals crucial to successful negotiations,
brought the company much acceptance where it demonstrated, to
fishers, the industL"Y'S sincerity and desire to help local
people. For example, the chairperson of the fishermen's
committee in Sunnyside had his telephone installed by the oil
company and his mother, Winnie, received flowers from Paula
White. winnie continues to speak fondly of Paula White,
although she has not seen her since the rishers signed their
agreement more than two years ago. Despite what has since
happened to the fishers' compensation with HMDC, Winnie is
certain that the oil companies involved ""ith the development
of the Hibernia field would not act in such a way as to harm
the local fishers:
My dear, they've been here to my house when they' ve been
out to see Clarence (Winnie I s son and chair of fisher-
men's committee) ... And I can tell you right now that
Paula White and John Banks are good people ... I know they
cares about the fishermen out here; I know they do ...
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They listened to what we had to say and they did right by
the fishermen ..• Every time Clarence had to go to town
for a meeting they took care of all of his expcnses ...
They've been good to us I guarantee you (Oecember, 1997.).
One rather effective and convincing appt'o<lch ro,my
powerholders adopt is to manipulate others, in this cnso the
inshore fishers, by encouraging the belief th<lt thcy are bcirHj
helped. According to Freire, manipulation is effective d" it:
serves the 'conquest.' "The oppressors arc the onc,;:, II he
wrote, who act upon others "to indoctrinate tham and .ld just
them to a reality which must remain untouched" {Freire, l'rlO:
SJ). In other words, powerholders try to milkc othern con!orm
to their objectives. systematic acts of gcncro::;it.y, illl; IlldillCj
the industry's offer of financial compensation to l i5hol':,;
coupled with community bonuses and individual (.Ion':1(: iom;,
served to manipulate and reshape fishers' pcrccption~. For
Freire, a parallel can be made with various other social
programs as they "act as anaesthetic, distr<Jcting the
oppressed from the true causes of their prol>l.~m~" and I rom
creative decisions to subsequently change the i r si tua t ion
(Freire, 1970: 147),
".3." Linguistic: Symbols
Mobil's strategy to camOUflage fishers' 'real' intercsts wos
often implemented in rather indeterminute woys. Indu:.>try
consultants and representatives used language 10:0 'co-
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existence' to describe how the two sectors would interact
throughout the on~hore phase of Hibernia. As argued by the
industry's Environmental Coordinator, "there's no reason why
the Arm can't be used for regular fishing activity. I don't
sec why the fishermen and the industry can't co-exist." To be
sur-e, some fishers began to adopt the language themselves to
closer ibe their- perceptions of how the two ::;pr::tors '<lOuld work
together. "I think co-existence between Mobil and the fisher-
men is possible; we can work along side one another," corn-
man ted one of the fishers from Chance Cove.
As fishers began to reflect back on their interaction
with mlDC during the period of negotiations, their understand-
ing at' what took place became considerably differe;lt. As
argued by one of the skippers from Norman's Cove, co-exist--
Well it's great on paper. \~e're told you do this or you
won't get compensation. If that's co-existence than I
suppose we're co-existing•.. They like to say that we can
a 11 work together, but the truth of the matter is, is
that we got to do what they want or else we get nothing
(February, 1993).
Symbols, or more generally the discourse of Mobil, have
worked to generate consensus. 'Co-existence,' and other
rel"ted terms such as 'spin-ofis,' have been used effectively
by the industry to help shape fishers' perceptions and the
nature of their 'real' interests. As expressed by one of the
local fishers during a discussion about employment opportun-
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ities stemming from thE: Hibernia project: "I already got one
son in Ontario and that's enough ... maybe the girls will get
something here once them spin-offs happen." Other phrases were
adopted by the industry to describe their interaction with
fishers during the negotiation period. Thesc phr<l~cs WCl'C
taken up by fishers themselves; for example, both IlHDC
officials and fishers would cite HMDe's commitmecnt to "ttlKC
care of the fishermen." In the introduction of this thesis
Eli's account shows similar experiences: "I can hear them now
telling us that Mobil is going to take care of the fishermen."
Similarly, HMoe's phrase, "in good faith," was USE!d to
describe how the industry negotiated with fishers. Oddl;
enough, fishers continued to use these phrases to disclose the
conditions under which they entered into the contractuill
arrangement with AMOC. According to one of the fishers from
Chance Cove: "Fishermen signed that agreement in good f.aith,
they aren' t going to settle for less. II
If we argue that linguistic symbols do, in fact, express
and help shape consciousness, then these terms and phrases
must be considered more than mere words and their use
than just coincidence. For these symbols, I contend, were
imposed upon a subordinate population, a group that later
adopted the values of corporate developers. In citing de
Beauvoir, Freire writes: the interests of the powerholdcr~
rest with "changing the consciousness of the opprcs:;ed, not
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the situation which oppresses them," and the more the subordi-
nate adapt to their condition the more likely the domination
will continue (Freire, 1970; 60). Linguistic symbols did, in
fact, help to mould the consciousness of subordinate others,
or aore specifica.lly, inshore fishers. Moreover, linguistic
patterns, similar to those developed in Trinity Bay, could be
seen in the Appalachian valley '(0 the industrial powerhold-
el:"S imposed their value system upon miner-mountaineers.
Perhaps the best example of this was the way in which names of
streets, mines and schools from the existing culture were
replaced with those from the new order (Gaventa, 1980: 66).
Whether we call it a "direct ap;>ropriation of local culture"
(Gaventa, 1980) or simply "cultural invasion" (rreire, 1970),
the end result is the same. 'I'tle powerholdcrs intrude upon
local culture, imposing their domillant view of the world, In
this social phenomenon, the dominant are the "authors of, and
actors in, the process" Where they objectify those invaded
(Freire, 1970: 150). These forms of domination entail either
physical or overt practices, or methods of camouflage and
disguise so that the dominant take the appearance of a helping
friend,
".3. S Power1ossness
There is, finally, one other process of shaping fishers
consciousness ....hich derives from their continued interaction
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with powerholders, that is, developed o[
powerlessness. Among many subordinate populations, Giwcnttl
suggests, there exists a certain apathy or fatalism which
initially seems to preclude any kind of action. As Cavonta
illustrated in the case of miners working in t.he AppillilchLw
coal camp, a sense of powerlessness may emerge "as an i1dilpt ive
response to the exploitative situation" (Ga'/enta, 1980: 97.).
Stated differently, the more the non-elite adopt the r.oles
imposed on them, the more probable it is that:. they will adjust
to their situation as i.t is, and to the fragmented view of
reality Which subsequently follows (Freire, 1970: 60).
According to one of the local fishers' accounts or tho
dialogue that took place between the men in his crew: "the
fishermen were saying we are like a mouse against an clQph-
ant",they're too big for us; they're a big oil company."
Other, more marginal fishers in the bottom of the Arm
expressed comparable sentiments: "I just wanted her signed, we
were afraid we wouldn't get nothing .... " similarly, Mueller's
work is about groups which "cannot articulate their interests
or perceive social conflict. Since they have been socialized
into compliance, so to speak, they accept the definitions o[
political reality as offered by dominant groups, classes or
government institutions" (MUeller, 1973: 9). Elsewhere in
Newfoundland, Leyton observed social patterns among miners,
suffering from the debilitating Black Lung disease, which
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coincided with some of the fishers' rather fatalistic outlook
on reality.
4o.4o Conclusion
In this chapter I have begun to explore the quiescence
phenomenon by first mapping out fishers' 'real' interests: in
other words, how fishers would have acted or thought were it
not for the power of the oil consortium. Understanding the
relevant counterfactual is crucial in ordC!:r for the observer
to comprehend the social processes Which later emerged. It is
not merely an observation of changes; in fishers' perceptions,
but rather an understanding of the relations of social power
which helped shape those perceptions. To understand how
fisher' interests were, in fact, camouflaged I began the
analysis by looking in detail at the less visible aspects of
power, in particular the two-dimensional view articulated by
Bachrach and Barat2: (1970). Their argument reveals how certain
issues became non-issues and were consequently organized out
of the political arena. Empirical evidence, moreover,
uncovered less visible aspects of the fishery, women in the
processing sector, thus illustrating how plant workers
interests were neglected by the oil company.
The final section of this chapter deals specifically with
how HMDC effectively mal~aged to camouflage the interests of
fishers Where they willingly entered into the agreement with
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HMDC. I have identified in this section the means by which one
could observe how peoples' choices were moulded. Regardless of
Whether attitudes are shaped through the usc of symbols,
myths, promises, manipUlation, or some form of choice ,,\luang
alternatives presented to fishers in a power situ<ltian, tho
impacts are the same. perceptions are turned away from their
I rea l' interests to acceptance of the wclys, va lues ,lna
pra,=tices af the dominant arder. in :Jther wards, to become
voluntary participants in a culture of silence.
What kept the issues from arising in the ilt'cnil of local
politics? What prevented fishers and plant labourers [rom
recognizing the social inequities surrounding thorn? ChClpter
fi ve will address these questions illustrating first, how
patterns of power endure over time ilnd second, whtlt h.:lppons




'We Never Knew No Better'
Maintaining Control and the Collapse of Consent
We didn't understand much about the oil industry on the
first of it. So they (HMDC) came out meeting after meet-
ing ... We tried to get something in place to protect us;
we tried to get a traffic lane that wouldn't adversely
(Iffect the fishermen in the area. We had to get compensa-
tion in some way for that. .. The compensation was like
this. They (HMDC) came back to us; they arranged a five
YC(lr base for every fisherman ... The fishermen were
satisfied with this. Last year was the first year the
progr(lm started and ... overall it was a good year. HMDC
was pleased with it; fishermen were happy with the system
(December, 1992).
One of the greatest barriers to overcoming social inequities
is the realization of one's subordinate position: the "opp
ressive reality," wrote Freire, "absorbs those within it,"
where it obscures peoples' perceptions of the social world
(Freire, 1970: 561). All too often, the subordinate remain in
situations which further their exploitation as well as stunt
or impede their consciousness. Power furthers the creation of
power and once power relations are enacted they become
increasingly self-propelling (Gaventa, 1980: 256). While the
inshore fisher' 5 experience, as indicated above, does not
illustrDote directly exploitation or some misuse of power, his
social reality is, nonetheless, shaped by and exists in a
concrete situation of domination and control. To comprehend
why people, in this case the inshore fishers and plant
1"
labourers, do not challenge or protest against such domination
one must understand the complexity of power relationships.
This chapter will explain how the silence surrounding the
issues of fishers and plant labourers wa,::; mi'lintained 'lnd thu~
endured, in other words, how quiescence in the (,lce of
inequality persisted. The data for this chapter will focus on
two different time periods. The first perlod is between March,
1991 and February, 1992; the second, is the period nfter GulL'
Oil pulled out of the HIbernia project, from February, 1992,
to March of 1993 when the last data were collected. 1'hese
data, moreover, will shO\~ the conditions under whIch the
status quo was maintained, where fishers' 'real' interm:ts
were left unprotected and fish plant labourers' grievances
neglected, Empirical evidence will illustrate that neither
fishers nor plant workers understood the consequences of their
actions, especially how their long-term interests would be
affected.
I will begin this chapter by examining more closely the
terms and conditions outlined in the agreement fisher's signed
with HMDC. In particular, attention will focus on certa in
principles contained in the contract as they help to explain
why fishers' acquiesced under such conditions. An account of
the onshore activity that took place during the summer of 1991
\~il1 follow with emphasis placed on its impact on the environ-
ment, in par.ticular on the inshore fishery. In doing so, my
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data ,... ill reveal HMDC's use of power in the third-dimension
where it served to strengthen quiescence among fishers. By the
third section, more direct forms ot social power become
evident; HHDC officials used threats in order to gain fishers'
compliance as well as to redirect issues in the pUblic arena
of the B.A.A.C.C. meetings.
The analysis will then lead into a discussion of how
fjshery interests were managed in a more public forum. More
specifically, I will show how fishers' and plant labourers'
interests were considered in different arenas: in particular,
the B.A.A.C.C. group, Monitoring Meetings which were organized
by the 'Offshore' component of the Institute of Social And
Economic Research, Memorial University of Newf~undland, and
The Atlantic Planners Conference held in C1arenville, New-
found land during the Fall of 1991.
A discussion which focuses specifically on the issues
surrol~nding plant labourers, particularly women employed in
the fish plant, will folloW'. While plant women did, in tact,
see the inequality bet\l1een their own negotiation process with
HMOC and ma:~ tishers, many of wholll are their husbands, they
were ultimately unable to act. One at the shortcomings of
Lukes' perspective is that it does not consider gender
relations or how power relationships may indeed be different
for men and women. The data provided in this section, there-
fore, will contribute further to our understanding of the
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basis of social power as it relates to questions of gender
relations.
The last section of this chapter focuses on the coll<'lpsO
of consent. In other words, what happened when Gulf oil
announced it was withdrawing from the Hibernia project.
Although this portion of the chapter is brief, much of the
evidence demonstrating aspects of three-dimensional power
throughou't the thesis, comes from data collectL1d during thi.5
period.
5.1 The FiSheries compensation Program
By March, 1991, most fishers who fished in Bull Arm, Trinity
Bay had entered wilfully into a contractual agreement with the
oil company, HMDC. To be sure, the majority of fishers, if not
all, were pleased with and demonstrated much support for the
compensation program in place. "Fishermen figured we got a
pretty good deal, we got what we could the way we went about
it." A skipper in a nearby community uttered similar remarks:
"we in Chance Cove got 100 percent in favour of the deal we
got ... " More significantly, though, fishers came to understand
the terms of the agreement as a form of protection against any
potential disruption or negative impact they might experience
during onshore development. As one of the Bellevue (i5hQr.~
claimed: "I can hear Paula White's voice ringing in my ears,
telling us we have a guaranteed income." Unfortunately,
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fishers, at the time of signing, were neither sufficiently
aware of the full implications and sUbsequent repercussions of
the compensation program they had supported. It was not until
much later, after Gulf oil pulled out of the Hibernia project
in February 1992, that fishers cam'" to understand the full
impacts of the:ir actions.
Much secrecy surrounded the negotiation period during the
late Fall and early winter of 1991. As more fishers began to
settle their contracts with the oil industry, little was said
in the nearby communities about the actual agreement. In fact,
few members of non-fishing households knew much about the
arrangement made between the two groups. To be sure, this was
not coincidental, but rather a deliberate attempt by the oil
industry to control th~ extent to which information about the
program became ava Hable to other members of the community -
thereby containing any overt challenge or related conflict.
"'les, we were told to keep this to ourselves', It commented
Alonzo. The lIessage being conveyed by HMOC was for fishers net
to share with others specifics about the negotiation process.
On the occasion when the forlller mayor of Sunnyside tried to
attend one of the meetings between the oil industry and
fishers, he was asked by the group to leave, when, in fact, he
had been initially invited to take part by the local chair of
the fishermen's comm!ttee.
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They asked me to come along to a meeting they were having
with Mobil. So I did; r went on up to the hall ... I\nd
soon as r got through the door they turns around and asks
me to leave Mobil don't want nobody involved with the
negotiations they got the fishermen convinced ttlilt they
can do it themselves. r gave up trying to tell them
(fishers) different (February, 1991).
Unfortunately, many of the community leilders and com-
mittee members, who should have been made aware at tile
compensation program, blamed the inshore fishers themselves
for fostering the secrecy surrounding the ne'Jot bt ion pCl·i.Oc!.
All too often, comments arc made that "fishermen <Ire ii.kc
that ... they're not cooperative, they're a secretive bunch."
Or, alternatively, comments suggest that fishcrs behClvioul' is
somehOW inherent: "it's in their nature" -such comments
little mot'e than local folklore and unsubstantiilted myths. Filr
more accurate, however, was the extent to which fishers were
passively complying with HMDC's subtle tactics of control. As.
one of the skippers from Norman's Cove began to reflect bilCk
on this early period he commented:
You know we're not SUppOSG to be ta.1kin~ to you about
what's going on ... They told us we'CG not allowed to be
saying anything to you •.. r don't mind telling you ilbout
what's going on, but I don't want my name being used in
any of this ... Lord only knows what would hilppen if they
found out. I'm telling you there's gonna be a lot of
fishermen that aren't gonna want to talk to you about
what's going on with MobiL
The fishery consultant hired by IlMDC to negotiate wi.th
fishers was also influential in gaining consent, while, in
turn, fostering further the notion of secrecy. Prom time to
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time, some fishers would directly quote the consultant as he
reassured them continuously that the program would protect
them from any direct conflict with the oil company. "I did
trust them at first," stated Albert:
When they came out first they were good to us, telling us
we would work together and everything would be
fine ... Jesus, I can hear Sam saying there's no way you
are going to be worse off, it's not possible ... When we
signed that deal we believed them and what they were
saying ... I really trusted them.
Albert's comment indicates how three-dimensional power was
operating when fishers signed their contracts where their
interests and the industry's were treated as one and the same.
From his research in the North Sea, Wills, t.oo, makes an
interesting argument about confidentiality and how the
petroleum industry operates making use of such a strategy. For
example, in the case of Shell and the Brent discovery off
Shetland, Wills states, there should be "no private deals and
no secret committees ... or the developers will bind the
representatives hand and foot with commercial confidentiality"
(Wills, 1991: 56).
Not surprisingly, though, fishers believed that they
could themselves negotiate with HMDC. Moreover, they believed
the final agreement reached with the industry was, indeed, in
their 'real' interests. Yet, closer examination of the
document reveals certain factors which do not protect fishers'
interests, In particular, clause number 6.0 states that:
""
continuation of the Program is dependent upon Company's
continuation of the GBS construction project. Comp.1ny may
terminate or suspend all or any part of the Progr<lm upon
termination or suspension of the GBS project ancl llpon
written notice to Fisherman ... Company sh.111 not be
liable for damages or loss of anticipated profits on
account of such termination.
In other words, clause 6.0 allowed the Cornp<lny to suspend the'
agreement with fishers for an indefinite .:tmount of t.imc
following Gulf oil's pullout of the Hibernia projeet -
roughly eleven months after fishers tirst silJl'ed thelr-
contracts. HMDC, at the time of signing, nei.thcr el.1bor;,tecl all
the meaning of the clause, nor made l':,;hers aW<lre throllqllollt
negotiations of the consequences for fishers if there were it
work slowdown or stoppage. Under these conditions f,ot only i~;
the compensation program suspended, but <lisa, morc importilnt-
ly, fishers still lose access to traditional fishing qround~
where any damage incurred as a result of onshore devl!! iopment
becomes the sale responsibility of individual fishers.
When they suspended our compensation last February we
told them we wanted back our fishing grounds, but they
said they didn't have to .•. we had signed that agreement
and they were following what was said ... 'l'hey had no
intensions of honouring that agreement right from dL'y
one. Their biggest concern all along was to get us to
sign it .. . and then they turns around and suspends it ...
I I d just as soon see them leave ... "
By preventing community leaders and other committoe
members from gaining access to the conditions set out in the
agreement, HMDC safeguarded their own interests. As fishers
reflect back on this time period, they recall how they first
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came to understand the terms in the agreement. As one of the
fishers from tlorman's Cove stated:
If '"e only knew from the start. _ we didn't know that
clause was there because we certainly wouldn't have
signed it if \..e did ... If we had our time back we would
have taken it to a lawyer to look over before we agreed
to anything but we truly thought that Mobil was acting
in geod faith now we know it was all a 'put on' to get
us to si'j'n.
other fishers in the neighbouring community of Chance Cove
utteretl similar comments:
It's the '''ay it's worded ... When ~le were signing it they
never told us thot was there, and in the preliminary
aqreement that was signed in St. John's at Christmas time
(Dec. 1990) that clause wasn't in it. They put that in
after when they came back with the individual contracts-
Nobody understood what that meant. 'lou see it says
GBS construction and to us it's all the same. Now if the
worcing had to say site work that would have been
different you see ... They asked us if anybody had any
questions but we never said nothing because we thought it
was the sa,ne as what we agreed to ... If they had to tell
us what that meant then we wouldn't have signed it ... But
....e didn't know .. "
fishers, moreover, later came to understand the behaYiour
of the eil industry as intentional: "they put a·few words in
there so they could get out of it whenever they want." One of
the fi~hcrs' wives interpreted the interaction between the two
sectors as the powerfUl negotiating with the powerless. "They
are some of the smartest people in the world," she stated,
"and they can word things anyway they want. And here they are
negotiating with just a bunch of fishermen." It was not until
Gulf oil withdrew from the Hibernia project that fishers came
to understand the actions of HMDC more clearly, where fishers
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themselves understood and saw how three-dimensional power was
operating. "First going on Sam was best ki.nd to work with,"
claimed one of the fishers negotiating f"r Chance Cove ceews:
They would invite us into town und they would pay foe
everything, our transportation, our meals, eveeythjnq. \"e
didn't have to spend a dime. Even when they woulet ,;omc
out, sometimes we would have a fe.... beers and they paid
for it all. \'I'e thought it was all on the up nnd up", Now
we know that they just wanted us to sign., ,They don't
care about the fishermen; they care! about linin<] theil'
pockets that's all.
Wills, too, points out similarities in the dOCLlmonts ,IIKl
statements compiled by Shell during the development pl\;\sc of
offshore oil in Shetland. They are, he wrote, "<:I master at
words, These people have word engineers as we] 1 <IS pipeJ ille
engineers" (Wills, 1991: 56).
\"hile HMDC did not specify fUlly the impiic<ltions of the
precise wording contained in section 6,0 of the <l(Jreement,
they did, most certainly, clarify the rneuning found in section
8.0 of the contract. for it states:
Fisherman agrees that all pUblic reliltions mutters
arising out of or in connection with the Program shalJ be
the sale responsibility of Company and will cooperate
with Company in making such announcements.
Introducing this clause into the agreement not only ensured
a certain level of compliance among fishers, but served ilS
well to control the flow of information about the progr,1m.
'Public relations matters' became a convenient term ~Ihich, in
practice, meant that fishers had to relinquish their right of
freedom of speech. This applied to all situations, including
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the Fisheries Broadcast, a local radio program for and about
fishers and their experiences. As stated by one of the
fishers: "Fishermen's Broadcast called and wanted me to give
an interview, so I called Paula White. She didn't want me to
do it and said that she would handle this."
To be sure, fishers did not have I'rior knOWledge of the
company's intention to introduce clause 8.0 into the agree-
Mento According to one of the skippers from Chance Cove:
The preliminary contract signed in St. John's did not
have the clause about the media. But when they came out
to get fishermen to sign the individual contract they put
the part in on the media. (\~hen asked how he felt about
HMDC's actions, Clarence's response was typical of many
other fishers.) You see, we trusted them.
Jacob, one of the younger fishers from Bellevue, was one of
the few who articulated some concern at the time of signing
the contract regarding clause 8.0. He stated:
I didn't I ike one thing in the agreement and that was
that we weren't allowed to talk to the media about it ...
They didn't want no bad pUblicity."
Although Jacob did, in fact, sign the contract in exchange for
his right to free speech, he did so as a conscious decision
Whereby he saw no alternative to act otherwise. In other
words, there existed a constrained sense of agency, a posi-
ticn, therefore, which separated him from his remaining
cohort.
For the most part, fishers did not question the actions
taken by the company as they had begun to unconditionally
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accept the passive role inflicted on them. "The invaders
mold," wrote Freire, and "those they invade arc molded"
(Freire, 1970: 150). Like 'cultural invasion,' the subordinate
began to respond to the powerholde.rs' values, stundilrds .:Ind
practices. Under these conditions one can easily understand
hoW the non-elite could be led into "an unauthentic type of
organization" (Freire, 1970: 145). What we see, then, taking
place in Trinity Bay throughout much of this time period LS
how the patterns of power and powerlessness persisted .,n1l
continued over time.
5.2 Environmental I:!lsues
The agreement fishers signed, which forms part of the document
called Fisheries Code of Practice, permits Mobil 011 to punalC
development in Great Mosquito Cove, development th"t cntailn
the reshaping of the landscape by blasting away section:1 of
the cove as well as creating an eAclusion zone and traffic
lane which occupies prime fishing grounds. This activity was,
for the most part, scheduled to take place during tht:l Spring
and summer of 1991 when fishers would, under normal circum-
stances, begin the years' first harvest. This section will
show how power relations were, in fact, enduring, as fishers'
perceptions continued to be shaped by UMDC and where their
long-term interests were neither secured nor protected by the
industry.
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Before marine construction began in the spring of 1991,
Great Mosquito Cove was designated as a fisheries exclusion
zone fEPP, 1991). Onshore construction scheduled du::"ing this
time, however, was not only limited to marine activity, but as
well entailed developing the Cove IlS a construction site that
would facilitate both CBS and topsides fabrication. As stated
earlier, Great Mosquito Cove was barren land which contained
little more than a few trout ponds, small wildlife and the odd
summer cabin inhabited mainly by neighbouring fishers. Onshore
canst.ruction in and around the Cove would preserve little of
this environment and way of life and, therefore, render its
social importance as insignificant for both fishing and non-
fishing households alike.
As development proceeded in Bull Arm, fisher's witnessed
the destruction of the Cove's scattered trout ponds, which now
accommodate parking space between two office buildings. The
mother of a local fisher, who at one time 'made' fish with her
mother in the household production of salt fish, commented on
how they would, many years ago, travel by "steam" to the cave
where t.hey would f ish from the ponds.
Oh my dear, it's some spot over there ... We still goes
over every summer and goes trouting ... and the trout are
as big as salmons. There's nothing like them.... it's our
own little paradise over there. (April, 1991)"
Two years later, however Pearl stated how she missed not being
able to return to Mosquito Cove "to go trouting" in the ponds
162
located across the bay. She was saddened, not only by tho fact
that she could no longer enter or fish in the Cove, but more
importantly, that the trout ponds had now disappeared; they
were I filled in' to accommodate the development of the GBS.
The 10s5 of the trout ponds, however, seems to evoke <I
different sensitivity and understanding today, than it did two
years ago. "Paula assured me that they '....ould save. the fish,"
claimed Pearl, as she began to recall the conversaUon sl~e had
with Paula White during the spring of 1991. Yet, S;lvin'J a few
hundred trout cannot replace the social and environmental sig-
nificance of the ponds situated in and around the Cove, Wh"t
is indeed significant is how HMDC twisted the informat i.on
which helped shape the perceptions of residents, p<:JrticuturlY
fishers and their families, and, therefore, managed to contain
any conflict that might have arisen over the issue of environ-
mental sabot.age - thus illustrating power in the third-
dimension, HMDC, and Paula White in particular, discussed the
filling in of the trout ponds as if HMDC were acting in an
environmentally sensitive fashion and uf;ed thiD example,
moreover, as an expression of their environmental conscious-
ness. HMDC representatives discussed how they would take care
of the fish and relocate them to a separate body o( water.
What they neglected to mention, however, waf; the (act that a
few hundred trout. are in themselves insignificant when one
considers the loss of natural habitat.
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Apart from Pearl's experiences, there was silence among
the inshore fishers concerning the environmental destruction
occurring in Great Mosquito Cove. It was not until after
Gulf's pull-out that fishers along the Arm came to reiterate
perceptions they had stated before the onzet of onshore devel-
opment. As one of the Bellevue fishers stated: "We were so
easily pushed over last year." Other nearby fishers made
similar comments: "I would prefer they never came out,"
remarked Chester, "they're tearing up the land over
thcr~... and that was worth a million dollars to go over there
and catch a few trout."
Development of Great Mosquito Cove further devastated the
land and sea as underwater blasting began to reshape the
physical landscape. The debris floating in the Arm and on the
seabed during the summer of 1991 was overwhelming - even for
those working with the oil company. According to one of the
locally hired industry employees: "There was a lot of debris.
When you start blasting with all those trees and sticks, well,
you can imagine. It was a mess. II While under water blasting
did indeed contribute to many debris problems ~ its impact was
negligible in comparison to the effect it was having on the
natural habitat, in particular, on the herring and mackerel
fishing grounds. Yet, fishers said little about the technology
being employed by the oil industry. In fact, fishers looked
toward HMDC as the experts, az being more kno..... ledgable about
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such matters, because they were, in their own words, "just
fishermen." Manipulation, or as Freire would state, oppressive
action, is most successful when the subordinate believe in ilnd
internalize the myth about their own inferiority and thu~
render supremacy to the dominant group (Freire, 1.970: 1.36).
To be sure, fishers in Trinity Bay were neither famili,'r
with the blasting procedures nor cognizilnt about alternative
technologies. While some would - and did - blame fishers for
their own ignorance or complacent views, a more thot-ollgh
explanation would go beyond these superf ici,,} accounts to
examine the conditions under which fishers passively compli.ed
with the oil industry's practices - in other words, to explain
acquiescence by focusing on how the dominant successfully
shaped the participation patterns of the subordinate, moulding
their consciousness in such a way that their d",milnds ilnd
expectations became compatible with those of the dominant
class. Fishers were unaware of the illternate technol0<JY
available for underwater blasting. This technology, while more
costly, would have decreased the impact of blasting on fish
habitat. According to Earle Johnson - the prime negotiator for
fishers in Placentia Bay during the time when lIdam' s llead was
thought to be the site for onshore development - HMOC wns well
aware of alternate methods because fishers in Placl:!ntia had
insisted on other techniques it development were to continue
in their Bay:
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If the project had to have stayed here we would have had
more control put on the blasting. Underwater blasting is
devastating to any fish within five miles ... We wanted
air walls which are like pipes which allow the air
pressure to be controlled.
Yet, when questioned, HMDC maintained:
'fhcre will still be a fishery when we are gone. The
habitat will have changed, bLlt not one that will preclude
a fishery. We have documented evidence of the fish killed
from blilsting. Some fishery people say that you have to
multiply that by X percent by the fish you don't see, but
I don't care if you multiply it by 50 or 100 percent it
still wasn't significant.
The industry's approach, however, has changed little over the
YCiJrs as Wills, too, confirms in his research in the North Sea
(Wills, ]991). Offshore develo!Jment continues, Wills argued,
to have a 'monitoring' perspective when it comes to issues
surrounding the environment. In other words, it observes and
records various catastrophes without necessarily taking any
kind of action. As one of the members of the HMDC management
team claimed: "Whenever you do monitoring and you see a
change, what are you going to do about it? If it means more
money, things may not necessarily change." For example, the
appearance of Whales in Bull Arm during the Spring of 1991 was
not anticipated by HMOC. Their response to this issue was
simply:
The blast ing probably gave them" headache or something,
but life goes on. Our focus until the whales showed up
was monitoring the numbers of fish kills ..• Blasting will
affact animals but it is not catastrophic.
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The environmental impacts of onshore development were, at
the time, known by the industry to have devastating conse-
quences for not only marine life, but also for the nO\tur.11
habitat - consequences W'hich W'ould result in perm..,ncnt
environmental damage. Yet, there was no outcry, no protest by
fishers to stop further annihililtion ot' the cnvirollll\~nt, .111
issue, that was or crucial importance ror fishcnl less th<lll .l
year before. Despite fishers' experiences of debe is on the
seabed, blasting wire in their nets and tho loss of 0\ Wtly of
life, there continued a lingering silence. As rishel'S later.
began to reflect back over this time period they understood
what had taken place somewhat differently. While they .!:;poke
hesitantly, they nonetheless spoke publicly for the first timo
of the damaqe done to their gear and nets. Other fishers spoke
of the rattling of house windows with every underwater blilst:
The windows used to shake here, so what do you SliPflO8C
it's doing to the fish ... We don't know; yOU'd have to be
a scientist to know. But you can imagine thilt if the
windows are shaking in Bellevue what is happening under
the water in Bull AnD.
Another neighbouring fisher stated, "we certa in ty took the I ["
word for it," when asked why nothing was questioned 0[" said to
HMoe 'oIhen environmental destruction was at its peak. D<ltn
gathered from local fishers suggest something quite differcnt
than passive compliance; they imply that previous con~ent hud
been manipUlated.
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What fishers, at one time, were opposed to had nolo/
little, i[ any, bearing upon their lives. Their social worlds
had become, for the most part, an interaction between t",o non-
competing sectors, the powerful and the powerless and where
the non-elice saw as legitimate not only the actions of the
dominant, but acceptance of their own subordination. We can
define the oil industry's legitimacy, then, as that of a
powerholder who maintains an "acknowledgo;ld right to command"
and the subordinate "an acknowledged right to obey." It is the
'source' and not the 'content' of a comma nd that grants it
legitimacy "and induce~ willing compliance on the part of the
person to whom it is addressed" (Wrong, 1979: 49).
5.3 sanctions and the Use of Threats
ay lIIid-wintp-r of 1991, lIost fishers situated along the Arm had
negotiated and settled their compensation agreellents with the
oil industry, that is, all fishers apart frail "the crews in
Norll3n's Cove. Their early negotiations with the industry, as
they recall, were similar to other fishers in the Bay. Yet,
the conditions under which they entered into the agreement
were considerably different. According to the sxipper negot1-
ating for Normants Cove, the crews were presented with their
individual documents and "finally Sam (t'ishery consultant
hired by HMDC) said sign it or you get nothing." While anger
was expressed individually, it did not translate into some
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form of concerted action or organized protest. To be sure,
Norman's Cove fishers were small in numbers, comprising only
five crews with roughly three men per vessel. Moreover, they
had little experience in dealing with large multinationaJ
corporations. Under these circumstances, fishers S.:l.W few
alternatives and consequently signed theil' individual <::on-
tracts, suppressing any further discussion.
The experiences of Norman's Cove fishers reflect power in
the second dimension. The typology of power, uS argued by
Bachrach and Baratz, takes into consider.. tion concepts sllch uS
coercion and force, to name only two, as striltegic~ employed
in non-decision making. Coercion, they argue, is defined at.;
when A secures the compliance of B "by threat of deprivation"
where there is dissension over a certa in course of action
(Lukes, 1974: 17). For the fishers of Norm... n's CO'le, I thrc<:It
of deprivation' quite simply meant the potenti ... l loss of
compensation. And, to this end, the power mechanisms employed
by HMDC were effective in squashing any grievance 0[' voiced
opposition.
While fishers were aware of the direct connection bet....een
their inaction and the possible risk of sanctions, they ....ere,
however, unaware of the "indirect connection by which their
compliant behaviour (fed) into the social order," helping to
sustain the cycle of constraint and sanctioning that governed
them (Barnes, 1988: 101). Threat of sanctions is not an
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unfamiliar strategy as both states and multinational corpor-
ations employ them use to bring about some form of compliance
worldwide. In his work on the Appalachian Valley, Gaventa
illustrates how the elite used coercive measures to quell any
opposition; miners' articulated grievances would render them
both unamployed and homeless (Gaventa, 1980). Parenti, too,
reveals similar findings from his work on community power in
Newark. He states that fear of eviction among the poor black
helped to explain their inaction on social inequities (Paren-
ti, 1970).
Although seldom would any opposition be articulated
within the political arena, it would be false, nor.etheless, to
suggest that resistance never occurred. Yet, on the rare
occasion when the odd issue did get raised, threats proved to
be an effective mechanism to silence any protest or gr ievance
residents might have. For example, dur ing a rather heated
discussion in one of the B.A..A.C.C. meetings, the representa-
tive on the committee artiCUlating the interests of employment
for youth insisted, unusually, on an issue being addressed. On
this particular occasion, the youth representative was
insistent that the subject be confronted. The project manager
for HMDC, John Banks, demonstrated how effective the company
was in controlling the B.A.J\.C.C. as he adamantly stated: "If
this is what you people want, then we'll pack up and leave and
take the project elsewhere. II Silence immediately followed his
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comment as the committee member voicing opposition remClined
still and the meeting was redirected toward other 'safer'
issues. As Gaventa suggested, it is not the <tctual use of
coercion that rQinforces non-challenge among the sUbordino:1tc,
but rather the constant threat that it might be exercised
(Gaventa, 1980).
5.4 The public Forum
Once power relations have been established where rout lnes 01
non-challenge emerge, little action is demanded on the p.:lrt of
the powerholder to maintain the relationship. In other wor.cls,
patterns of prevalence in the decision m£lkincJ aren" ,'110""
power to be exercised more easily over the agenda it:'>.:Jlf. '1'ho
pattern set by the B.A.A.C.C. group illustrates the case in
point; a challenge to the status quo was prevented or blocked
"by the power which surrounds and protects the beneficiaries
of the inequalities" (Gaventa, 1980: 252). As will be docu-
mented later, two-dimensional power continued to be operative
in situations where key issues remained off the agenda and
grievances of the subordinate suppressed; two-d imens ioni'll
power thus addresses the obstacles that preve:.1t grievances
from emerging into overt conflict (within th~ orqanization).
To be sure, fishery interests as well <IS environmental
matters continued as non-issues in spite of the development
and sUbsequent destruction occurring in the Cove. 'fhe issues
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that were articulated, on the other hand, continued to be
around matters of employnent and local business opportunities
- othen"rise thought of as the relatively 'safe' or specific
issues. r10reover, HMDC officials '....ould attempt, on occasion,
to reinforce not only their image of corporate consciousness,
but more importantly the perceptions of committee members
to.....ard development in Bull Arm, For example, John Banks, the
Proj~ct munager for Hi1DC, articulated this position during one
of the meetings: "\ie're here to work together., .we want to be
a part of the community." B.A,A.e.c. members. however, never
questioned the underlying intent associated with such a
comment. On the contrary, committee members continued to think.
highly of oil company officials and spoke often of the
kindness and generosity received fror.J HMDC members since they
fir!jt arrived in the region.
During much of the early spring and summer of 1991, B.A.-
A.C.C. m@.mbers, in addition to other community leaders, were
waiting in anticipation for benefits of onshore development to
triCkle down, so to speak, to individual communities in the
areil. The inshore fishers, by comparison, were thought of by
many on the committee as 'taken care of' as fishers had
negotiated with HMDC a compensation plan for those affected by
onshore development. Consequently, little debate surrounded
either environmental and harvesting issues or concerns
pertaining to the processing sector. In fact, the B.A.A.C.C.
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newsletter, an i.nformation pamphlet distributed quarterly to
6,000 households wi thin the impact region, neglected through-
out the entire period of field observation to account for and
document fishery related issues. Not surprisingly, the
interests that were represented reflected business persons 1n
the area and made reference to the successful contracts
awarded coupled with present employment statistics of 10Ci\1
residents. As suggested by the member of B.A.A.C.C. primilrily
responsible for writing the newsletter:
No, I never mentioned the fishermen's compensat ion
package in the newsletter. To tell you the truth, I never
even thought of it. It wasn't all that long ago that u
fishermen's representative started to attend those
meeting on a regUlar basis ... Oake (fishery represent.:l-
tive on B.A.A.C.C) only ever came to three or four
meetings ...
Patterning specific information into the newsletter,
while other details remain hidden, allows "the gatekeeping" of
inforlliation to remain a prerogative of certain committee
members. "By shaping certain information into the communica-
tion floW's and shaping certain other information out, the
gatekeeping capacity could combine with the responsive
capacity to isolate, contain and redirect the conflict"
(Gaventa, 1980: 106). By excluding certain information from
the newsl~tter, knowledge concerning fishers' and plant
labourers' situations was never made available to other
residents of the impact region.
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Other community forums or organizations also neglected
fishery interests. For example, the intent of the Monitoring
Meetings, organized by the Offshore component of the Institute
of Social and Economic Research (Memorial University), was to
monitor· and collect data on specific areas of the social and
economic environment as indicate.1 by B.A.A.C.C. members, the
industry, government and social scientists. 1 Whi!e more than
thirty different areas of monitoring were identified, fishery
issues did not enter into the discussion - again, illustrating
two-dimensiona! power. In fact, when issues related to the
p!ant did arise, such as gender relations, they were debated
in terms of pre-defined social problems frequently used by
those involved in monitoring resource development (Cake, 1986:
J). For example, gender was discussed in terms of monitoring
prostitution and increased pregnancy rates among single women,
whereas monitoring women's employment status at the fish plant
or employment opportunities for women in non-traditional areas
of work never entered into the deliberation. As Gaventa so
ISER offshore saw its role primarily around is!iues of
social and economic impact research and monitoring Which,
for them, did not take into account fishery interests.
~loreover, ISER Offshore social scientists were employed
by HMDC to carry out the socio-economic impact research
on the onshore construction project. This may help to
explain why there was little cri":icism of the Hibernia
project fronl the university in gel.~ral and ISER Offshore
in particular.
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clearly points out, what happens as a result of institutionill
or organizational neglect must be considered as a form of
power (Gaventa, 1980).
Probably the most direct or blatant domination of fishery
interests was evidenceti at a conference in Clarenvillc,
NeWfoundland in the early Fall 1991 - the first Fall, ."I(tor
the compensation program was in place. While the conference in
general addressed community impacts of onshore development,
HMoe's fishery consultant spoke on the fishery compensation
program, in particular. He stated:
The program was a big success... I f the fishermen in
Trinity Bay were not happy with the compens<Jtion program
in place, without a doubt it Would have been in "I'he
Packet' .by now. (The Packet i~ the local newspaper.)
In other words, lack of overt conflict somehow implies
consensus. The consultant's comment also gives the impression
that if fishers ""ere not happy with the program they were free
to go to the media and report their experience. The reality of
the fishers predicament, however, was that they were not
permitted to disclose t.o the media information about the
compensation program. As stated previoU!:lly, such violations
would result in the termination of their individual agrcc-
ments. When fishers signed their contr.acts .... ith HMOC they gave
up their right of freedom c.f speech. t.foreover, the issues of
plant workers were excluded from the discussion as if the
plant did not exist. By ignoring the concerns of the proces£>-
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ing sector, their issues and grievances, as Schattschneider
(1960) stated, "became organized out" of the process. To be
sure, H1"DC was aware of the plant but the lack of articulation
of plant workers' i.nterests meant that they could be ignored.
While j t would be wrong to suggest that people could not have
inquired about other aspects of the program, they did not,
through no fault of their own, but because of the way in which
information was controlled throughout the project to prevent
others from knowing what all the issues were in the first
place.
".5 patriarchal social Relations
While the inshore fishers' stated interests were disguised or
camouflaged so that the interests of HMlJC and fishers appeared
as one and the same, plant workers' concerns were neglected
throughout tnis research period. Plant workers, moreover, came
to see their position as inevitable, if not. natural or
legitimate. Fish plant labourers did, to be sure, see the
inequality between HMDC's neqotiations with fishers and their
own situation; yet, they were unable to act. How do we account
for women's silence? What are the barriers or obstacles which
blocked women's effective action and public participation?
This section will attempt to explain these questions by
looking at the expe:!:"iences of plant women and the position
they have come to occupy within the household structure. For
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the most part, women's non-challenge was a result of their own
consent t.o a secondary role or subordinate status as women.
Many plant women had come to accept their inferior position ':IS
the natural order of things where men both dominate and
govern. In explaining gender inequality, feminist theories or
Marxism2 and radical feminist) positions are useful. For
Walby, this combination is considered as a 'dual-system~'
theory (1990: 5), while for others, such as myself, the
synthesis of these two theoretical positions is referred to as
a 'capitalist-patriarchal' system. In other words, we <:,111
explain women's acceptance of their subordin<lte position by
looking at the capitalist-patriarchal social structure which
both organizes private and pUblic spheres. As Walby put it,
patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices in
which men dominate, oppress and exploit women (Walby, 1990:
20).
A Marxist feminist analysis explains gender jnequ<ll ity
(or men's control over women) as a by-product of how
capital dominates over labour. As Walby argues, "Clazs
relations and the economic exploitation of one class by
another are the central features of the social structure,
and these determine the nature of gender relations"
(1990: 4). See also Barrett (1980) and Hartmann (.1979).
The system of domination where men as a group control
women as a group (and are the main benefir.:iaries of tho
subordination of women) is called patriarchy. This system
of domination, unlike Marxist feminists, is J;ot viewed <IS
a by-product of capitalism. See also Firestone (1974) and
Rich (1980).
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The men and women who live in Chance Cove where the plant
is located adopt well defined traditional gender roles, which
illustrate for them appropriate definitions of masculinity and
femininity. This becomes increasingly apparent when one sees
how some of the plant workers interpret the perspective of
their male partners as more legitimate and a form of knowledge
superior to their own. When asked for their opinion, often
women would refer to what their husbands thought about a
particular issue and would devalue their own perspective as
meaningless. A telling example is Winnie 4 , a long-term fish
plant employee from the Cove. During the course of the
interview Winnie's husband returns for lunch. Winnie quickly
removes het-self froln her chair at the head of the table and
begins to attend to matters in the kitchen. Roy, on the other
hand, takes his place - at the head of the table - and begins
to engage in conversation about the Hibernia project. Winnie,
for the most part, is silent, while her husband speaks of his
experience with HMDC. He does not mention the issues sur-
rounding the fish plant until his attention is drawn to the
topic. At this point, Winnie contributes to the conversation.
This time, however, the confidence she has in her own voice is
not visible. Her opening remark demonstrates this, as she
states: "What do I know; I'm only a women." Another account
The data used in describing Winnie's experiences were
collected in October, 1990.
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which illustrates women's acceptance ot their sUbordinate
position is the comment from Lillian, a plant worker for more
than fifteen years, who claimed her spouse could articulate
best her experiences with HMDC:
Girl I don't know nothing about that. Fred is the best
one to talk to ••• I wouldn't know what. to be saying to
you. But Fred now, he can tell you what went on.
Similar comments were also made by Sara as she persistently
referred to what her husband, Eugene, thought:
Now Eugene thinks that Paula White and them didn't treat
the fish plant workers right when they came out (or the
meeting.
Eugene, meanwhile, along with all the other rishers did not
attend the meeting with HMDC. Yet, probably the most. sig-
nificant portion of the interview with Sara was her descrip-
tion of what she calls women's 'place' in life":
I don't think it's my place to go out fishing. I don't
care what nobody says I don't think it's my place ..• The
men here have never allowed no women to go fishing and
they never will. •• not to be a true fishermen that is ..
I don't think there's any such thing as. a bonafide
fisherwomen. How can there be? I can't see no women out
there haUling up those nets. My dear, I'm just ag tough
as the next one, but I wouldn't be able to do that. It's
okay if they wants to work in the plant or something like
that, but not to be going out in the boats. My place is
here ••• I'm a fisherman's wife llnd proud of it. The men
does good here in the fishery an,j its because they're all
capable strong men ... It wouldn't be the same if women
were fishing.
other women spoke, too, of their reluctance to pursue any
attempt at negotiation with HMDC as it would lead to some
familial disruption, causing their male partners diffiCUlty in
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the cOflUllunity. Erma, a fish plant worker and married to Jack,
a local inshore fisher, ventured on a number of occasions to
influence her husband to discuss the issue of compensation for
fish plant workers with the fishermen's committee. After
several rather unsuccessful attempts, ho....ever, Jack was
reluctant to continue this endeavour as it would jeopardize
his own reputfltion in the COMmunity and the reputation of his
wife:
If I kept on them about the compensation for the plant
workers, my dear, I'd be called the biggest kind of
trouble-maker this side of the Cove ... It's not right
what's happening. If the fishermen in Chance Cove are
going to be affected, then we are too ... It's pointless
trying to tell them that. I don't think they (fishermen)
really cares about the plant... They're not doing
anything for us. They're over there causing the biggest
kind of racket and they're getting it all for them-
selves ... You ait and see, we'll end up with nothing.
Most women, however. felt that the absence of a union was
significant in explaining why the compensation program was not
extended to plant ....orkers. " ... if we had a union we figure we
loIould have had lIore." Another women spoke at SOlie length:
We should have all been one negotiating this (meaning all
the plant workers and fishers frolll Chance Cove). But
what's happened is that the fishermen have gone off and
fought for themselves and the plant workers have got to
fight for their own selves ... You see, a lot of the older
fishermen around here won't let wom.en on the fishermen's
committee ... They don't think women belongs in the
fishery. As far as they're concerned, that's all the
plant is, is a bunch of women working to get a few
stamps; so they haven't got to bother with us ... I think
it would have been different if tho. plant was more like
some of the other ones around ... and the fellows would
have kicked up more of II fuss (November, 1990).
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Asked specifically if she meant that the plant negotiations
for fish plant workers would have been more successful if more
men worked there, she replied:
Yes, I think it has a lot to do with it. The fishermen
wouldn't have ignored us the way they did. They (meaning
male plant workers) would have had more to S'ly about it.
Male fishers, not surprisingly, were quick to verify the
accounts given by plant women as evidenced in the comment made
by Jerome:
The women don't fish in Chance Cove. We don't let them ...
Women can't fish and that's all there is to it. Some of
them work at the plant, you don't mind that.
Similar patterns indicating gender inequality could also
be found within the household where women assume prime
responsibility for unpaid domestic labour. Consistent with the
research findings of Sinclair and Felt (1992), responsihility
for domestic work fell primari.ly upon women. When women were
asked specifically about who does what chore within the
household, they spoke at length about the sphere of life they
knew well. They were not, to be sure, bitter or at all
resentful about the uneven divis ion of domestic labour, but
rather accepted this rola as if it were somehow intrinsic to
their nature:
Now don't get me wrong, Joe is as good as gold, but it's
like talking to the wall to get he to do something around
here. (When I asked Marian who did the housework when she
was working at the plant, she responded in some detail.)
Well it sure wasn't Joe. The girls do a fair bit, but t
usually get my work done before I goes to the plant or
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when I comes home... In the summer time Sundays are no
day of rest around here. If I didn't bake bread on Sunday
morning we wouldn't have none for the week ... I knows a
lot of women that has to do most of their cleaning and
that on Sundays ... (I asked Marian about whose responsi-
bility it was to make dinner especially when she was
working at the plant.) Now Joe can cook himself a pork
chop or something if 1 takes it out for him. But if 1
clan' t have something ready for his dinner before I go to
work, then he' 11 go over to the take-out and get some-
thing ... But 1 suppose girl that's what I do, I takes
care of the cooking and cleaning and looked after the
youngsters when they were small. You see Joe never had to
do none of that stuff growing up, his mother did it all
for him. And sure even now, she thinks it aWful if I
don't have Joe's dinner ready before I goes to work... I
don't be bothering any more to get Joe to help me with my
work. He does good at the fishing MId that's all I care
about ... the rest of it don' t matter, I can do it.
A similar account was also provided by Erma:
Well I does my bit of work before I go in ... I really
have to work around my shifts. It's not too bad though ...
(When I asked if her husband shared the responsibility
for housework, Erma laughed and stated): Now if I asks
him he'll give me a hand doing something, but you got to
get him in the right mood. Now he might get himself a
slice of bologna or something, he won't starve. But for
al:> far as making himself a cooked dinner, no my dear, he
couldn't be bothered. I suppose I don't really encourage
him to. He makes a big enough mess as it is without
getting him to make more.
Women, too, understood what was considered as acceptable
arenas of paid work for them. While most expressed an interest
in obtaining work with the Hibernia project, seldom did they
articulate an interest in non-traditional areas of work. All,
with the exception of one plant worker, stated that they would
prefer work in housekeeping and kitchen duties - even when
other areas of work were more highly paid. Yet, for some plant
women employment outside of the home or f ish plant is not an
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alternative - even when they express an interest in working
elsewhere - as they themselves comment on how their husbands
do not want them seeking wage employment. According to Sara:
Before the fishery closed I was happy being a fish plant
worker, but now I would like a job on the Hibarnia. They
make good money working in the kitchen and making beds
and that. I think they're getting something like $17.00
an hour ... But now Eugene, he don't want me working; he
may have to do something for himself that's all.
While women did see the inequality between their expcr-
lences of negotiation with HMDC and that of their husbands,
they did not understand the patriarchal social relations which
alloW them to accept their subordinate position. Along with
economic and political power, most theories that address
issues of gender inequality also put considerable emphasis on
ideological domination - that is, the ideas, beliefs, prac-
tices and cultural values of one. group over another
(smith, 1987) For Smith, women's lives have been outside or
subordinate to what she calls the ruling apparatus or rela-
tions of ruling, which is "that familiar complex of manaqe-
ment, government administration, professions and intelligent-
sia." (Smith, 1987: 108). The relations of ruling, then, halp
to make visible the complex social processes of how class,
qender and ideology intersect.
Elsewhere in Newfoundland, rural outports are experi-
encing considerable social change, particularly in the area of
household relations. According to Davis, the southwest coast
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of the island illustrates such change as she claims that "the
rigid division of labour which once characterized the tradi-
tional life is rapidly ceasing to exist" (Davis, 1983: 26).
Alternatively, Sinclair and Felt did not find similar patterns
occurring in the Great Northern Peninsula of liewfoundland.
Their research findings, however, show greater consistency
with the present work in that "macro cultural changes underway
in the region" have not significantly eroded the gender
division of labour found in traditional household organiz-
ations (Sinclair and Felt, 1992: 56).5
5.6 The Collapse of Consent
Seventeen months after onshore development began, Gulf oil
announced that it was withdrawing from the Hibernia project.
Within weeks of this announcement massive layoffs occurred as
a work slowdown period soon became evident. Although oper-
at ions at the site never came to an end, certain areas of
construction, partiCUlarly the GBS, came to a close until new
investors could be found. As stated previously, the impact of
Gulf's decision to pullout resulted in the termination of the
fisheries compensation program. The 'culture of sllence' HMDC
had maintained was now broken. This section of the chapter
other social scientists, however, such as Nels (198B) and
Porter (1985; 1991) have also illustrated significant
changing roles for women in outport Newfoundland.
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will focus on the events which followed Gulf's withdrawal. In
particular, the data will illustrate how fishers came to
understand t:leir past actions and inactions as a consequonce
of HMOC's power and domination. As stated by one of the
skippers from Bellevue involved in the negotiation process
with HMDC:
Reflecting back on it they were iI; wolf in sheep[s]
clothing. We were all ignorant ... they suckered us into
it.
Similar comments were also made by a fisher rrom Chance Cove.
He claimed:
The contract was only made up by a bunch of f isherm"'n ...
They were like Dr. Jeckel and Mr. Hyde. They knew wh .. t
they were doing all along. The thing was we didn't know
what they were doing until it was too late. We were so
easily pushed over last year.
These data, similar to the accounts of fishers documented
throughout the various chapters, tell us much about how
rishers initially interpreted HMOC's actions during the early
stages of negotiation and help to validate the ,three-dimen-
sional perspective put forth in this thesis. A skipper from
Norman's Cove provided further insight into the situation as
he reflected back over the early events and HMOC's arrival:
They never gave the fishermen no notice. All of a sudden
one day they say they're changing locations and there
they are on your back door. We didn't have time to plan
nothing ... Looking back on it I don't think that should
have been allowed. We should have had more time to
prepare ... They should have had to do those same stUdies
that they did over there in Adam's Head that year. They
did nothing over here until it was too late, but I figure
that's what Mobil wanted all along.
1.5
Loss ot compensation and 'traditional rishing grounds
further exacerbated fishers' precarious state. Following
Gulf's withdrawal, HHOC suspended fisher's compensation
program, with the exception of sunnyside rishers who continued
to be compensated, while refusing to relinquish control over
Bull Arm. According to HHDC officials, fishers willingly
entered into a contractual arrangement wh tch permitted the
company to suspend their individual agreements without the
onus on the company to compensate for any loss of f i5h Lng
ground or damage reSUlting from onshore activity. Fishers were
neither cognizant of the true translation of section 6. () of
their contract nor did they believe that HMDC would inten-
tionally act in such a way as to leave their interests
unprotected. As stated earlier in this chapter. the eXilct
wording of the terms and conditions set out in the contract
allowed HHDC to discontinue the program in the case of a work
slowdown or stoppage inVOlving the CBS construction:
When we signed that contract we thought what we were
signing was pretty goc.d ... and that's what they used
against us, the wording of it. They said GBS.
Fishers spoke ot their experiences the day HMDC suspended
their contracts:
It seemed that at the beginning they couldn't do C!nough
for us. If we had to go to town for a meeting they would
pay for all our expenses, take us to dinner ... doing it
all they were. And when Gulf pUlled out they calls us up
to a meeting in Bull Arm, not sayinq a word to us. She
got her lawyers to do all the talkinq for her ... tells us
that the compensation is suspended and that we would go
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back on it when things started up again .•• 1 couldn't
believe it ..• She wouldn't even answer our questions. She
would turn to her lawyers and ask them to answer the
question for her ... They wouldn't even talk to us about
it. After they finished telling us the compensation was
suspended they told us to leave and they would be in
contact. We tried writing letters to the government and
we took the contract to the union to have their lawyers
look into it ..• but nothing ever came of it. The contract
they say is legal.
It is not surprisi~I~' then, that under these conditions
fishers soon began to reflect back over their experiences and
reinterpret the past somewhat differently. The trust and good
will that many fishers experienced toward HMOC had now been
replaced by much bi tt€lrness and resentment. Fishers spoke of
how they wished the company had never come to the region as
the credibility of the comp,my had now been called into
question. A more elderly fisher f.rom sunnyside spoke of his
experience with HMOC and "the lies" that were initially
conveyed to him and his crew:
When Sam and he first came out they told us a bunch of
lies. He tried to get as much for the company as he
COUld. Hibernia is not good for the local people. It's
for the merchants not the general people. They tried
telling us there would be all kinds of benefits, but we
haven't seen none of that yet. And girl, we never will.
While few fishers questioned the decision to change the
location for onshore development from Adam's Head to Bull Arm,
some, primarily skippers of vessels, later felt that the
justification for relocating the construction project was in
part due to their ignorance:
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I think the reason they changed the location of the site
was because of the fishermen in Placentia Bay. They were
organized and they weren't going to let Mobil tilkc
advantage of theil',. Mobil wouldn't have been able to do
what ever they wanted over there I can asure you ... I'm
not the first person who thinks that's the reason why
they changed sites. They knew if they came over here we
would be unprepared to deal with them. All along it was
the Placentia Bay fishermen that were involved with
Hibernia we didn't know a thing about it ... Mobil took
advantage of our ignorance and now were're paying the
price for it.
The most anguish fishers experienced, however, was over
the fact that HMDC was under no legal obligation to return
their fishing grounds:
If we're not allowed in there well then compensate me [or.
not going in there. Great Mosquito Cove is one of the
best places for herring and mackeral in Trinity [)<lY ...
With all the blasting that went on over there the
migration patterns could be fucked up for good ...
A fisher from the neighbouring town spoke of utter disgust
over the way in Which HMDC has treated the inshore fishers "nct
their crews:
We thought that any chllnges made to that agreement would
be negotiated between the fishermen and Mobil and that if
it 'Were to be cancelled for any reason well then all
deals 'Were off. And that includes the right to our
fishing grounds. We couldn't believe they weren't g01ng
to give us back Great Mosquito Cove. My dear what they've
done is 'out and out' disgusting.
Tensions between fishers from different communities, moreover,
strengthened during this period as sunnyside fishers wera not
sUbj ected to the slime contract terminations. Theose sources of
perceived inequality create a social situation in which
fishers feel they are being treated unfairly. Tne fact that
,..
some fishers still receive compensation and not others
contin"Jcs to be a source of tremendous conflict:
What we didn't like is that they kept sunnyside in the
agreement and not us. Sunnyside may be closer to Great
Mosquito Cove but that don't mean we don't fish there as
much as them ... But you see. Sam and them thought we made
the same as the fishermen in sunnyside. They're not real
fishermen down there, they don't make no money in the
fishery ••. Keeping them on the compensation program is not
costing them nothing ..•
Tensions continue to exist between different groups of fishers
that eithel.* receive compensation or have had it suspended:
"and now these fishermen that don't have compensation don't
talk with the fishermen that do."
Alth;:lugh fishers expressed much anger toward HMDC when
they spoke of organized struggle, it did not, however,
manifest itself in some form of collective action. For
example, the skippers negotiating with HMOC for Norman's Cove
crews had this to say when ther.e was an increased possibility
of Texaco joining the Hibernia project:
Fishermen want the same compensation that they had. This
time we know better and if they don't negotiate with
fishermen in good faith then we would be satisfied to go
down and block her off.
Unfortunately, it took Gulf oil pUlling out of the Hiber-
nia project for fishery issues to reach the community politi-
cal agenda. Until HMDe suspended the fisheries compensation
program, B.A.A.C.C. members had neither seen nor discussed the
actual terms set out in the agreement. While B.A.A.C.C. 's
efforts to have the program reinstated were unsuccessful,
1"
fishers' issues ar~und compensation matters did, nonetheless,
reach the community agenda. Yet, any correspondence th<lt
existed between HMDC and the B.A.A.C.C. group ended soon after
it had begun as HMDC asserted that the program for fishers
would be reinstated after a new partner was round for the
Hibernia project.
Feeling somewhat paralysed, fishers' of
powerlessness began to grow stronger as they became further
alienated by HMDC. Contact with the company became less
frequent as most fishers adopted a 'wait and see' approuch.
"There's not much we can dOj we just have to ""ait and sec Whilt
happens" (March, 1992) Nearly a year later, the same fisher
commented on how the contact with HMDC was now nonexistent. "I
haven't seen tell of her (Paula White) since the duy she
called us out to the NODECQ office to tell us the program WilS
suspended. "
As fishers began to prepare for that year's spring
harvest, many crews made plans to relocate their gear outside
of Bull Arm away from onshore activity. All additional
expenses as a result of relocation now became the sale
responsibility of individual fishers; unlike before, when llMDC
guaranteed fishers a base income regardless if th(!y fished
outside the Arm or not. compounding the already dubious
situation, the northern cod fishery was closed in July of that
year, as a result of further depletion and deterioration of
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the f ish stocks. This closure had serious repercussions for
many dependent on ocean resources in Trinity Bay. "When you
close the fishery down here you close a big percentage of your
fishing," commented one of the fishers from Chance Cove. "Yes,
when John Crosbie (former federal Minister of Fisheries)
closed the fishery that put another wrench in it."
Although sunnyside fishers continued to receive compen-
sation from HMDC, they were, nonetheless, anxious about their
own futures. Some fishers during the interview refused to dis-
cuss matters related t" the oil company or offshore oil in
fear of HMDC's retaliation. In other words, fear not only kept
fishers compliant, but also silent. "Now we can talk about the
fishery here in the Arm," said Issac, "you can ask all kinds
of question, just not about Mobil oil that' 5 alL"
Throughout much of the Fall and early winter of 1992
gossip and rumour were at a peak as local residents speCUlated
as to whether or not Texaco would join the oil consortium. Not
long after TeKaco's decision not to join the Hibernia project
a new partner was found in the early winter of 1993. Murphy
oil from EI Dorado, Arkanas and the Canadian federal govern-
ment would absorb the remaining shares. Although the project
was scheduled to proceed wi thout furthe.r delay, there was much
scepticism in the area as local people had become suspicious
of the company and questioned their many promises:
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We were told back then to expect a big impuct ... the end
result has been a big disappointment. We were hoping for
a certain amount of development that never came through.
We pushed here in Arnold's Cave for a commercial/indust-
rial park. We had a lett of lead up time to get ready for
the project and when the project slowed down well, it WelS
a disappointment. We were hoping for more than just
residential growth, we thought that there would be
economic growth too ... We were really hoping for big
things. The project lost a lot of credibility when Gulf
pulled out ... There's a whole new stigma to Hibernia now.
By January of 1993, the construction site at Great
Mosquito Cove had returned to its normal schedule as employ-
ment rates started to increase once more and new contt"acts
were awarded to local firms and businesi'ies around the pcov-
ince. Yet, for the fishers in Trinity Bay, little had chungcd.
For the most part, fishecs waited in anticipation for eithec
their contracts to be reinstated or for HMDC to reschedu l,e
negotiations. While the company may have been slow to insti-
gate communication with fishers, issues of compensation were,
nonetheless, being addressed in the B.A.A.C.C. group. For the
second time, B.B.A.A.C. intervened on fishers'. behalf when
they reminded HMDC of their earlier commitment to resume
compensation to fishers after a partner to replace Gulf oil
had been found. Fishers issues were, for the first time, offi-
cially an the community agenda where questions and concerns
aroutld the harvesting sector were debated at length. Marc
important, however, was the fact that the discussion served as
an impetus for further examination af fishery issues; the
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committee started to question and called for a review of its
own mandate:
Perhaps what we need to do as a committee is to review
our mandate. Part of our agenda is to represent the
fishermen and we haven't been doing that. Why didn't we
see the compensation agreement before the fishermen
signed it. We can't do our job properly if all we do is
act after the fact ... As a committee we need to sit down
and discuss what our objectives are and then take this
back to the local people in the area.
In spite of the existence of fishers' issues on the
community agenda, only those issues that concerned the men
engaged in the harvesting sectorwere discussed; women in the
processing plant continued to be invisible and their experi-
ences unaccounted for. It was through the actions of this
observer, assuming the role of <I participant in the comndttee,
that the issues of plant women became articulated in the B.A.-
A.C.C. organization and entered the. official record. ~
HMDC's extraordinary strength, in Trinity Bay, it has not been
altogether effective in shaping universal acqUiescence. As
Freire points out, when individuals begin to analyze their own
world they "become aware of their prior, distorted perceptions
and thereby come to have a new perception of that reality"
(Freire, 1970: 107). For Freire, this would lead to some kind
of praxis - defined as process of critical reflection and
action. While fishers did attempt to take action, their
efforts to organize were effective only within community
boundaries. As stated by one of the skippers from Bellevue:
193
"If we could get the other fishermen on side we would be <l lot
stronger in fighting this together. We would look united.
The problem though is getting them on side." The end result of
the skippers' atte;npt to organize Trinity Bay fishers was not
entirely without success as Bellevue fishers sought legal
action in early February of 1993.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at how the patterns of power and
powerlessness endured over time. More specifically, it h<lS
focused on the events which unfolded between two differant
periods: March, 1991 to February, 1992, and after Gulf Oil
pulletl out of the Hibernia project until March of 1993.
Empirical evidence continued to demostrate acquiescence amonq
fishers and plant labourers in spite of the social inequities
and destruction happening in Great Mosquito Cove. Lack of
participation over time can contribute to one's accepting and
adopting the role of non-challenge where one fails to acquire
the necessary resources of political action - these resources
being skills, consciousness, organization. Routines of non-
challenge, then, require little action on the part at the
powerholder for power relations to endure. This has been made
evident in the five sub-sections discussed in this chapter.
I began this discussion by looking more closely at the
document fishers signed with HMOC as it illustrates clearly
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how fishers' interests were left unprotected by the industry.
f'ishers were neit:her cognizant of nor aware of the full
implications contained in the terms of agreement. And as such,
they remained ignorant of the terms set out in the agreement
until Gulf oil pulled out, causing the fishers' compensation
program to be suspended and Great Mosquito Cove to remain
under the control of HMDC. Fishers later carne to understand
how they were, so to speak, victims of three-dimensional power
or as Eipper suggested "victims of hegemony" (Eipper, 1989).
Fishers, to be sure, understood the actions of HMOC represen-
tatives as being intentionally manipulative and deceiving.
Comments such as "we were some green back then," and "we must
have been some soft" tell us much about how consensus was, in
fact, manipulated. Moreover, fishers came to interpret the
negotiation process as a deliberate scheme to get fishers to
enter into a contractual arr.angement.
Three-dimensicnal power could also be seen as the
mechanism neutralizing conflict as HMoe pursued onshore
development that further devastated the natural environment,
in partiCUlar, how company officials discussed the filling in
of trout ponds in Great Mosquito Cove. HMDC representatives
provided information in such ~ way as to distort people's
perceptions of what was actually taking place, while at the
same time attempting to reinforce their image of environmental
sensitivities - illustrating power in the third dimension. The
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second environmental atrocity committed by HHDC during this
time deals with the underwater blasting practices, Fishet's
were, through no fault of their own, unaware of the technol-
ogies available for such procedures. The oil industry, on the
other hand, was aware of other methods, but employed the most
efficient and cost effective method without any regard for its
impact upon the environment. Fishers, moreover, had come to
trust the oil company to protect their interests. 'let, wilen
HMDC's practices were questioned they refused to acknowledge
as significant the number of fish k.ills from blastinq, wlli-cll
rendered invalid tishers' knowledge.
Power in the second dimension wa$ seen oper<ltin'J where
threats and coercive measures were used in order to SCClire
Norman's Cove fishers' acceptance of the agreement. Acconl j nCJ
to Bachrach and Baratz, 'threat of depriv<ltion' secures til('
gaining of compliance. Threats to cancel onshore development
were also employed by HMDC officials when strong opposition
was voiced in a public forum. On the rare oceusian wh~n
grievances were articulated threats proved to be an effective
strategy to silerlce any protest. Residents in general, and
fishers in particular, did not understand how their compliancl:!
actually fed into the system that served to dominate and
further exploit them.
Power relations also endured in the various community
forums where we see operating together aspects of both two lind
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three-dimensional power: particularly, in the arenas of the
B.A.A.C.C. group, Monitoring Meetings and the Atlantic
Planners Conference. Sillilarly, poyer relations in the
household - relations originating in a capitalist-patriarchal
social structure - led women to adopt a subordinatE'! status in
which they accepted as legitimate their inferior position as
if it was somehoW' inherent in their gender.
'fhe last section of this chapter illustrates hoW' fishers
themselves came to understand HHDC's control and to recogni~e
that the previous consensus W'as manipUlated. If ""e can draw
some general conclusions, they must be that the silence of
fishers should not be understood as consent about their
condition or inherent within their social or cultural circum-
stances. For if we look more closely, discontent is indeed
present, but it continues, for the time being at least, to lay
festering where it remains contained.
1.7
Chapter 6
'We must have been some soft'
Conclusion and Summary
Close to a decade ago Doug House, .:l zooia1 sciontizt i~i th
expertise in the area of the petroleum industry, wrote tll.lt.
offshore oil and gas "promises to bring <l new and weJcome
affluence to Newfoundland" (House, 1985: 1). lie cl.limod tlhlt
dev:;!.J.opmel,t of the offshore resour.ce would stimulate the
,=:conolr.Y, while reducing unemployment and umlercmploymcnt, ,1nd
curb the out-migration rate of the province's youth. rt h;,s
been more than two years since onshore development first b('(J,111
in Great Mosquito Cove: yet, House's accl"mittion or oil
development has had little significance in the rur,11 GJtport:::
of Trinity-Placentia Bay. To be sure, much hCls happened Ginc.:e
HMDC first arrived, back in the Fall of 1990; many hopes fOI"
a brighter future have been destroyed <lncl people's drcL,m::; of
prosperity have now dwindled. The excitement that many loc.:iJ J
rG!sidents once shared has since been replaced with fr.ustration
and much disappointment. Some residents have, more recent Jy.
e:xpressed a desire to see the project leave the region as it
is a constant reminder and tnrment of unfulfilled promises.
"If Hibernia left I'd feel rel.ieved,n commented one of. the
local mayors. "I~ it's not there you don't expect nothin(J ...
There are so many people depressed and tormented abolJt this
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that it's sickening." Fishers, too, now feel a certain
animosity toward the company as they were, in their opinion,
"treated wrong" by the industry. "1 wish the Christ they never
came out here ... "
The experiences of fishing men and women in Trinity Bay
ilnd their encounter with the oil industry have added s1gnifi-
c<lntly to our present understanding of hydrocarbon develop-
ment. Mare specifically, some of the areas of weakness in the
literilture - evidenced by its failure to account for and
c>.:plain theoretically the experience5 of those involved in the
f j shery, in particu lar the exper iences of Women in the
processing sector - have been addressed. For the most part,
the boomtown research coming from the U.S. has relied heavily
on quantitative data where social scientists drew, almost
e>.:clusively, upon the social disruption thesis. The literature
from the North Sea, on the othor hand, while it focused on how
the two sectors (fishery and oil) co-existed, did so in such
a way that it failed to account for why the interaction took
the form that it did. Closer to home, Canadian stUdies in
general, and regional studies in partiCUlar, have been varied;
data have either been descriptive in nature and quantitatively
measured or dependent upon marx ian interpretations where
theories of development and underdevelopment predominate.
This present work, in contrast, has attempted to explain
the social relationship between fishers and the oil industry,
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by detailing why the pattern took the particular structure
that it did. On a much broader level, ho....ever, this reseilt-ch
has sought to ans....er the question: in Wh'lt ways <lnd to Wh.lt
extent are social actors constrained to <lct and think in the
ways they do. This research has been essentially <l :>tmly in
the exercise of power where it examines the conditions unde-l'
which social inequal i ty ....as mainta ined. More sped f lcall y, 1t
has investigated how a multi-national oil corporation negoti-
ated with local residents in such a way th<lt the interests oC
fishing m(>n and women in pr(>serving their culture and W<lY of
life were effectively masked by the industry, l have 'lrgllcd
that the relationship between the oil and fishing sC'ctors
encompasses an underlying power structure. Empirical cviclcncc
supports the argument that the consensus of fishers .:lnel pli'lnt
labourers is neither intrinsic in their culture nor in theil-
condition, but rather stems from the effective wieidilllj oC
power, particularly evidenced in the two and three-dimensional
views. The Data, moreover, show how corporate powcr success-
fully managed to shape itself, bringing about its own lcg i t-
imacy.
"Power is the capacity to decide, to act with discretion"
(Ottenheimer and Sinclair, 1993: 25) and to have access to
necessary resources that can be exercised when nac~~ssary in
order to secure that discretionary power. IIMDC did, in fact,
use discretionary power, in addition to financial resources
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and skilled personnel to help bring about its desired objec-
tives. To the extent that HMDC did provide some monetary
compensation to the fishers engaged in harvesting in Bull Arm.
the amount was mj nima 1 by compar ison to the total cost of
onshore construction. Invariably, the power held by HMDC far
outweighed the power of locdl men and women. At the time of
....dting this thesis, little has changed for the inshore
fishers and plant labourers situated along the bay of Bull Arm
as they cont~nue to live without compensation of some form and
rama in depr ived of traditional fishing grounds.
Although the choices fishers and plant labourers made
seem to contradict their stated interests, there was no
outcry, no voiced opposition to the injustice occurring in
Trinity Bay. As onshore development began, there was quietly
taking place the structuring of inequalities that was later to
have a significant impact upon the lives of fishers and plant
labourers dependent upon sea resources in Bull Arm. In other
words, their wants and needs became a product of a system that
twisted and reshaped their 'real' interests.
Under what conditions and against what obstacles did
fishers enter wilfully into a contractual arrangement with
HMDC? In answering this question, I have relied upon the
perspectives advanced by B..:chrach and Barartz (1970) and Lukes
(197<1) to explain qaiescence through the perspectives of both
two and three-dimensional power. To understand fully the
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conditions .lnder which fishers' perceptions were camoufl~ged,
an examination of the community political arena was llndcr-
taken. It was revealed that the forum, in fact, contributed to
quiescence by blocking ::.:ertain key issues from ever reachinlJ
the agenda. For Bachrach and Baratz (two-dimcn(;ion'lt view),
power is exercised not only over people within the decision-
making process, but also, more significantly, by restrictillfJ
various kinds of issues and participants illtoqethcr.
The three partied forum in place, in other worels, hillJ .:Ill
agenda which ~uppressed certain issues and promoted otl1cr~.
For example, 'specific' issues as in local employment ilnd
business opportuni t les predominated in this a rena, wll i le athel:
'collective' issues were squashed as evidenced in the sup-
pression of fishery matters and environmental concern::;. 11::;
certain issues came to dominate the agenda, they rei n(orced
the appearance of other similar kinds of issues. 1'ho end
result made visible a community agenda that did not comprisc
a random sample of both kinds of political concerns.
If we look more closely, however, we can Sf:lC other more
subtle forms of manipulation taking place. In particular, thc
fishery consultant hired by HMDC to negotiate iI compensiltion
package with fishers did so in such a W<.ly as to discour.Jqe
them from raising issues with the B.A.A.C.C. group. In fact,
few fishers during this early period were informed of the
e:dstence of the committee to manage their interests, which
202
illustrates the extent to which information was controlled
throughout early r,egotiations. Meanwhile, within the community
political arena itself, HMDC and the main contractor for the
GBS were busy making rather generous donations to the B.A.A.-
C.C. group, thus allowing issues surrounding the fishery to
rem",in unspoken within the community political arena. Probably
the most significant issue left concealed throughout this
process was the plight of fish plant workers. Women comprise
the majority of labourers in Chance Cove's fish plant and for
many they are the spouses of male fishers from the Cove. I"h.i.le
they, too, felt that onshore development would disrupt plant
operations, their interests were left unconsidered by the oil
industry, the B.A.A.C.C. group and fishers themselves.
In this analysis I have rejected the pluralist argument
by suggesting that the political system is, in fact, impen-
etrable. Fishers and plant labourers did lwt, to be sure, find
a spokesperson in the political arena. 'iet, to claim that
fishers acceptance of the compensation arrangement indicates
some form of consensus is unsatisfactory and dismisses one of
the most insidious uses of power; that is, the power to shape
people' 5 understanding of issues so that they are prevented
from being cognizant of any recognizable grievance. Empirical
evidence, thus, revealed five key areas where three-dimension-
al power could be seen operating.
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Crucial to the oil industry's securing and maintaining
power was the setting in which negotiations between the two
sectors took place (making visible the structuring of power
and powerlessness which not only disguised fishers I percep-
tions, but also helped shape HMDC's own legitimacy). Pishet:s,
from the beginning, were ignorant of much of the COl t: 1Y
planning phase for onshore development. This lack o[ knowledge
increased their vulnerability and dependence, if only fot:
information, on the oil company. Fishers' subordinate st,'ltus,
moreover, allowed HMDC to structure the negotiations by
setting the ugenda, which excluded fishers' long-term inter-
ests and plant workers' grievances. Alternati ve ly, the
negotiation process focused around compensation ilnd financial
arrangements; in other words, it masked fishers' long-term
interests with short-term economic gain.
A central part of HI1DC' s structuring of the negotiation
process was to divide the inshore fishers according to their
residential community. Although this is by no means a new
strategy, it is one that continues to be effective as fishers
all along Bull Arm began to distrust other naighbouring
fishing crews. By dividing fishers, the flow of information
between equally powerless groups of fishers in nearby settle-
ments was consequently blocked, which prevented any attempt,
on their part, to organize COllectively. Local residents, and
fishers in particular, wilfully accepted HMDC' s ·.strategy
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they had come to trust the oil company whose actions they saw
as legitimate. The many promises of employment and prosperity,
coupled with the company's increasing visibility in individual
communities, played an essential part in shaping and distort-
ing fishers' percept ions. Fishers spoke of how company
officials would visit their communities where they not only
participated in rural life, but would also make large dona-
tions to various groups and in some cases engaged in individ-
ua 1 gift giving.
Linguistic symbols, too, became an essential part in
shaping rishers' perceptions; HMDC representatives would use
a particular vocabulary (including co-existence, spin-ofts and
good faith to name but a fe.w of the terms) to describe the
relationship between the two sectors. Although these terms do
not in themselves imply some form of cultural invasion, we
cannot view them as simply words When fishers t:hemselves began
to adopt them to describe their experience with the oil
industry. These terms, I might add, were not originally a part
of fishers' linguistic culture, yet they were significant,
nonetheless, in helping to mold their consciousness.
In addition to the more direct methods employed by HMDC,
there exists an indirect means by which power alters political
conceptions. It can be viewed as a three-dimensional effect,
which stems from the powerlessness experienced in the other
dimensions: in other words; a relationship where a continued
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interaction between the elite and the sUbordinate results in
a sense of increased vulnerability of the latter. This
indirect mechanism of power's third dimension essentially
entailed fishers' adaptation to a state of being witho\ t power
so that a developed sense of powerlessness emerged. 'This
manifested itself as apathy or fatalism and consequently
hindered fishers' efforts to act collectively or to engage in
some form of inquiry. Dialogue between people or groups C<lnnot
take place in a milieu where hopelessness exists; if people
expect little from their efforts, their struggle will be
bureaucratic and insincere, wearisome and without effect
(Freire, 1970).
These early negotiations between fishers and IlMDC
officials set the pattern for any fur.ther interaction anI.!
debate that was to take place at a later time. Whether
intentional or not, the outcome of the company's actions was
the same, that is, to change the consciousness of fishers and
not the situation which dominated and exploited them. As
fishers were manipUlated into adapting to their situation, the
more easily could they be controlled. For this kind of
cultu.:.:.tl invasion to succeed, those invaded must believe, ilS
they did, in their own intrinsic subordination where they
accept a rather static view of the social world. In spite of
the many inequities brought about by onshore development,
there appeared in a rather brief period of time a consensus
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among fishers to accept the industrial inequalities. I have
argued, however, that the basis of consensus was not some form
of choice, but r~ther an exercise of power by HMDC to obtain
it. Power not only shaped fishers I choices; it also allowed
them to believe that a choice was, in fact, made.
That fishers accepted the terms and conditions set out in
their contract with HMDC, an arrangement that neither con-
sidered nor protected their long-term interests, provides
evidence to support tne claim being made. The secrecy sur-
rounding the negotiation process, as well as the damaging
contents in the agreement, allowed HMDC to protect its own
interests, while managing to suppress any overt conflict. Over
time, fishers' lack of action or participation reinforced
their acceptance of the role of non-challenge, which, in turn,
demanded 11ttle action on the part of the powerholder to
maintain. The result is that fishers failed to obtain the
skills and resources necessary for some form 'of political
action. Once HHDC had successfully managed to shape its own
legitimacy by conditioning fishers into compliance, so to
speak, sustaining their own superior position was not diffi-
cult.
The shaping of consensus meant that HMDC' s actions would
go unchallenged. As onshore development proceeded, fishers
neither questioned the oil. cOmpany's practices nor objected to
the passive role inflicted on them. Their silence or acquies-
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cenee persisted throughout the spring and summ<ilr of 1991 in
spite of the many inequalities, in particular, the environ-
mental impacts which devastated much of the natural habitat
around the Cove seemed to no longer instigate dispute. ('rtlCSC
issues were, at one time, of fundamental importance for
fishers in maintaining and protecting their way of life.)
More coercive means, aspects of two-dimensiona I power,
.....ere also used to secure compliance among fishers as well as
members of the B.A.A.C.C. group. On the rare occasion when
l"cal residents would probe further for inforlOlation, t:hc USE!
of threats reinforced HMDC's power position. 'let, it W,'5 not
the company's actual use of coercion that reinforced acquies-
cence among fishers or other local residents, but the constant
threat that it might be used. In addition to the use of
threats and sanctions to contain conflict, other aspects of
two-dimensional power continued to operate as the anchor-a
phase developed. In particular, pUblic forums ranging from the
B.A.A.C.C. group and Monitoring Meetings to the Atl<lntic
Planners conference pertaining to onshore activity continued
to discuss and debate issues in a rather specific manner.
stated differently, barriers to participation continued to
exist for subordinate groups where their gr ievances were never
voiced or opposition raised. Routines of non-challenge,
demonstrated by fishers' lack of participation over time
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within the decision making anma, allowed power to be wielded
more easily over the agenda itself.
I have argued that what appeared to be fishers' ignorance
or acquiescence was, in fact, a result of the social, economic
and political domination of which they were victims. Instead
of being encouraged to know and understand their reality,
fishers were directly and indirectly submerged in a situation
where critical reflection and response were all but imposs-
ible. By distorting and controlling the flow of information
HMDC managed to restrict and contain fishers' own limited
knowledge. These restrictions, moreover, prevented fishers
from dcting, either from engaging in some form of inquiry with
other subordinates about their particular situation, or frOm
establishing co-operative interactions with neighbouring crews
where their ability to organize collectively might potentially
have been strengthened.
1\s the analysis indicates, HMDC was able to- achieve this
objective in a number of ways. For example, fishers were
divided by residential community during the negotiation period
where any discussion or debate remained, for the most part,
undisclosed. Fishers, too, spoke of how they were not per-
mitted to speak freely about the compensation program in place
and pointed to section 8.0 of their contracts which prevented
them from dealing with any so called 'pUblic relations'
matters. The non-disclosure of fiShery related issues was
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particularly evident in the community organization of the
B.A.A. C.C group where certain information was slv\ped into the
communication channel, while other information waS' shaped out.
Perhaps the most visible indication of the neglect toward
fishery issues was noted in the B.A.A.C.C. newsletter which
failed to contain any reference, criticism or grievance of
fishers and plant labourers in the region - illustrating pOWell:'
in the third dimension. Similar patterns were also noted in
the Monitoring Meetings and at the local planners conference
where the actual distorting and misconstruing of facts was
observed. The means by which HMDC set limits upon local
fishers l knowledge and restrictions upon their ability to
acquire information was, therefore, a useful and effective
resource in furthering their subordination.
Wh<;lreas the 'real t interests of fishers were being
twisted and disguised in some way by HMDC officials, plant
labourers' interests were undoubtedly thought of as insignifi-
cant because they remained dismissed and unaccounted for. The
fish plant workers, while unaware of their interests as women
subordinated to men, were cognizant, nonetheless, of their
interests as plant workers, yet remained powerless to act on
those interests. In this particular case, second and third
dimensional power were operating simUltaneously. I have
suggested that power relations in the household, resulting
from capitalist-patriarchal social relations, provide some
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explaflation for women's silence; women, in particular plant
workers, sa.... their sUbordinate status as legitimate and
somp-how intrinsic in their gender.
The central argument in this work focuses around how
social inequality was maintained. Examination of this sUbject
n,att.er explored more precisely how po....er relations were shaped
and sub$equently maintained over time. 'let more salient was
analysis Which focused on specific time periods when events
relevant to the shaping of power were discussed. For example,
in the first time period between September, 1990 and March,
1991, we see how power relations were first established in
Trinity Bay, whereas the periods which followed (March, 1991
to February, 1992 and February, 1992 to March, 1993), illus-
trated how prevailing patterns were maintained in the region
until Gulf oil pUlled out of the Hibernia project, thereby
causing the field of power to change. As Gaventa illustrates
in his concluding argument, one cannot understand" SUfficiently
power relationShips within a community "simplY by observation
at a given point in time" (Gaventa, 1980: 256). For these
relationships are constantly being shaped and reworked where
social power is seen to be both enduring and, at times,
contested.
Much of the supporting evidence I provide for explaining
fishers' and plant labourers' perceptions, argued as products
of both two and three-dimensional power, derives from more
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recent data where fishers' and pli:lnt labrJurers' reflect back
over their experiences and interactions with HNDC. In other
words, when Gulf oil pulled out of the project, the field of
power altered significantly; and fishers, for the f.irst time,
came to see how their interests were left unprotected by the
oil company.
In this concluding section, I shall try to place some of
the issues discussed earlier in this thesis in the context of
an overall analysis of the current probpects for a social
theory on power relaticlns. This thesis has pointed to ,1 nllmber
of limitations found within two and three-dimensional power
and at this juncture I will take up these issues in more
detail. As I have argued previously in chapter one, the two-
dimensional view of power comprises a significr,nt improvement
over the pluralist or one-dimensional view; it brings into the
analysis consideration and questions of control over the
political agenda and how certain issues are consequently
prevented from entering into the political process. While this
is a major advance in our understanding of the conditions that
effectively block and constrain the social actor from finding
representation in the political arena, it is, noneth~less,
deficient in several ways. For example, this view of power
restrains the analysis of the various arenas of str·uggle by
simplifying the conditions in which such struggles or con-
flicts take place. Moreover, the two-dimensional vie·.... implies
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that once the barriers or obstacles to the political arena are
removed, politically invisible actors will no longer be
excluded frolll the process, but rather they will participate
equally where their grievances are both recognized and
articulated. On purely theoretically ground, this view of
power seelllS to hold merit; on a more practical or applied
basis, however, it is weak and subject to much criticism.
Within the context of the harvesting sector, fishery issues
did eventually reach the community political agenda; yet
fishers' efforts to participate continued to be constrained
and shaped by the powerholder. Their participation in the
community political arena neither brought an end to the
inequality in Great Mosquito Cove nor to the reinstating of
their contracts.
\~hereas two-dillensional power conc,mtrates on the
comllunity political arena as the site in which struggles take
place, the three-dimensional view takes a much broader focus
where it addresses other 'social forces' and 'social arrange-
ments.· More to the point, three-dimensional power examines
the perceptions the subordinate hold about potential conflict,
and links those perceptions to power processes. Theorists who
support the thref.<-dimensional view often point to the limita-
tions found within the second dimensional approach and suggest
that we can explain these deficiencies through a radical view,
more specifically, the perspective espoused by steven Lukes
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(1974). In its allied form, however, it too falls short in
explaining the actions, choices Dnd preferences of the social
actor. Although I have alluded to this previously in chapter
four, it is worth reiterating.
To conceptualize power from the position of 'power over'
or an exercise in po",er is to dodge the critical issue of
power resources. The realization of any act of power, so to
speak, demands access to key or antecedent resources. "As one
needs capital to make capital," wrote Parenti, "one need:::
power to use power" (Parenti, 1970: 527). Three-dimensional
power, however, fails to engage rigorously with this argument.
Alternatively, it explains why actors make the choices they
do, choices which may not reflect their interests, as a result
of the elites I ability to shape their very wants and prefer-
ences so that they, in fact, think a choice was made. But does
this perspective actually go far enough to help explain what
is currently taking place in Trinity Bay? As fishers became
cognizant of their subordinate position one would intuitively
expect to find some form of struggle or conflict. Yet, the
contention fishers expressed did not translate into or serve
as an impetus for them to organize or act collectively. Lukes'
radical view of power, moreover, does not lend itself to a
discussion that extends beyond the three-dimensional approach
to ask why fishers did not attempt some form of collective
action.
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For the fishers of Trinity Bay, the situation more
closely resembles one of "cumulative inequalities" (Parenti,
1970: 527). If fishers, and plant labourers too for that
matter, had the material resources to act differently, they
would not have been in the subordinate position to begin with
and they would have less need to organize against grievances.
Future developments in the theory of social power, however,
could benefit from an analysis Which considers in more depth
the question of power resources and the conditions under which
subordinate groups effectively organize. Korpi's argument that
we must proceed by understanding first the bases of social
power, rather than the exercise of power, may be a useful
starting point for future theoretical analysis (Korpi, 1985:
31) •
This thesis is essentially a study of power relation-
ships. While I map out the conditions under Which power
relations exist, and examine how they are patterned and
maintained, the research only lightly touches the surface of
what requires further empirical and theoretical investigation.
Future inquiry needs to focus around questions connecting the
social movement literature more closely to the stUdy of power.
Given the power relationships that have been found, how does
protest emerge? What is the impetus for some form of praxis -
def incd as tho process of cr.~.tical reflection and action? Why
did the growing unrest among fishers remain latent? Did the
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social policies in place affect men and womcm differently? t\nd
does this then suggest that the conditions for change or some
form of collective action are the same .fOI: men and women? If
not t why are they different, how are they different? In whilt
arenas, then, do we see women participating?
While this study did not inquire system<itically into the
relationship between participation and consciousness, such
analysis would add substantially to our present understanding.
What shapes political consciousness or one's participation,
and how are consciousness and participation intet'reliltcd? E.V0.11
as fishers became more critical of the actions of HMDC when
the silence, so to speak, was broken, fishers' d('mands and
efforts to redress the issues continued to be poorly articu-
lated and only partially developed. How do we explilin this
phenomena?
More specifically, future reseat'ch would benefit from a
social history of fishers and plant labourers where one could
show how historically patterns of power <lnd dominance have
helped shape the apparent 'consensus' of today. This would
help shed light on fishers' past experiences and Whether their
present circumstance is the result of 'choice' or whether it
has been shaped by power relations. While the present work
provides an initial attempt to understand relationships of
90wer, it would undoubtedly benefit from comparative research,
particularly with communities, like those found in the North
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Sea, that share similar experiences. In Illany of these rural
societies women do not actively participate in fish harvest-
ing. They do, however, cluster around fish processing, an area
of study that has been neglected. Womens' experiences with
onshore development, more generally, have been absent in much
of the oil literature. Consequently, we know little about how
they part icipate in this industry, or conversely, about the
bilrriers and obstacles that block their effective participa-
tion.
In conclusion, it might be useful to comment briefly
about the bearing of the ideas brought forth in this thesis
upon discussions over agency and structure. This thesis has
shown the constraints and limitations placed upon the social
actor as he or she attempts to make choices about various
courses of action. The social world can only be understood
properly as a dialectic of agency and structure. From the view
advanced by Lukes (1977), this dialectic is comprehended as
"as a web of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both
active and structured, to make choices and pursue strategies
within given limits ... " (Lukes, 1977: 29). An analysis which
focuses solely on a one-sided argument of actors without
structural constraints or power structures without agents, or
fails to consider how they are entwined, is unsatisfactory and
neglects to engage in a full systematic account of how social
life is reproduced and transformed. In sum, a social theory
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that fails to m.... intain an ever present dialectic of agency ;'\nd




1963 Federal Government issues exploration permits for the
waters off the east coast of Canada. By 1965, 100 million
acres were granted for exploration.
1965 Mobil oil is granted an exploration permit.
The provincial government, under the liberal leadership
of J .R. Smallwood, passed the Petroleum and Natural Gas
lI.ct. Beneath the £lea surface, a iJlaque is placed claiming
offshore jurisdiction for the province of Newfoundland.
1967 Supreme court of Canada rules that British Columbia does
not own sub-sea resources off its coast.
1973 'fhe Offshore Petroleum Industrial Advisory Council is
established by former Premier Frank Moores. The responsi-
bility of the council is to investigate the requirements
and consequences of offshore oil development. By the mid
19705, however, the council had become inactive due to
the decline in exploration activity.
1977 The provincial government passes the Act Respecting
Pet::-oleum and Natural Gas which not only outlines
policies pertaining to petroleum development but also
establishes provincial claim to the offshore.
The provincial government establishes new crown corpor-
ation, Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Ltd. The
corporation is responsible for managing offshore areas
which the provincial government claims to be the property
of the province.
1978 Renewal permits issued to Mobil, Gulf and Petro-Canada.
1979 The Hibernia P-15 discovery well is drilled offshore
Newfoundland.
Prime Minister J. Clark makes assurances that offshore
resources off Newfoundland will be treated as if they
were on land.
1980 The Newfoundland and Labrador Environmental Assessment
Act is passed in the House of Assembly.
The provincial government sets up the Offshore Petroleum
Impact Committee which includes five sub-committees:
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education and training; fisheries and environment; social
and cultural; and financial impact.
January The Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Directorate is
set up by the Newfoundland government and reports
directly to the Minister of Mines and Energy. The
responsibility of the Directorate was to ensura that tha
principles of the Act Respecting Petroleum and Natural
Gas were implemented.
March The Hibernia Development Project is referred to FEARO by
the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.
July FEARO issues Mobil ....ith specific guidelines for the
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement.
1981
December The federal government passes legislation, bill C-'IB,
which specified a national energy policy. Most important-
ly, however, it stated the federal government's ownership
of offshore resources.
1982
February Ocean Ranger, a semisubmersible drill rig, capsizes and
sinks.
April The EIS is drafted by Mobil for the Hibernia Development
project.
May ownership of the offshore resource found off NeWfound
land is referr"!d to the Supreme Court of
Canada by Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau.
October Both the federal and provincial governments agree to
refer the ownership issue of the offshore to the courts.
1983
February The Newfoundland Supreme Court Appeal Division rules
against Newfoundland's ownership claim. The Supreme Court
of Canada agrees to hear the federal claim.
August Update of EIS is undertaken by Mobil.
1984
March The Supreme court of Canada rules that the subseil
resources found off the coast of Newfoundland and
Labrador belongs to Canada.
1985







A joint federal-provincial panel, Hibernia Environmental
Assessment Panel, is set up to review the Hibernia
Development project.
Mobil submits to HEAP the Environmental Impact Statement
tor the Hibernill: Development Project. HEAP is to oversee
a public review of the Hibernia Development Project EIS.
HEAP holds twelve pUblic information sessions held around
the province.
Mobil sublllits updated EIS to HEAP outlining the preferred
mode of development in addition to highlighting the
aspects which dit'fered from the first Ers released.
HEAP requested additional information on matters ranging
from work camps to sea bed stability. Both federal and
provincial government departments were also asked to
respond to issues pertaining to their responsibilities.
September Mobil submits a Supplementary Information volume of the
EIS.
October Public hearings held which included 66 oral and 90
written submissions.
CNOBP declares the Hibernia oil f iald to be a :iignif icant
discovery.
December HEAP presents its report to the government wi+:.h 50
reconunendations. The panel identified numerous ways in
which economic benefits would increase and environmental
disruptions and social impacts be kept to a minimum.
1986
January The Hibernia onshore project is exempt from an EIS
procedure. In its place, an Environmental Protection Plan
of the first 180 days of activity is implemented.
February The provincial Justice Minister reactivates the Offshore
Petroleum hlpact committee/social and Cultural committee.
March The Hibernia Construction Sites Environmental Management
Committee (HCSEMC) is set up by the provincial govern-
ment.
June (Decision 86:01) The Capada-Newfoundland Offshore
Petroleum Board approves both the Hibernia Development
PI<!ln tlnd the Hibernia Benefits Plan SUbject to a number
of conditions.
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August The departments of Health and Social Services and the
Community Services council all prepare proposals for oil
impact monl toring.
The Offshore Fund Resource Policy Committee/Cabinet
Secretariat accepts six different proposals for a
Placentia Bay impact monitoring system.
1987
May Ot'fshore Development Fund/Social and Cultural oil Impilct
Committee commissions a study to develop parameters
necessary to assess oil impact monitoring.
1988
June Both the federal government and the provincial govQrnment
sign the Hibernia Agreement.
Offshore Petroleum Impact Committee is officially
terminated.
HCSEMC is restructured to become the province'S 'sinyle
window' and impact monitoring agency. ~Ioreover, only
government officials can sit on the committee. ROIMA' s
{Rural Oil Impact Monitoring AgencYi legitimacy <l~








The Statement of Principles is signed by both government
and industry.
HCSEMC begins to formulate the criteria for assembling an
EPP for the Placentia Bay, Adam's Head area.
Mobil and the ROlMA group negotiate to provide funds for
fisheries impact research,
GBS bidders complete EPP's for the Adam's Head site.
HCSEMC Technical working Group reviews all the EPP's
completed by each GBS bidder.
September Mobil announces that the site for onshore development has
changed from Adam's Head, Placentia Bay to Great Mosquito
Cove, Bull Arm, Trinity Bay.
1990
January The CNOPB declares the Hibernia field to be a commercial
discovery.
February The two bidder.s for the GBS prepare EPP1s for the Great
Mosquito Cove site in Trinity Bay.
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A 25 year production licence is issued to the Hibernia
consortium by CNOPB.
June The Offshore Development Act is pllssed in the House or
Assembly.
August The CNOPB gives a conditional approval to the oil
consortiums Development Plan update.
September The Hibernia Agreement is signed. Nelolfoundland Offshore
Development Corporation (NODECO) receive the contract to
build the GBS.
Fishers begin negotiations with HMOC.
The consortium of oil companies (Chevron, Gulf, Petro-
Canada and Mobil) involved in dQveloping the Hibernia
f leld form the Hibernia Management Development Company
(HMOC). HMOC assumes responsibilit}' ror the construction
and operation of the Hibernia oil rield.
October The construction of the road from the Trans Canada
Highway to Great Mosquito Cove is started by McNamara
Constructions.
Bill C-44, The Hibernia project Act, receives its third
and final reading in tho Senate.
Fall The ROII1A group is officially dissolved and the Bull Arll
Coordinating COllllllittee CBMCC) is formed. BAA-Ce's mandate
is to represent the impact area around issues relating to
the fishery, business opportunities and employment.
December A rough road is completed to Great Mosquito Cove.
Additional ....ork will be completed in the Spring of 1991.
Dredging of the Cove is under way.
A preliminary agreement is reached between fishers of
Trinity Day and HMOC.
1991
spring Marine construction a.ctivity begins in Great Mosquito
Cove. The exclusion zone and safety area in Bull Arm is
now in place.
August The Bull Arm construction site is completed.
1992
February Gulf announces that it is withdrawing from the Hibernia
project.
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Work slow down takes place at the construction site and
is followed by numerous layoffs.
HMDC suspend fishers' compensation proqram.
The provincial government agrees to fund the Hibernia
project for six months until a new partner could be
found.
1993
January Murphy Oil from El Dorado, Arkansas and the federal
government agree to invest in the Hibernia project. Both
Chevron and Mobil invest as well an additional five
percent. The new consortium consists of the following:
Chevron, Petro-Canada, Mobil, Murphy Oil, the feder"l
government.
May The first concrete was pour.ed for the GBS in a high! y
pUblicised event at the Bull Arm site.
Local residents protest outside of the Bull Arm construc-
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